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A HISTORY OF TERRORISM

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Despite the appearance of terrorist violence at various times in the distant past, modern terrorism is widely believed to have begun during the last third of the 19th century. Since that era, terrorist activity appears to have come in a succession of 'waves' (Rapoport, 2004). One question well worth posing is whether or not today's Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL) and related bands bear sufficient similarity to, say, the anti-Czarist Russian revolutionaries of the 1880s to warrant their being placed under the same label?

Some scepticism seems warranted. Many of those who fought to bring down the Russian autocracy did so in the name of social democratic rule or, at a minimum, giving the people a voice in government. On the other hand, ISIS and the contemporary jihadi groups regard democracy as a heresy, an attempt to replace God's rule by secular control. There is also the matter of targeting.

Certainly in the Russian case, aspiring terrorists often agonized over whether they should in good conscience kill members of a high official's family if he became vulnerable to a bomb attack while out in public. As Albert Camus put it, 'at the same time these doers of deeds, who so completely put their lives at risk, would involve the lives of others only with the greatest fastidiousness of conscience' (quoted by Ternon, 2007, p. 161). Do these would-be assassins of grand dukes, princes and other lofty figures belong to the same family as today's suicide bombers and specialists in the decapitation of helpless captives? Today's terrorists are willing to kill large numbers, the more the better, of civilians without regard to their ages and origins. To repeat the question, are we really dealing with the same phenomenon?

Our answer must be 'yes'. In both the 1880s and our time, terrorism involves the extraordinary use of violence directed against civilian or non-combatant targets for purposes of making 'propaganda by deed' and engaging in a type of coercive diplomacy – aimed at compelling governments and other institutions to do what the terrorists want them to do. Intent trumps scale.

Now we should consider the events and problems confronting the world from say, 1875 to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Terrorism analysts recognize the serious difficulties involved in identifying the 'causes' of terrorism. At the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, terrorism typically involved attacks carried out by single individuals or commonly small groups of individuals operating on a clandestine basis. Does it make sense to employ the macro-measures available through large N aggregates of information in order to explain

the behaviour of tiny groups or single assassins, to explain bomb throwing, or why single 'lone wolves' turned to terrorism rather than other types of political expression (see Crenshaw, 2011)?

There are a number of background conditions without which 'the Age of Attentats' (i.e., the last third of the 19th century) would have been unlikely. Since the French Revolution, young radicals throughout Europe had dreamed of duplicating its achievements. What were the ingredients that would combine to make such a revolution possible? Revolutions in support of popular rule had been attempted and failed in 1848. In 1870, in the wake of the Franco/Prussian war, Parisians had taken to the streets to prevent the return of authoritarian rule and had been violently crushed by the French military. For many would-be revolutionaries it seemed as if the era had passed when a professional military could be defeated by popular mobs storming public buildings (e.g. Bilington, 1980).

It was also during this period that trade unions began their struggles on behalf of workers' rights. Their employers and government officials to whom they were usually responsive opposed these struggles. Agitation and protest were often met by violence and repression.

The experience of Russia

Imperial Russia seemed to be a special case, at least in comparison to the Western world. There had been few reforms aimed at liberalizing the government system and containing the powers of government. The country's enormous peasantry had only been freed from slave-like conditions in the 1860s. The Czars were defined as instruments of God's will. Industrial development was at its earliest stages.

It was during this period that the Russian intelligentsia gave rise to a group of writers who voiced support for revolutionary violence and the application of terrorism. "The concept of systematic terrorism and its use in revolutionary strategy first appeared between 1869 and 1881 in the writings of the Russian revolutionaries" (Laqueur, 2004, p. 51). Sergey Nechaev's 'Catechism of the Revolutionary' became the most widely discussed of these statements. This 'catechism' called for the 24-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week revolutionary, someone willing to abandon his personal life in exchange for an all-consuming commitment to revolutionary violence.

Nikolai Morozov and G. Tarnovski were two followers of Nechaev who published books in 1880 (from exile) calling for the use of terrorism as a means to topple the Russian autocracy. Morozov and Tarnovski were both members of the People's Will (Narodnaya Volya), Russia's first clandestine group committed to terrorism. Many of its youthful members had become disillusioned with the revolutionary potential of Russia's peasants when a campaign to 'go to the people' (under the label Land and Liberty) failed to win many converts to the cause.

In the wake of this setback, the People's Will central committee considered options and alternatives (1878–79). During these discussions, some members said that the killing of key figures in the autocracy would represent a new form of revolutionary struggle, a more scientific means of winning power. (It's worth noting that Russian university students studying chemistry and other sciences were drawn to the organization.) Instead of mass violence, terrorism represented a means of toppling the regime by selectively killing its most dangerous officials. In addition to this theoretical perspective, the desire for revenge was never far from the surface. If the Russian secret police and other security tortured and killed members of People's Will, they should meet the same fate (Laqueur, 1977).

The scientific aura of this new form of revolutionary struggle was matched by a new scientific achievement: the development of dynamite. Prior to Alfred Nobel's invention of the explosive, would-be assassins had to rely on handguns and fulminate of mercury. Both these means had major disadvantages. Knives and handguns required close proximity to the target,

while fulminate of mercury was unstable, as likely to kill the perpetrator as his intended victim. Dynamite, on the other hand, was a stable compound that could be used at some distance from the intended target.

From the late 1870s forward, the People's Will launched a campaign of terrorist violence, meaning assassinations, against Russian officialdom. This campaign reached its peak with the assassination of Czar Alexander II in 1881. Following his murder, the new Czar's regime staged a widespread crackdown on the People's Will. Not only were five of the six assassins publicly hung, but security forces arrested many of the organization's cadre, sentencing them to long prison sentences and exile in Siberia.

Despite an undercurrent of terrorist activity in the years following the People's Will's project, it was only in the years following the turn of the century that a new and substantial terrorist campaign was launched.[1] In this case, the initiative came from the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRs). Created in 1901 by independent Populist groups of locals and exiles, the SRs formally adopted terrorism (meaning assassination) as part of its programme for bringing an end to czarist rule. As in the case with People's Will, revenge was clearly a motive in some of the SRs killings.

For the most part, the SRs limited itself to the assassination of high-ranking czarist officials in St. Petersburg and Moscow. Its major achievement was the assassination of Grand Duke Sergei, governor general of Moscow (1905), and the Russian interior minister V. Plehve (1904). These acts were carried out by the SRs semi-autonomous Combat Organization, whose membership, as it turned out, included a number of police spies (Geifman, 1993).

After the failed Revolution of 1905, the Czar conceded the people a parliament, or Duma. On the basis of this gesture, the SRs leadership declared an end to its terrorist campaign – since the Russian people now had a voice. This democratic gesture was short-lived. The Czar dissolved the Duma in 1906 and, predictably enough, the SRs resumed their terrorist operations. But this resumed campaign of terror was itself cut short by government repression involving large numbers of arrests and executions. The SRs revolutionary project came to an end in 1907.

This is not to say, however, that Russian terrorism came to an end. Throughout the Russian Empire, independent groups, including Polish, Armenian, Ukrainian and Jewish groups, carried out a large number of attacks all aimed at liberation from the yoke of czarist oppression.

The revolutionary terrorism that emerged over the last decades of the 19th century was hardly confined to the Russian Empire. Nationalism became a potent source for violence. Armenian nationalists (the Armenian Revolutionary Federation) carried out attacks on Ottoman Turkish targets in their desire to achieve national independence. The Ottoman Empire was also the target of terrorist attacks staged by IMRO (Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organization), whose goal was the region's independence from Muslim rule. Indian nationalists also carried out a series of assassinations and assassination attempts in London and Bengal.

But it was the struggle for Irish independence from Britain that won the most attention. In 1882, Lord Cavendish, the newly appointed Governor General, and his secretary were stabbed to death in Dublin by nationalist extremists. These killings were followed by attempted jail breaks and dynamite attacks carried out in England and elsewhere in the Empire. Under the name of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, Irish nationalists in the United States supplied their counterparts with dynamite and other weaponry (Coogan, 2000).

Anarchist terrorism

During the 1890s and for the first two decades of the 20th century, most of the terrorist activity that caught the public's attention was carried out by groups and individuals on behalf of the anarchist ideology of revolutionary anarchism or 'propaganda by deed'. As proposed by such

writers as Mikhail Bakunin, Pyotor Kropotkin, Karl Heinzen, Johann Most, Errico Malatesta and others, anarchism came to represent an alternative framework for social revolution than that proposed by Karl Marx and his disciples.[2]

Space does not permit a full explication of anarchist ideas, but here are at least some of them. States and capitalist enterprises are inherently oppressive institutions and need to be replaced by free associations of workers and peasants. How is this goal to be achieved? Violence in the form of 'propaganda by deed' will be the means for sparking social revolution. The oppressed masses will be inspired to seize power based on the exemplary actions of individuals and anarchist 'circles'. Their targets would be prominent figures, captains of industry, political leaders, religious leaders and royalty representing the prevailing order.

These ideas had particular salience in France, Italy, Spain and, to a certain extent, the United States: situations where existing labour strife and landlord/peasant conflict provided ready-made audiences for propaganda by deed. Accordingly, individual anarchists carried out a long series of widely publicized assassinations during this era of 'Attempts'.

In the 1890s and the decade-and-a-half leading to the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, anarchists killed a long list of prominent figures. Usually motivated by some combination of anarchist ideas about freedom and the desire for revenge against those linked to the repression of strikers seeking improved pay and working conditions, anarchists carried out the assassination of the Spanish Prime Minister, Italian King Umberto, the President of France Carnot, Empress Elizabeth of Austria-Hungary and American President William McKinley. In addition, there were at least two attempts to assassinate the German Kaiser (Hubac-Occhipinti, 2007).

Prominent figures in business were also frequent targets. Often they were targeted by anarchists when they acted to break strikes launched by farm workers, miners and industrial workers. Perhaps the most widely discussed of these events was the 1892 attempt by Alexander Berkman to assassinate Henry Clay Frick, President of the Carnegie Steel Corporation. This gesture was brought on by Carnegie's brutal breaking of a strike by steel workers at the company's Homestead (Pennsylvania) Works.

Anarchist activity in France represents a transition from terrorist attacks on single individuals to attacks carried out on a largely indiscriminate basis. Not that the latter lacked for terrorist attacks on individuals. Illustratively, in March 1892 an anarchist bombed the homes of a trial judge and public prosecutor he held responsible for the beating and torture of other anarchists while they were being held in prison.

In addition to an abundance of such cases, anarchist terrorism in France took on a new aspect, involving the idea of objective or group responsibility for working class oppression. In 1893 Auguste Valliant hurled a bomb on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies. Casualties were limited but Valliant was executed nevertheless. In retaliation, another anarchist, Emile Henry, threw a bomb in a crowded restaurant adjacent to the Gare St. Lazare railway station. Henry's rationale was that all bourgeois were guilty of crimes against the working class. Here we have the idea of objective criminality; if you belong to a category in the population identified with working-class oppression, then you become fair game for terrorist attack (Law, 2004).

As intended, the wave of anarchist terrorism created widespread fear throughout the Western world. The daily mass circulation newspapers, themselves a relatively new phenomenon, sounded the alarm. The press abounded with stories of a vast anarchist conspiracy to tear down civilization. Governments in Europe and North America were quick to enact new legislation against anarchist activity and sought international cooperation to fight this plague. To the extent the anarchists wanted to sow widespread fear to the point of hysteria, they had achieved their objective. On the other hand, none of this terrorist violence incited the masses to revolution, and no governments collapsed as a result of the 'attempts' (Jensen, 2004).

On the other hand, the immediate cause that triggered the outbreak of World War I in the summer of 1914 was the assassination of Franz-Ferdinand, the Archduke of Austria-Hungary, by a Serbian nationalist, a member of the Black Hand, whose aim was his country's independence from Vienna.

Far-right terrorism

To this point in our analysis we have not paid attention to terrorism committed by groups on the far right of the political spectrum. The interwar period (1919–1939) provides an opportunity to compensate for this omission.

We should begin by noting that racist and anti-Semitic ideas became sources of terrorism before the turn of the century. After the Civil War in the United States, the Ku Klux Klan waged a terrorist campaign throughout the South aimed at preventing newly freed slaves from exercising the right to vote and the normal liberties available to U.S. citizens. Nocturnal raids carried out by hooded Klansmen were the organization's stock in trade. In Imperial Russia, the police helped to organize the 'Black Hundred', a loosely linked group of anti-Semites who blamed the country's Jewish population for popular discontent and for fomenting revolution (Laqueur, 1977, p. 16, 37). The Black Hundred gangs specialized in launching pogroms, raiding villages in the Jewish Pale of Settlement, killing and looting as they went along.

It was the two decades between the two world wars that witnessed the full-scale development of terrorism carried out by groups on the far right. And if anything is to blame for far-right terrorism, it was the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia that unintentionally set off this right-wing backlash.

The Russian Revolution, with its threat and promise of worldwide social revolution, scared many throughout Europe and the United States. The advent of fascism in Italy (1922) and Nazism in Germany (1933) were in no small measure the result of popular fears of communism. These worries were not limited to the two right-wing dictatorships. In Eastern Europe especially, small fascist-like paramilitary groups surfaced that combined elements of traditional Catholic religious belief, hatred of Jews (as bearers of the communist infection), and fascist ideas about authoritarian rule (e.g. Sugar, 1971; Carsten, 1967; Feldman and Turda, 2008).

Accordingly, in Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, paramilitary bands grew up committed to preventing the spread of communism, nationalism and the promotion of authoritarian solutions to their countries' problems. The outstanding cases are those of the Hungarian Iron Cross, the Romanian Iron Guard (or Legion of the Archangel Michael) and Yugoslavia's Ustasha movement.

In terms of their violence, these groups typically combined street-corner brawling with various types of terrorism. In the case of Romania, a largely pre-industrial peasant society, followers of the Iron Guard leader Codreanu carried out assassinations and assassination attempts during the 1930s. Members of parliament were frequent targets. The Iron Guard was successful in murdering the country's prime minister in 1938 (Barbu, 1969; Carr, 1964).

In interwar Yugoslavia, the Ustasha was essentially a Croatian nationalist group that sought to achieve independence from the Serb-dominated government in Belgrade. It expressed admiration for Italian fascism and Hitler's regime. Mussolini shared an interest in a Yugoslav breakdown for reasons of a hoped-for Italian expansion into the Balkans. The fascist dictator was not above providing subsidies to Ustasha and offering training to its operatives on Italian soil.

In fact, in 1934 Ustasha operatives managed to assassinate Yugoslav King Alexander, along with the French foreign minister, while he was in Marseilles on a state visit. The event produced worldwide publicity and prompted the League of Nations to draft two international conven-

tions on terrorism. However, World War II broke out before these conventions could be transformed into international law.

The role of terrorism during the War itself is a little beyond the scope of this account. Suffice it to say that assassination and sabotage were carried out with some frequency, often by resistance or partisan groups against Axis targets. The occupying Nazi forces reacted with great brutality, as in the aftermath of the 1942 killing of SS deputy leader, Reinhard Heydrich, in Prague. Hitler responded by having all the adult males in an adjacent village killed and the women and children scattered to other communities. In Florence, Italy, in 1944, anti-fascist resistance fighters assassinated the philosopher and former fascist minister of education, Giovanni Gentile, without any subsequent reprisals.

National/separatist terrorism

In the years following the end of the War, colonies and other possessions of the major European powers, Great Britain and France most notably, sought to achieve national independence. In some cases, this goal was achieved as the result of largely peaceful popular protests, as in Ghana (1957) or India (1947) and the Philippines (1946). In other instances, though, independence had to be won by what came to be known as wars of 'national liberation'. In most cases, these conflicts involved the use of guerrilla tactics in the countryside by national liberation armies or 'fronts'. This was true, for example, in Indonesia (the former Dutch East Indies) and Vietnam (formerly part of French Indo-China) (Laqueur, 1976).

Most of the fighting followed, more or less, the theories of Mao Tse-Tung, China's revolutionary leader, but in some places urban terrorism played a central role in these armed struggles. The National Liberation Front's (FLN) fight against French rule in Algeria (1954–1962) involved the use of terrorist violence against French civilians in the country's major cities and, occasionally, on the French mainland (e.g. Crenshaw, 1978).

In the British Mandate of Palestine, both Jewish and Arab forces carried out terrorist attacks on each other's communities. But in terms of post-war resistance to continued British rule, it was two Zionist groups that took the lead. The Irgun, led by future Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and the so-called Stern Gang (or LEHI – Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) carried out spectacular acts of terrorism against British targets. In 1946 the Irgun detonated a bomb at the King David hotel in Jerusalem, an attack that killed 96 people. Earlier (1944), Stern Gang operatives assassinated Lord Moyne, the British Resident for the whole Middle East, near his headquarters in Cairo (Bowyer Bell, 1977).

There were a number of other places where terrorism played a significant role in these anti-colonial struggles. In Cyprus, a highly urban environment, insurgents under the leadership of Colonel Grivas carried out attacks against British civilians in the major cities, Nicosia in particular. The British abandoned the port of Aden in 1964 following an outbreak of terrorism – so that it then became part of Yemen, or South Yemen.

Elsewhere, terrorism was used with some success by the communist Viet Minh in their largely guerrilla-based conflict with French forces in their struggle to free Vietnam from colonial rule (Karnow, 1983). On the other hand, the British were successful in defeating the communist insurgency in Malaya (1948–1960). The pro-Chinese insurgents in this case, operating under the name of the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), were largely composed of the country's Chinese minority. So that the independence fight became associated almost from its beginning with a widely disliked segment of the Malay population. The MNLA's campaign involved the killing of foreign plantation owners and attacks on English residents of the major cities. Unlike the French in Vietnam, the British military was able to develop a sophisticated

counter-insurgency strategy based on separating MNLA cadres from the Malayan civilian population (Nagl, 2004).

Events occurring in the 1960s stimulated a new wave of terrorism. The key events appear clearly to have been the following: The American involvement in the Vietnam War triggered a massive series of protests throughout the Western world. The United States and its NATO allies were denounced for their effort to maintain an independent South Vietnam, under American domination, at the expense of a vast majority of the Vietnamese people. A serious split occurred between China and the Soviet Union over the future direction of the worldwide communist movement. Mao Tse-Tung accused the Soviet leadership of abandoning the revolutionary cause in favour of peaceful-coexistence with the West. The effect of this dispute was the separation of pro-Chinese elements from the large communist parties and trade unions in Latin America and parts of Western Europe, Italy most conspicuously.

In Latin America, thousands of university students and other young people had been inspired by Castro's Revolution in Cuba (1959). Some sought to replicate his achievements in Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia and elsewhere. These attempts at waging guerrilla warfare were not successful. The 1967 defeat of the legendary Cuban revolutionary leader Che Guevara and his small band of followers in the Bolivian Andes symbolized this failure. For some Latin American revolutionaries these setbacks required a new strategy. The new approach involved the establishment of the 'urban guerrilla'. Latin America's vast cities could serve as the settings for attacks on state institutions, banks and foreign-owned businesses. Cities were also the centres of the mass media. Television coverage, for example, would be far more.

Another important condition that made for a major outbreak of terrorism was the June 1967 Arab/Israeli war. Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and other Palestinian groups had hoped to provoke a war between Israel and the Arab countries surrounding it. Their expectation was that such a war would result in Israel's destruction. The Palestinian struggle groups succeeded in promoting a conflict, with Syria and Egypt taking the lead. But the outcome was not the intended one (Oren, 2002). The aptly named 'Six Day War' produced a striking victory for the Israelis with its armed forces occupying the Sinai Desert (including the Gaza Strip), Syria's Golan Heights and the entire West Bank of the Jordan, including total control of Jerusalem.

In the aftermath of this 'disaster', the various Palestinian groups came together to decide what was to be done. The result was an umbrella organization, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), under which a substantial list of Palestinian groups linked themselves. The PLO's initial goal was to launch a 'People's War' against Israel in the manner of the FLN in Algeria and the Vietcong in South Vietnam.

Another factor that aided in setting off a new wave of terrorism was the civil rights movement. A Republican (largely Catholic) group in Northern Ireland sought to stage peaceful marches in the manner of Martin Luther King's non-violent Civil Rights Movement in the United States. These protests were often met by violence by the province's majority Unionist (Protestant) population, in Belfast and Londonderry especially. So that from 1969 forward a newly revived IRA sought to achieve Northern Ireland's separation from Great Britain using terrorist means.

Ideological terrorism

At first, opposition to America's role in the Vietnam War (1965–1974) took the form of popular protests, ones typically lead by university students on both sides of the Atlantic. These protests became widespread in the United States, France, what was then West Germany and Italy (e.g. Hoffman, 2006; and for a more conspiratorial view, Sterling, 1981).

As these mass movements evolved in the late 1960s, they often developed distinctive ideological appeals. In Italy, for example, the student protests became identified with the extra-parliamentary Left – which meant some combination of Maoism, Trotskyite thinking, and Third World national liberation thought. By the early 1970s, the mass protest movements began to subside. What was left in their place were dozens of small terrorist bands committed to the cause of violent revolution.

The most prominent of these were the Red Brigades and Front Line in Italy, the Red Army Faction and June 2nd movement in West Germany, Action Directe in France and the Weather Underground in the United States. The groups involved specialized in kidnapping, bank robbery and murder of prominent individuals (e.g. a former Italian prime minister). They hoped to ignite a red revolution in the countries in which they conducted their affairs. The more realistic figures in these small groups (the largest, the Red Brigades, numbered no more than a few hundred members at the height of their operations) recognised that to win more than just extravagant publicity, they needed to develop links to Third World organizations in order to inflict real damage on the world's wealthy countries. The prime candidates for these cooperative arrangements were the Palestinians.

Let us recall that after the 1967 fiasco, the PLO had become an umbrella organization for some dozen groups, and that in terms of policy it was committed to a 'People's War' aimed at the liberation of all of Palestine from Zionist control. To that end, PLO groups, operating from bases in Jordan, launched guerrilla attacks on Israeli targets located in the occupied West Bank. With a handful of exceptions, these attacks were not successful. At this point in the history of this protracted conflict, West Bank Palestinians were rarely amenable to having their communities used as PLO guerrilla bases. Furthermore, in September 1970 the Jordanian government expelled the PLO groups from the country. The latter then set up secure bases in Lebanon, most with their headquarters in Beirut.

At this point (1969–1970), a number of the PLO-linked groups turned to terrorism. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestinians (PFLP) and a breakaway faction the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation (PDFLP) began to carry out terrorist attacks on Israeli soil. But the attacks that drew the most attention were the long series of airline skyjackings. On occasion Palestinian skyjackers took over a commercial airliner in mid-flight and demanded the plane be flown to a destination of their choosing. In other instances, terrorists attacked airport waiting rooms and attempted to kill as many passengers as they could manage. Also, with some backing from the Assad regime in Syria, Palestinians planted bombs aboard airliners (e.g. Swiss Air flight bound for Tel Aviv) timed so that they would explode in mid-flight (Ruben, 1994).

By all odds, though, the most spectacular of Palestinian attacks occurred during the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. Some half dozen members of 'Black September' (a unit of Yasser Arafat's Fatah organisation) took hostage 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team within the Athlete's Village. The hostage takers demanded money and the release of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the Israelis' lives. With the whole world watching on television, Black September killed an Israeli on the spot. Then the German government, acting in coordination with the Israeli one, agreed to the prisoner exchange. This agreement was in fact a ruse. When the Palestinians and Israeli athletes reached the Munich airport, they were met by two helicopters parked on the tarmac, there ostensibly to fly the Black September fighters to safety. Instead, German sharpshooters attempted to pick off the Palestinians while freeing the athletes. The results, though, were a disaster. All but one of the Palestinians were killed but, before dying, the terrorists set off bombs that killed all the Israeli Olympians.

The Munich terrorist attack was an exclusively Palestinian enterprise. Other episodes, however, involved collaboration between European revolutionaries (usually German) and the PLO

groups. Along with members of the United Japanese Red Army, the Europeans received terrorist training at PLO bases in Lebanon and what was then the People's Republic of South Yemen. This training bore some fruit in the form of joint terrorist attacks on Israeli and various European and conservative Arab targets. Among the most spectacular of these joint enterprises was the 1976 seizure of OPEC headquarters in Vienna; and, also in 1976, the seizure of an Air France Tel Aviv to Paris flight and its diversion to Entebbe, Kenya, where German guards separated the passengers by religion. Jews were intended to receive 'special treatment'. Then in 1978 there was the diversion of a Lufthansa flight over the Mediterranean to an airport at Mogadishu in Somalia. The largely Arab skyjackers demanded the release of prominent German terrorists in prisons in the Federal Republic.

The attack on OPEC and the kidnapping of the organization's oil minister were successful. Led by the European-educated Vladimir Sanchez (aka 'Carlos the Jackal'), the terrorists were paid a substantial ransom for the hostages' release after a flight to Libya. In contrast, Entebbe and Mogadishu were highly publicized defeats for the terrorists. In both cases, highly trained special forces killed most of the terrorists without much loss of life for the passengers. On the other hand, the imprisoned German terrorist committed suicide after learning of the skyjacking.

In Europe, the 1980s witnessed the end of revolutionary terrorism. In the Italian case, this was largely the result of improved counterterrorism policies involving the creation of new police units specially designed to defeat the Red Brigades and other terrorist formations. In Germany, the other major case, it was the end of the Cold War and the complete discrediting of the Marxist-Leninist project that led the revolutionaries to cease fire.

The situation with the Palestinians was more complex. In 1982 the PLO was driven out of its bases in Lebanon by an Israeli invasion. The leadership relocated in Tunis. Earlier, some Palestinian groups, e.g. Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Council, had broken away from the PLO to wage separate attacks on a variety of targets, not all of them Israeli. In any case, the PLO's use of terrorism had yielded massive publicity but not led to more tangible gains. For its part, the United States sent out diplomatic feelers to the PLO leaders. In exchange for American recognition, the United States demanded the PLO give up its use of terrorism. Despite some fits and starts (e.g. the Achille Lauro incident), Arafat and the rest of the PLO leadership agreed to the demand. This agreement led to a series of international conferences leading to the 'Oslo Accords' in 1996, which produced Israeli/Palestinian mutual recognition and an expressed willingness to a negotiated end to the long-standing conflict.

Terrorism in Latin America

During the late 1960s, and subsequently through most of the balance of the century, Latin America was the locale for the most widespread episodes of 'urban guerrilla' activity. The Tupamaros in Uruguay were among the first to launch an insurgency. Despite the existence of democratic rule, the Tupamaro leadership insisted its aim was to 'unmask' its real authoritarian character. Accordingly, the group's initial operations included kidnapping and bank robberies. It even stole money from a gambling casino and distributed the proceeds to the poor. It then made the fatal error of attacking members of the police and military. By 1972 they had had enough. The military removed the civilian government and imposed rule by a junta of officers who removed the proverbial 'kid gloves' and destroyed the Tupamaros without all that much difficulty.

Brazil offers a similar case. Following a military coup in the mid-1960s, the country came alive with Marxist urban bands in the country's major cities. Inspired to some extent by Carlos Marighella's *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, Brazilian revolutionaries launched a series of bank

robberies and kidnappings (foreign businessmen were favourite targets in Rio, Sao Paolo and other major cities). As in the case of Uruguay, once the ruling junta decided to act decisively, the urban guerrilla groups were dismantled without too many problems (Laqueur, 2004, pp. 370–76).

Argentina provides a more complicated situation (Gillespie, 1982). Despite being a highly sophisticated modern society, Argentina's 20th-century history was one of oscillation between military dictatorship and democracy. The years with which we are concerned, the late 1960s through the early '80s, were particularly volatile even by Argentine standards. Popular protests broke out against the ruling junta. Crowds in Buenos Aires and other major cities demanded the return from exile of Juan Perón. Although himself a military officer, Perón ruled the country (1944–1954) as a populist politician who gave voice to the 'shirtless ones', Argentina's impoverished masses. Shortly after the death of his wife, Eva Perón, Perón was forced into exile and replaced by still another junta. By the early 1960s, the country's economic situation had deteriorated. The 'shirtless ones' demanded the return of Perón from his Spanish exile. Among the most vocal and violent of the 'Peronistas' were the Montoneros (originally a Catholic youth organization) and the Trotskyite People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). To achieve their socialist objectives and a return of Perón's national leadership, they initiated an urban guerrilla campaign – bank robbery, kidnapping, murder – which had reached a fever pitch by 1967. At this point, the military agreed to cede power and a democratic president, Hector Campora, was duly elected. This gesture, though, did not stifle demands for a return of Perón. The demand was granted, and Perón, treated as a conquering hero, returned to Buenos Aires. In 1968 new presidential elections were held that confirmed his popularity. Perón chose as his running mate his wife Isabel, someone without any political experience.

The Montoneros were delighted by the results of the balloting. The Trotskyite ERP, on the other hand, was far less pleased and, in fact, continued its terrorist attacks, although at a somewhat reduced level. It quickly became clear to the Montonero leadership that Perón had little interest in implementing their radical agenda, beyond a few modest reforms. Consequently, the Montoneros resumed their own terrorist operations. In the middle of this increasingly chaotic situation, Perón died of a heart attack in 1972. In his place, Isabel, his widow, became Argentina's new president. Between 1972 and 1976, Argentine terrorism reached unprecedented proportions. At this point, the military intervened once again and deposed Isabel Perón. An interservice junta then ruled Argentina for the next six years. During this period, the military waged a 'dirty war' against all those it considered even vaguely sympathetic to the revolutionary cause. Suspects were snatched off the street, detained at various military bases, tortured and then killed in a variety of excruciating ways. Some thousands of people were killed in this fashion.

The 'dirty war' only ended when a real war began. In 1981, Argentina invaded the British-occupied Falkland Islands, 1500 miles off its east coast. After negotiations failed, the Thatcher government in London sent an expeditionary force to push Argentine forces off the islands. This task was accomplished within a short time. Popular protests in Buenos Aires led to the military's resignation and the restoration of civilian rule.

The other countries in Latin America where urban guerrilla campaigns were of considerable significance were Peru and Colombia. In the former case, terrorist activity coincided with the restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1980. The two principal groups were the Marxist Tupac Amaru and most especially the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). The Sendero was by far the most important. Led by a charismatic philosophy professor, Abimael Guzmán, from a small Andean university, it formed what was originally a revolutionary student organization. But under Guzmán's (aka Commandante Gonzalo) leadership, the Sendero became a formidable organization combining guerrilla activity in the Andes with terrorism in Lima and Peru's other cities. Scott Palmer (2007, p. 95) summarizes the situation:

Over the first ten years of the radical Maoists people's war, more than twenty thousand Peruvians were killed, $10 billion worth of infrastructure was damaged or destroyed, some five hundred thousand internal refugees were created. ... And there was a decline in gross domestic product of thirty per cent and a cumulative inflation of more than two million percent. By 1990 discouraging indicators suggested that a Shining Path victory was close at hand.

As it turned out, however, a Sendero victory was not close at hand. In 1991, Guzmán was arrested by the police while visiting a friend in Lima. From that point on, the Shining Path went on a tailspin from which it never recovered. This is at least one case where the decapitation of the leadership completely changed the dynamics of an insurgency.

Traditional analyses of terrorist groups stress they are typically small-sized and are not interested in the conquest of territory. Neither of these generalizations apply to the Shining Path nor to its counterparts in Colombia. In both cases, memberships numbered in the thousands and, particularly in Colombia, insurgents were able to conquer and retain control of significant territory for many years (Waldmann, 2007, p. 228). The two insurgent groups that posed the most serious and long-term threat to the government in Bogota were the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). During the 1960s, at least six revolutionary groups emerged to challenge the rule of the country's dominant democratic political parties. For some, Castro served as an inspiration, for others, less so. The FARC represented a breakaway faction of Colombia's communist party, and ELN was initially inspired by Liberation theology.

Two factors help to explain the size and duration of Colombia's insurgency. First, the country has a long history of political violence. For example, between 1949 and 1958, some 250,000 people were killed in what came to be known as *La Violenza*, a conflict between the country's two major political parties. In the private sphere, Colombia's homicide rate was among the highest in the world. To add more complexity to this situation, the country is poorly integrated geographically. Some areas are inaccessible to government forces from Bogota and the major cities.

As a result, it was relatively easy for insurgents to seize and maintain control over territory from which to launch attacks on large landowners and government forces. FARC and ELN were also able to take advantage of the country's drug business. FARC especially was able to offer 'protection' to small coca farmers whose land fell within the group's domain.

Over the years, a succession of Colombian governments have pursued a variety of policies aimed at bringing this long-term conflict to a peaceful end. These have included a mix of carrots and sticks. Peace negotiations have taken place on a number of occasions. In recent years, these have led the ELN to put down their weapons. FARC, the hardest case to resolve, finally agreed in 2016 to give up on the idea of violent revolution and return to the democratic political fold.

European nationalist/separatists

The two other cases that require our attention in this era are those of Northern Ireland and the Basque region of northern Spain. From the early 1970s on, Northern Ireland suffered from its 'Troubles'. These Troubles involved an armed struggle between republicans, largely Catholic, and unionists, largely Protestants, over the province retaining its links to the United Kingdom. The Provisional IRA sought to force the British out through a campaign of terrorist bombing and shooting representatives of Her Majesty's government along with a variety of symbolic targets in Ulster and various locations in Britain itself. Loyalists were intent on preventing the success of the republican goal of a united Ireland and amalgamation with the Republic of Ireland. Accordingly, they launched their own terrorist operations under such labels as the Ulster Defence Association.

By 1972 the violence had reached a boiling point. The government in London was so concerned that it sent British Army units to the province in order to restore law and order. But the presence of army units had the opposite effect, with the Provisional IRA depicting them as an army of occupation which required armed resistance.

Until the mid-1990s there was little reduction in the level of violence. At that point, the IRA leadership reached the conclusion there was little further to be gained by the continuation of its terrorist campaign. After some initial hesitation, peace negotiations were begun involving political parties representing the two communities in Northern Ireland, along with representatives from London, Dublin, the United States and Norway. The negotiations proceeded in fits and starts. Finally, the discussions produced the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The arrangement provided for Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom while the Catholic minority in the region was given a greater stake in its government and administration. The Good Friday settlement almost broke down over the question of 'decommissioning' the IRA's weapons. Eventually the organization's leaders, headed by Gerry Adams, agreed to turn in its large cache of weapons so that the Good Friday Agreement could be fully implemented.

The struggle in the Basque region of Spain was over national independence. In this case, a group, Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA), was formed in 1959 when the Franco dictatorship, with its repressive security apparatus represented by the Guardia Civil, was still in place and where virtually all types of Basque cultural expression were prohibited (e.g. speaking Basque in public was regarded as a crime) (Clark, 1979). After Franco's death in 1975, Spain went through a successful transition to democracy. The country's new democratic constitution provided a measure of autonomy for the Basque provinces and other regional communities throughout Spain. The ETA leadership concluded that local autonomy and the opportunity to participate in the Cortes were far from satisfying their concerns. ETA took the opportunity afforded by the new democratic Spain to launch a terrorist campaign aimed at complete independence. ETA developed clandestine units in Bilbao, San Sebastian, Pamplona and other Basque communities, and at least for a while, ETA leaders were also able to seek sanctuary in the two southern French provinces adjacent to the Spanish border.

ETA carried out a long list of assassinations, kidnappings and bombing attacks throughout Spain, and by 2010 ETA had killed close to 1000 people. Kidnapping wealthy industrialists was a favourite tactic. From time-to-time the government offered various concessions involving enhanced Basque autonomy in the context of a unified and democratic Spain. ETA developed its own political party, *Herri Batasuna*, to contest elections and pursue a place in parliament. Over the years, ETA suffered a number of defections, usually based on a faction's willingness to end the violence and participate in the political process.

Negotiations to end ETA's armed struggle proceeded in fits and starts. Some discussions were held secretly and later openly. But ETA terrorism persisted, despite the government's willingness to re-integrate ETA members into Spain's normal social and political life. Eventually, ETA's strength declined. Its leaders were no longer able to find safety in France – the French government became much more willing to arrest ETA members on the run from the Spanish police. By 2012, ETA not only declared a permanent cease-fire, but its modest number of activists indicated that it was dissolving itself (Reinares and Alonso, 2007).

The new terrorism: transnational groups

By the mid-1990s it appeared to some observers that terrorism itself was in decline. The Cold War had ended. The Palestinians and Israelis had agreed to the Oslo Accords calling for mutual recognition with outstanding differences to be resolved peacefully. The various Latin American urban

guerrilla groups were on the wane as one country after another had restored their democracies as revolutionary terrorism had proved to be a dead end. As it turned out, however, peace was not at hand. The world was confronted by what some observers labelled 'the new terrorism'. What was 'new' about the new terrorism?

Religion or religion plus nationalism were at the heart of the matter. Analysts of modernization in the 1950s and '60s had anticipated a decline in religious practice as the 'new nations' of the Third World underwent the sorts of economic and social changes as had occurred in the industrialized democracies of Western Europe and North America in earlier times. Instead, as we shall see, there were dramatic religious revivals in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia. It was in the context of this religious revival that new terrorist organizations appeared whose aims were often both transnational and nationalist.

Another feature of the 'new' terrorism was the willingness of the new organizations to kill on an indiscriminate basis. The 'old' terrorist groups had wanted 'a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead'. The 'new' terrorists were proud of their work and wanted to achieve maximum publicity, but they also wanted to kill as many people as possible. Analysts were worried that the new terrorists would employ weapons of mass destruction – chemical, biological, radiological – to murder on a mass basis (e.g. Stern, 1999). As it turned out, however, the most emblematic form of attack for the new groups was suicide bombing; acts that were carried out with relatively primitive explosives (Neumann, 2009).

The earlier generation of terrorist groups employed hierarchal forms of organization with basic decisions being made by a handful of leaders at the top of the group. The new terrorists, instead, developed horizontal networks, some national, as with the new Palestinian groups, others transnational, as with al-Qaeda. These networks involved the use of nodes. Decisions regarding if, when, and where to attack were made by semi-autonomous local bands. So that security forces able to dismantle one small group would not be able to destroy the entire web-like organization. Some observers even described these new forms of operation as 'leaderless' because of their highly decentralized decision-making.

What were the circumstances that gave rise to the new terrorism? There were two major events which provided the initial impetus for its emergence. Both occurred in 1979. The first was the decision made by the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan as a way of maintaining the country's communist regime in power. The Soviet commitment to a communist Afghanistan produced calls for a 'defensive jihad' by clerics throughout the Muslim world. Second, the religiously-inspired revolution in Iran that succeeded in deposing the Shah led to the creation of a militant theocracy headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini. Shiite communities throughout the Middle East and beyond began receiving support from Tehran in order to emulate the Iranian success.

We are now some decades distant from these two events. Yet religiously inspired terrorism, unlike its secular predecessors, has not declined in magnitude. Why not? Two additional developments come to mind. The American invasion of Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 2003 unintentionally created a jihadi backlash against the foreign control of part of Dar al Islam. And second, the Arab Spring of 2011, again, unintentionally, led to the replacement of brutal dictatorship by a vacuum of power and the ascent of terrorist organizations in countries such as Yemen and Libya.

Perhaps the best place to begin our summary of the new terrorism is with the group that has received the most attention: al-Qaeda (or the "Base" in Arabic). Arab opponents of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan responded to the appeals of Muslim clerics by gathering in Peshawar in Pakistan, a small city close to the Afghan border. From this locale they supplied fighters, weapons and other supplies to the mujahideen confronting Red Army forces in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia

and the United States filtered aid to these jihadi with assistance from the Pakistani security forces, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). To help the growing number of Arab volunteers, a Palestinian cleric, Abdullah Azzam, formed an aid organization to help newly arriving jihadi. One of these volunteers was a wealthy young Saudi, Osama bin Laden. Another figure was the Egyptian physician Ayman al-Zawahiri. In addition to his medical background, Zawahiri had led an Egyptian terrorist group, al Jihad, involved in the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981. He had served time in prison for his involvement.

The attempt to expel the Russians was successful. The Red Army withdrew its forces in 1989. The effect of the Kremlin's decision was three-fold. First, the Soviet defeat convinced Azzam, bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and others that irregular warfare carried out by Salafist jihadis could overcome a highly trained but weakly motivated armed force. Second, there was a blowback effect. Veteran fighters returned to their countries of origin in the Middle East and North Africa prepared to use what they had learned in the Afghan struggle to address intolerable situations at home. Their reactions were not long in coming as Salafist jihadi groups were formed in Algeria, Yemen and elsewhere. Third, Azzam, bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and others in Peshawar created a group prepared to render aid to Muslims suffering oppression throughout the world. The name they attached to this new 'pioneering vanguard' was al-Qaeda (see Wright, 2006).

A debate developed among the leaders of this new group over tactics. All agreed on the need to eliminate the corrupt and secular regimes that dominated the region. Was the principal target to be the 'near enemy', i.e. the Middle Eastern dictatorships, or the 'far enemy', namely the United States and its allies? The United States was regarded as the premier force keeping the Arab dictatorships in power. The debate was resolved when Abdullah Azzam, an advocate of the 'near enemy' was assassinated in 1989 by unknown assailants, along with his two sons.

In the summer of 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden offered to have his Afghan veterans expel the invaders. Rather than accept his offer, the Saudi royal family sought and received American military support to expel the Iraqis. In 1990–91, the United States and its allies succeeded in doing just that. Bin Laden was infuriated, accusing the Saudis of inviting infidels into the land of the two holy sites (Mecca and Medina). From the Saudi perspective, bin Laden and his followers were trouble-makers. The country's leaders then sent this young sheik into exile.

He relocated to the Sudan, a country which had recently come under the control of Islamists. From this location, bin Laden and many of his fighters trained to carry out attacks on the United States, the 'far enemy'. At this time, other Salafist groups appeared in various spots in the Middle East and North Africa, combining religious fervour, anti-Americanism and nationalism. Between 1993 and 1998, bin Laden and al-Qaeda were involved in the 'Black Hawk Down' incident in Mogadishu, Somalia. A local warlord had succeeded in convincing American-led and UN sanctioned peace-keeping forces to leave the country after a few American helicopters were shot down with weapons supplied by al-Qaeda. The quick departure of American forces led bin Laden to the conclusion that the United States was a 'paper tiger' whose presence in the region could be ended without all that much difficulty. al-Qaeda elements had attempted to assassinate Egyptian president Mubarak, and in 1998 al-Qaeda operatives had detonated bombs at the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar al Islam, attacks that produced many deaths and injuries. In addition, a man, Ramzi Youseff, with family links to an al-Qaeda leader, had set off a bomb in the garage of the World Trade Center in New York. These and other terrorist attacks led American and Egyptian governments to demand that bin Laden and his followers be expelled from the Sudan. Under pressure, the Sudanese government agreed. So that in 1996, bin Laden and the al-Qaeda core moved to Afghanistan.

Most of Afghanistan at that time had fallen under the control of the Taliban, a group largely composed of Pashtun fighters who had gone through training at one of the numerous madrasas (religious schools) located inside Pakistan. In exchange for some subsidies, the Taliban offered bin Laden and the growing al-Qaeda organization sanctuary. As it turned out, this meant the formation of training camps in and around the cities of Jalalabad and Kandahar. These training camps literally drew thousands of would-be jihadis from all parts of the Muslim World and beyond. In 1997, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri promoted the formation of a collection of different Jihadi groups under the name of the International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. In turn, the Front issued a fatwa or religious ruling calling for attacks on Americans wherever they might be found. No distinction was to be made between military personnel and civilians.

Space does not permit a thorough discussion of al-Qaeda-directed attacks. In the years following the issuance of bin Laden's fatwa, al-Qaeda terrorists carried out a number of spectacular attacks, events which captured public attention on a worldwide basis. Far and away the most infamous of these acts was the well-planned attacks on New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon carried out almost simultaneously on September 11, 2001. These terrorist attacks involving the mid-air seizure of commercial airliners killed close to 3,000 people, more than had died at Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941.

Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the mass media took notice of the fact that al-Qaeda had developed a network of jihadi organizations throughout much of the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia. In some instances, the links were direct. In others the groups were independent aggregations whose leaders found it advantageous to express their support from al-Qaeda central.

In the wake of 9/11, the United States and its allies launched a 'war on terrorism'. In practice, this meant removing the Taliban from power in Kabul and the destruction of al-Qaeda's bases in Afghanistan. Bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders took refuge in Pakistan's tribal areas. This success did not bring an end to al-Qaeda-linked terrorism. Illustratively, within a year of the 9/11 events, an Indonesian group, Jemaah Islamiyah, attacked tourist nightclubs on the island of Bali, leaving scores dead (Gunaratna, 2014). In May 2003, in Morocco, at the other end of the Muslim world, al-Qaeda in the Maghreb carried out a series of attacks in Casablanca on government buildings and Jewish targets.

Between these events and the death of bin Laden in 2011 at the hands of the U.S. Navy's SEAL Team Six unit, al-Qaeda and its affiliates carried out or attempted to carry out a large number of terrorist attacks. The most spectacular of these were the following: the bombing of Jewish and British facilities in 2003, killing 61; the April 2004 bombings of commuter trains at the Atocha railway station in Madrid which killed close to 200 passengers; the July 7, 2005 attacks on the London underground which left 56 dead, along with a long list of plots and schemes to attack European and especially American targets which were thwarted by the authorities before they could be brought to fruition. The Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was particularly inventive in this regard. AQAP bomb makers managed to plant an explosive on the person of a young Nigerian student. This student was supposed to detonate the bomb on Christmas Day 2009 while aboard a Northwest Airlines flight above Detroit. However, the device failed to detonate properly and the student was overpowered by passengers and crew.

While these AQ and AQ-affiliated attacks were underway, in March 2003 the United States launched Operation 'Enduring Freedom'. The United States, along with a British expeditionary force, invaded Iraq with the intent of deposing Saddam Hussein and his brutal Baathist dictatorship. The Anglo-American intent was to bring democratic rule to the country. The result, however, was quite different. Iraq's minority Sunni population, to which Saddam belonged, regarded the invasion as a threat to their position in Iraqi society. It was in this context that an al-Qaeda-linked group (*Tawhid wal Jihad*, or al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)) formed and began to carry out attacks against Shiite holy sites in Baghdad and the southern part of the country, in Karbala and Najaf. Under the leadership of a former Jordanian street criminal, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, this group also carried out attacks on American and United Nations (UN) targets.

Al-Zarqawi's group was particularly brutal and blood-thirsty, killing fellow Sunnis as well, so that al-Zawahiri sent him a message suggesting that he stop these attacks on Muslims (Brisard, 2005). (This message followed an AQI attack on tourist hotels in Amman, Jordan.) Al-Zarqawi was defiant and almost reached the point of declaring his group's independence from al-Qaeda. The debate was resolved, for a time, when Zarqawi was killed by an American bombing raid on his headquarters in April 2006.

The American military was successful in persuading Iraq's Sunni leadership to join the fight against the jihadist terrorists so that by 2010–2011, the Obama Administration and the British government began the phased withdrawal of their forces from the country. The departure of these foreign military elements did not usher in a period of peace and tranquillity. To understand what happened next, we have to describe the Arab Spring.

The Arab Spring

This 'Spring' first flowered in Tunisia towards the end of 2010 when an unemployed young man committed suicide over the hopelessness of his situation and the corruption of the government. The mass media and especially the new social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter) provided extensive coverage of the popular protests that followed the suicide. Within a breath-takingly short time, Tunisia's corrupt dictator departed the scene. Protests then erupted in Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain and Syria. For a time, Western observers believed that these Middle Eastern countries would undergo successful transitions to democracy. Except for Tunisia, these optimists proved wrong. No more so than in Syria.

Largely peaceful protests broke out in Damascus, Aleppo and other Syrian cities in 2012. The minority-led government of Bashir al-Assad responded to these demands for freedom with great brutality, shooting and killing the street demonstrators. The protests then turned violent, and a full-scale insurgency was launched. The Assad military employed chemical weapons against the insurgents and managed to kill hundreds of civilians along the way. Despite these war crimes, Assad received material support from Russia, Iran and the latter's Lebanese client, Hezbollah. Among the variety of groups committed to the overthrow of the Syrian dictatorship was the Salafist/Jihadi al Nusra Front, a group with links to AQ. It quickly acquired its own reputation for brutality involving the killing of civilians.

What today we identify as the Islamic State (IS) or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), represents a merger, proclaimed in 2013, of the Syrian al Nusra and the Islamic State in Iraq. Its leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, holds a Ph.D. in Islamic studies and claims descent from the Prophet (Stern and Berger, 2015). Baghdadi's goals for ISIS represent a sharp departure from al-Qaeda's under Zawahiri's leadership. While AQ has stressed the importance of attacking the 'far enemy', ISIS has established a transnational 'caliphate' by conquering territory in parts of what are now Syria and Iraq. The goal is to recreate what Islam looked like as it expanded in the centuries following the death of the Prophet.[3]

In other words, ISIS has combined the use of conventional military forces with terrorism in an attempt to dismember the already existing states in the region. It has broken free of AQ and in recent times has won the allegiance of other jihadi organizations in Libya and elsewhere – which al Baghdadi conceives as 'provinces' of the new caliphate. One of the curious features of ISIS is that it seeks, as a Salafist organization, to recreate the Muslim world as they imagined it to

be more than a thousand years ago, but still shows adroit use of the new social media, Facebook and Twitter. ISIS uses these internet tools to recruit new members from all over the world, including Western Europe and the United States. Its displays of the beheadings of captives and other manifestations of brutality are intended to sow fear among audiences and to inspire others to carry out similar murderous acts in their own countries.

On the other side of the Sunni/Shiite divide, Iran has served as patron for a number of Shia militias in Iraq. Drawing recruits from the poor and dispossessed youth from the slums of Baghdad and Basra, the Mahdi Army, led by the charismatic Muqtada al-Sadr, carried out attacks on American targets seeking to coerce the United States into withdrawing from the country. Also supported by the Iranians' Revolutionary Guards Corps is the Badr Brigades (Nasr, 2006). It would not be accurate to label these militias as terrorist groups, although on occasion they have committed acts of terrorism. They are essentially Iranian-backed private armies there to defend the Shiite community and its holy sites. As of 2017, they are participating in an armed conflict with ISIS, whose ideology stresses the heretical nature of Shia belief.

The new terrorism: national manifestations

In addition to the new transnational terrorism, there are a wide variety of groups whose aspirations are more limited in scope. These groups target single states, and although they may operate across borders, their attention is more narrowly focused. The cases are too numerous to be included in this brief history of terrorism. So the following accounts will be limited to a handful of cases.

The Israeli/Palestinian conflict

The various groups under the PLO umbrella were largely secular in nature. This is not true of the new terrorists. Religion is at the core of their doctrines. When the first Intifada (popular protests aimed at ending Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip) erupted at the end of 1987, the PLO leadership was in Tunis and had little role in promoting the new Palestinian activism. Instead, a significant role was played by two offshoots of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood: Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The latter limited itself to terrorism, while Hamas developed an extensive infrastructure, one including schools, clinics and other social services. Both groups were and are committed to the destruction of the Israeli state. Their claim is that all of Palestine is part of the House of Islam and that no secular authority has the right to negotiate its division. The founding documents are openly anti-Semitic, regarding Jews as sources of cosmic evil.

Both Hamas and Islamic Jihad played crucial roles in the Second Intifada (or Al Aqsa Intifada) that broke out in 2000 following the collapse of negotiations over the Oslo accords. The immediate precipitant was a visit of Ariel Sharon, then a government minister, to the Temple Mount and in the immediate vicinity of the Al Aqsa mosque. This gesture was regarded as an affront by many Muslims, and the Sharon tour was followed by riots and protests – which the Israeli government blamed on Yasser Arafat and the newly formed Palestinian Authority (PA). Over the next few years, the Palestinian uprising included a number of spectacular terrorist attacks. Many of these involved suicide attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad followers on public buses, restaurants and hotels. After one such attack, the bombing of the dining room at a seaside hotel in Netanya during a Passover Seder, the Israeli military invaded West Bank cities (Jenin, Nablus, Hebron, Ramallah) seeking to end the terrorism.

This reoccupation of the West Bank cities succeeded in the sense that it produced a substantial reduction in the frequency of suicide bombings of public busses and other Israeli targets;

so that by 2004 the Al Aqsa Intifada was essentially over. Under considerable pressure from the UN as well as the United States, Israeli forces withdrew from the major Palestinian communities (because of its religious significance, an army unit remained in Hebron). The Israeli government added to these developments by building a wall throughout the West Bank aimed at preventing more Hamas and Islamic Jihad infiltration into the country.

In addition to having a militant component, the Qassam Brigades, devoted to the 'armed struggle' against Israel, Hamas created an extensive infrastructure to draw Palestinians into its fold. It also became a political party and participated in Palestinian elections in 2004 and 2006. Hamas outpolled Fatah (the dominant force in the PLO and then the Palestinian Authority). These elections confirmed Hamas' popularity, especially in the impoverished Gaza Strip (see Levitt, 2006; Gleis and Berti, 2012; and Berti, 2013). As far as Gaza is concerned, the Israeli government led by Ariel Sharon ended its occupation in 2006. There then ensued a struggle for power between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas for control over Gaza. Hamas won the struggle and achieved control over Gaza. It used this control to pursue its goal of attacking Israel and launched a campaign of firing rockets and missiles into Israeli towns close to the border. These attacks led the Israelis to retaliate by bombarding towns throughout Gaza in what appears to be a futile effort to destroy Hamas.

Hamas has been the beneficiary of foreign support. Iran in particular has been generous in supplying Hamas with money and weapons. The patron–client relationship has cooled lately because Hamas is a Sunni organization, while Iran's Shiite rulers have sought to buttress regimes in Damascus and Baghdad which have a clear bias in favour of their co-religionists. This cannot be said for Israel's northern enemy: Hezbollah.

Hezbollah (or the Party of God) is a Shia organization that first appeared in the context of the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) and Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Another major stimulant was the Iranian revolution. Many Lebanese Shiites were inspired by the victory of the Ayatollah Khomeini's victory over the American-backed Shah. Young Lebanese Shiite clerics contemplated a similar outcome for their own country. Towards this end, a group of Iran's Revolutionary Guards travelled to Lebanon's Beqaa valley in 1982 in order to train Lebanese Shiites in paramilitary tactics to fight their enemies. Hezbollah was the outcome of this collaboration (see Ranstorp, 1994; Norton, 2007).

Since its inception, the organization has played a role in domestic Lebanese political life. It presently is represented in both the country's parliament and cabinet. But it is its role in violence that compels our attention. As of 2015, Hezbollah's fighters have entered Syria and are seeking to defend the Assad dictatorship against ISIS, the Nusra Front and the several other Sunni groups attempting to end its rule. Hezbollah's major foreign involvement, though, has been its struggle against Israel. When the Israeli army invaded Lebanon in 1982 in an attempt to eliminate PLO bases in the southern part of the country, Hezbollah's leaders committed their organization to forcing the Israeli occupiers from the country. Using a combination of suicide bombings and guerrilla tactics throughout southern Lebanon, Hezbollah succeeded in coercing the Israeli government of Ehud Barak into withdrawing from the area. Hezbollah, under the leadership of Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, was not content with this outcome, and with extensive support from Iran, Hezbollah has pursued a long-term goal of destroying the Jewish state.

To this goal, Hezbollah fighters launched a series of raids into northern Israel (the disputed Shebaa Farms area), often involving the kidnapping and killing of the country's soldiers. These raids became so troubling that it led the government of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to launch a full-scale attack on Hezbollah forces in July 2006. The conflict lasted for more than a month. The result was mutually destructive. Using Iranian-supplied missiles, Hezbollah bombarded northern Israel, including the city of Haifa before a UN-brokered cease-fire took hold. Since

that war, the Iranians have resupplied Hezbollah with missiles and other instruments of modern warfare.

The new terrorism: Central and South Asia

For some observers, terrorism and the Middle East are virtually synonymous. If we scan the countries of the Indian sub-continent plus Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, we cannot help but notice that this region has experienced an exceptionally high level of nationalist and religiously inspired terrorism over the last few decades (e.g. Marks, 2007; Lewis, 2014). Let us review these cases at least briefly.

On the island nation of Sri Lanka, the principal ethnic division has been between the majority Sinhalese population, largely Buddhist, and the minority Hindu Tamils. During the long period of British rule, the Tamils enjoyed a preferred status vis-a-vis the colonial power. When Sri Lanka became independent in 1948, Sinhalese leaders sought to reverse the situation by restricting the Tamils' place in government and public life in general. Consequently, the Tamils developed their own set of resentments. Initially the expression of these resentments was channelled through their parliamentary representatives in parliament. This parliamentary approach proved ineffective, and a political space was created that was to be filled by armed insurgent groups. After a struggle for supremacy among these, one became dominant: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

The LTTE was led by a ruthless and charismatic figure, Velupillai Prabhakaran. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the LTTE launched a formidable military campaign against the government in Colombo. Prabhakaran's aim was the creation of an independent Tamil state to be run along Marxist-Leninist lines. To this end, the LTTE became a formidable military force, one receiving support from the large Tamil population of Southern India along with exiled communities elsewhere.

Over the years there were several attempts to reach a negotiated settlement, including one pursued by the Indian government in the 1990s. None of these attempts succeeded for more than a few months. The LTTE carried out multiple bombings in Colombo, the assassination of civilians throughout the country, along with a conventional military challenge to the Sri Lankan army in and around the Tamil heartland, the Jaffna Peninsula. By the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, the Sinhalese majority had become sufficiently aroused to elect a government whose leadership was committed to the use of unlimited force to end the LTTE rebellion. The Sri Lankan army launched a brutal multi-year campaign (2007–2009) that achieved the LTTE's complete defeat – killing Prabhakaran in the process. Along the way, the military committed numerous war crimes against the Tamil civilian population.

The reason it appears appropriate to consider the LTTE's campaign under the label 'new terrorism' is that it pioneered the use of suicide bombing tactics. In fact, the organization developed a special unit, the Black Tigers, whose job it was to kill themselves while assassinating others. Rather than be captured alive, Black Tigers wore around their necks amulets containing quick-acting cyanide tablets to swallow in the event of their imminent capture. Both a Sri Lankan president and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi were victims of successful female Black Tigers (aka 'Birds of Paradise') suicide attacks.

India presents us with a variety of terrorist threats, some old, some belonging to the 'new terrorism' genre. So far as the 'old' terrorism is concerned, a Maoist group, the Naxalites, have waged an armed struggle against the government and Indian capitalism from the area around Calcutta for many decades. Tribal groups in north-eastern India have also carried out terrorist attacks from time to time. In addition to these manifestations of 'old' terrorism, India provides us with at least two examples of the 'new'.

Religion was at the heart of the Sikh rebellion of the 1980s and early 1990s. The highest concentration of Sikhs is located in the state of Punjab in north-western India, although there are significant populations in New Delhi and other locales. The Sikh terrorist campaign was ignited by a series of defeats and humiliations suffered by the dominant Akali Dal political party and by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, the Sikh religious leader. Electoral defeats and gestures interpreted as insults to the religion itself prompted Bhindranwale to create a terrorist group intended to redress Sikh grievances (Marwah, 2002).

Following a series of terrorist attacks on Hindus as well as a dissident Sikhs, in June 1984 Bhindranwale led his followers into the Golden Temple, the Sikh holy site, located in Amritsar. In response, the Indian government launched Operation Blue Star. The Indian Army invaded the Golden Temple complex and killed some hundreds of Bhindranwale's followers, along with the leader himself. Retaliation was not long in coming. Later in 1984, two of her Sikh body-guards assassinated Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In turn, Hindu gangs in New Delhi and elsewhere rioted and carried out anti-Sikh pogroms, killing scores of innocents.

All this turmoil led young Sikhs to organize various terrorist bands, including Khalistan Commando Force, the Babbar Khalsa, the Khalistan Liberation Force and the International Sikh Youth Federation (Wallace, 2007). Their goal was an independent state for the Sikhs. According to a data collection compiled by Paul Wallace, between 1981 and 1994 close to 12,000 people were killed during the conflict, the majority of whom were Sikhs themselves (6,177 versus 3,871 Hindus). Along the way, in 1985 a few Sikhs in Toronto planted a bomb aboard an Air India flight bound for London. When the bomb exploded over the Atlantic, a few hundred passengers were killed, making it one of the worst airline disasters in history.

By 1988 the Indian authorities had managed to learn from experience. Operating under the name Operation Black Thunder, the Indian military and police launched an attack on the terrorist groups while minimizing civilian casualties. They also promoted outreach programs in Sikh communities throughout the Punjab. Also, the moderate Akali Dal underwent a revival so that by 1992 it achieved a major electoral victory in the region. The drive towards independence waned, as did the terrorism. Today there are occasional acts of Sikh violence supported, apparently, by Pakistani groups operating from across the border.

Pakistan itself has long been a centre – if not *the* epicentre – of terrorism on a worldwide basis. For some decades, the government in Islamabad has instrumentalised terrorist groups to challenge India's control over the state of Jammu/Kashmir. Because of a decision made by the Hindu maharaja of the state when India and Pakistan became independent in 1948, the state with a Muslim majority became part of India. Since that formative period, India and Pakistan have fought three wars over the control of Jammu/Kashmir. Instead of conventional war – India and Pakistan are now both nuclear powers – the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has provided covert assistance to groups that cross the border or 'line of control' to stage terrorist attacks on Indian targets. The most noteworthy of these groups are the Lashkar-a-Taiba (LeT – Army of the Pure), Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and the militant wing of a political party, Jama'at-i-Islami.

LeT achieved prominence by its December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament in which a dozen people were killed, an event that almost precipitated a war. But it was the November 2008 attack on the city of Mumbai that caught the world's attention. A LeT commando came ashore at the port and proceeded to kill some 172 people over the next 60 hours. Launched from Pakistan and then directed by a Pakistani jihadist, the targets included two major tourist hotels, the city's principal railway station and a Jewish welcome centre (Fair, 2014). In what was essentially a suicide mission, all the attackers, with one exception, were killed during this terrorist action.

Pakistan has also gone into the terrorist export–import business. Residents of Great Britain, the United States and other Western nations have received training in Pakistan and then returned to their home countries in order to carry out terrorist attacks on, for example, the London Underground (2005). Foreign nationals who have visited Pakistan have also been targeted for attack, as for example, the execution in 2001 of *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl.

Pakistan's northern tribal areas (e.g. North and South Waziristan, Baluchistan) have served as sanctuaries for al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives who fled Afghanistan to regroup following American and British attacks. Radical clerics in these tribal areas have also trained and supported Afghan Taliban as they returned to the fray across the border. And we should remind ourselves that al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was able to establish a residence in Abbottabad, really a suburb of Pakistan's capital, and live there undisturbed until he was killed by American special forces in 2011.

Terrorist groups have also been active on the domestic scene (Gall, 2014). Pakistan's Shiite minority has repeatedly been attacked by Salafist Sunni groups. In Peshawar in particular, Shiite mosques have been attacked and bombs have been detonated in Shiite sites in Karachi, and scores have been murdered. Perhaps the most spectacular act of domestic terrorism was the 2007 assassination of Pakistan's former President Benazir Bhutto, who had returned to Pakistan to campaign for the next presidential election. Bhutto had made many enemies, including the country's then-military dictator, General Musharraf. But her murder was committed by members of a terrorist group, the so-called Haqqani Network.

What makes Pakistan's situation particularly troubling to outsiders is that in addition to all this violent conflict, the country is also a nuclear power. And in the West, at least, there is concern about the possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of one of the Jihadi groups.

Future prospects

Using current developments to predict future ones has its limitations. Nevertheless, there are several trends at work in terrorist violence that seem likely to persist and even grow in the immediate future. First, lone-wolf terrorism seems to be enjoying a growth spurt. Either self-starters who have simply become radicalized on their own or mediated and sponsored by some terrorist group, the lone wolf presents a growing threat particularly to the Western democracies, as recent events in France and Europe suggest. Second, there is a seemingly contradictory trend at work too. Terrorism increasingly has become part of the repertoire of large scale insurgencies such as the one launched in Iraq/Syria by ISIS. Third, the new or newer social media should continue to play an important role in the dissemination of terrorist propaganda, as well as with the recruitment of terrorists-to-be. Finally, there appear to be other trends at work. Once upon a time, the subject of terrorism -- during the Cold War for example -- was of limited interest to Western publics. These publics and elite political decision-makers had other things on their minds. Now, after 9/11 and subsequent mass casualty attacks, terrorism and the threat thereof appears to be close to the leading issue confronting the United States and the other democracies.

There is also the matter of prevalence to consider. Terrorist attacks seem to be spreading around the world from Western Europe and West Africa to Indonesia and at virtually all points in between. This sense of terrorism spreading throughout the world is, however, a bit deceptive. Once upon a time, there were home-grown terrorist groups throughout Latin America, Western Europe and North America. In Northern Ireland, the Basque country of Spain, Croatia, Sri Lanka and the Indian Punjab, terrorism was used to promote separatist causes. In addition, not all that many years ago, the Western world abounded with revolutionary groups seeking to bring

down capitalism and the political order associated with it. These terrorist groups have largely passed from the scene.

Contemporary terrorism is now largely confined to the Muslim world. Much of it involves the reactionary goal of recapturing the past of Islam. Within this framework, there is a war against the West (e.g. Jews and Crusaders), its values and sympathetic governments in Egypt and elsewhere. The other conflict is sectarian in nature; for example, the struggle between Sunnis and Shiites for control of Iraq and Syria. Terrorism seems unlikely to abate until there is some resolution of these destructive conflicts.

Notes

1 In the mid-1880s, the short-lived Terrorist Faction was organized under the leadership of V. I. Lenin's elder brother (see Burleigh, 2007, pp. 55–56).

2 For excerpts from some of the relevant writings, see Laqueur (2004, pp. 50–119).

3 In this regard, ISIS has come to resemble a human Jurassic Park in the sense the observer gains a picture of what the Islamic world looked like some 1500 years ago, replete with slave markets, suicide attacks, decapitations and other types of body mutilation (see Weiss and Hassan, 2014).

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5

ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM

Tore Bjørgo and Andrew Silke

Introduction

Identifying the 'causes' or 'root causes' of terrorism, and then removing or reducing these causes in order to diminish the scourge of terrorism, has been a popular idea among many politicians and scholars. They may argue that only social and political changes and measures can, at a more fundamental level, eliminate or lessen the basic conditions which are causing people to see violence as the only option for change and eventually engage in terrorism. Certainly, understanding how and why terrorism begins can be a vital first step towards preventing new campaigns erupting in the future. There is also the real potential that understanding what has caused the violence in the first place will help identify effective solutions to current conflicts and give sensible advice on how to wind down ongoing violence.

Traditional counterterrorism, however, has been more focused on just treating the symptoms. Critics argue that 'root causes' are too remote from the alleged outcome, acts of terrorism, to be of any analytical or practical use. For example, millions are touched by the conditions which are claimed to give rise to terrorism, but only a tiny minority actually engages in terrorism. What is then the explanatory value of 'root causes'? Furthermore, some critics claim that talking about 'root causes of terrorism' could afford legitimacy to terrorists, as it alleges that there are some justifiable reasons for why people make use of terrorism (e.g. Bennett, 2002: 67–69).

Indeed, some have actively dissuaded research that is aimed at understanding the causes of terrorism. As a former police Chief Constable in Northern Ireland curtly noted, 'For me, understanding, comes dangerously close to authorising, sanctioning and approving' (Harnden and Jones, 1999). While explaining terrorism by causality alone is too simplistic (Horgan, 2014: 86), entirely abandoning efforts to understand the causes is not simply unscientific but socially deeply irresponsible. Terrorism is too important a subject – and affects the lives of far too many – for the difficult questions of how it is caused to be declared off-limits.

While recognizing that the causes of terrorism are an important subject, it is worth highlighting at an early stage some of the key problems faced by efforts to better understand these causes. First is the ever-present definition problem. Studies into causes vary in terms of how they define terrorism. This means that case studies which are considered legitimate for inclusion in one study are not considered as a relevant example of terrorism in another. The result, not surprisingly, is that studies reach different conclusions. Systematic reviews have to be alert

to how the different studies define the subject and the impact this has on the data used and the conclusions reached.

Second, this area suffers from the common problem of limited data on many key issues. Terrorism research has traditionally been beset by limited methodologies and often questionable raw data (e.g. Silke, 2009). This problem is also seen in research on root causes. A linked criticism is that the causes debate has traditionally been dominated by reference to a small number of case studies (notably the Northern Irish and Palestinian conflicts). The dominance of these case studies risks skewing the debate towards factors especially relevant in those contexts, but which might or might not fairly reflect general patterns and processes (Noricks, 2009).

A final significant problem is that efforts to understand the causes of terrorism need to be sophisticated in how 'causes' are framed. Causes can work at different levels, from the social to the individual, but some efforts lump these together, cherry-picking a few prominent factors. There can be structural background causes as well as more direct proximate causes, and it is important to take the trouble to distinguish between these.

Types of causes

There are several conceptual distinctions which may be of help to get a better grip on how causal explanations can inform our understanding of the emergence of terrorism. The notion of 'root causes' may be more useful if we distinguish between explanations of prevalence and explanations of incidents of terrorism. In this context, *prevalence* refers to the number of terrorist attacks in a country or area in relation to population size (e.g. by one million) during a certain time period (e.g. annual average of the previous 10 years). Thus, Pakistan has a far higher prevalence of terrorist attacks than, for example, Norway or Canada, and there are some fundamental political, economic, social and historical 'root causes' which may explain these differences (Engene, 2004). *Incidence* refers to each specific act of terrorism, carried out by certain individuals or groups of actors. There are obvious links between these two dimensions. Prevalence may be seen as an aggregation of individual attacks. The processes that lead to most individual attacks are also to some extent influenced by the structural and political conditions that facilitate a high prevalence of terrorist attacks. However, the connections between these two levels of explanation are complex.

What explains the high or low prevalence of terrorism in different countries or regions does not necessarily explain why a certain individual or group decides to carry out a specific terrorist attack. Although structural or political conditions may have a distinct motivational influence on some individuals who decide to engage in terrorism, others are mainly driven by more idiosyncratic or personal motives or circumstances (Nesser, 2015; Bjørgo, 2011). In most cases where individuals get involved with terrorist groups or acts of terrorism, their engagement may be understood as caused by a combination of structural or political conditions, on the one hand, and personal dispositions and experiences, on the other. To take this distinction further, it can be useful to differentiate between two different types of causes behind terrorism: *preconditions* and *precipitants* (Crenshaw, 1981; Bjørgo, 2005; Newman, 2006).

Preconditions are the conditions that provide fertile ground for the emergence of terrorism. These are usually relatively general and structural in character and can help to produce a range of social phenomena and expressions, of which terrorism is only one. Even if the preconditions exist, these are not in themselves sufficient to cause an outbreak of terrorism. Examples of the preconditions which may facilitate the emergence of terrorism include a lack of democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law, illegitimate and corrupt national authorities (sometimes backed by foreign governments), discrimination based on ethnic or religious origin and a perception of social injustice.

Precipitants are a type of causes that far more directly influence the emergence of terrorism. These are the more specific incidents and situations that directly motivate or trigger an outbreak of terrorism. Such trigger events may be identified at macro as well as meso and micro levels, which is a further helpful distinction, though these three levels are connected in complex ways (Della Porta, 2013).

Macro factors relate to systemic conditions at the level of society, state, international relations or trans-national developments. Examples could be civil war or deep-rooted conflicts, invasion or occupation by foreign military forces, economic underdevelopment, bad governance and corruption penetrating the state at all levels, rapid modernisation or technological developments (like the rise of the internet and social media). Root causes of terrorism are often identified at this macro level (Bjørgo, 2005: 1–4).

Meso factors are conditions, developments and processes at an intermediate level, such as social movements, institutions, organisations and groups. Examples could be the activities of terrorist organisations, charismatic leaders who mobilize a mass following or peace movements.

Micro factors relate to individuals and face-to-face interaction in small groups. At this level of analysis we are interested in understanding why and how individuals and cliques of friends get radicalised and sometimes even engaged in violent activism – and what can be done to prevent this negative development.

An illustration of how these factors and different levels can link together can be seen in Table 5.1. This was provided by Schmid (2005), who pulled together a range of factors which can increase the likelihood of terrorism occurring. The table is useful because it highlights the complex range of factors that can be involved, a complexity which adds to the difficulty of reliably identifying the impact of any one factor.

The boundaries between the macro, meso and micro levels are not sharp. Moreover, it is important to understand how developments at the macro level (e.g. a military invasion or other major political development) may impact on the meso and micro levels, such as giving rise to militant movements and individual radicalisation (Della Porta, 2009: 67–68; 2013). Sometimes, events at meso (or even micro) levels may also have macro-level impact, such as the publication of the Mohammad cartoons in a Danish newspaper (discussed further below). Another example is how news and footage from civil wars in Somalia, Syria and Iraq have inspired young people from all over the world to volunteer as foreign fighters in these war theatres. Although factors and processes at individual and group levels obviously have been significant, internet-based social media have served to connect these levels in ways that make events taking place far away come very close to these individuals.

One example of a triggering event at the macro level is how the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 provoked young Muslims in countries such as the United Kingdom and Denmark into planning, and, on occasion, carrying out acts of terrorism. A similar provocative event which started at the meso level was the publication of the Mohammad cartoons in Denmark (and later in other countries). This small event turned out to have macro-level impact, triggering a wave of riots and acts of terrorism in large parts of the Muslim world and in Scandinavia, targeting Denmark, the *Jyllands-Posten* newspaper and the cartoonists in particular. This is unlikely to have happened without the existence of some preconditions at the macro level, including built up frustration about how the West treats the Muslim world. In addition, a number of different actors saw they could benefit from whipping up and exploiting this atmosphere for their own purposes by inciting riots and terrorist attacks. The publication of the Mohammad cartoons can explain how the Scandinavian countries – from being one of the least terrorism-exposed regions in the world – by the turn of the decade were now among the parts of Europe most at risk (Hegghammer, 2012: 9). One important precipitant at the meso level is

Table 5.1 Indicators pointing towards the formation of terrorist groups and the occurrence of terrorist campaigns

Root causes	Accelerators
1. Lack of democracy	1. Counter-terrorist campaign causing many victims 'calling' for revenge and retaliation
2. Lack of rule of law	2. Humiliation of the group or its supporters
3. Lack of good governance	3. Threat
4. Lack of social justice	4. Peace talks
5. The backing of illegitimate regimes	5. Elections
6. High/rising distributive inequality	6. Symbolic dates
7. Historical experience of violent conflict waging	
8. Support for groups using terrorist means	*Decelerators*
9. Vulnerability of modern democracies	1. Moderate counter-campaign using legitimate means
10. Failed states/safe havens outside state control	2. Loss of charismatic leaders/key resources/territory for retreat
Proximate causes	3. Essential concessions towards the terrorist constituencies' political demands
1. Escalatory counter-strategy	
2. Expectations of support group (esp. regarding diaspora)	4. Responsible media coverage
3. Declining support/rising support	
4. Declining media coverage	*Precipitants*
5. 'Successful' rival groups	1. Risk assessments of attacks
6. Problems of internal group cohesion	2. Logistical preparations
7. Group leader's personal image strategy	3. De-legitimation of the enemy
8. De-escalating low intensity conflict	4. Disappearance of key persons
9. Escalating violent political conflict	5. Rising interest in potential targets
10. Entrance of new actor in existing conflict situation	6. Increase of internal violence

Source: Schmid, 2005.

the existence of charismatic leaders able to translate widespread discontent and frustration into a political agenda for a violent struggle.

Thus, provocative incidents and actions at the macro or meso level can be the triggering precipitants behind violent radicalisation at an individual level. However, millions of people are exposed to these provocative events as well as the more structural conditions. Comparatively few are triggered to engage in extremist activities and violence. It is still a puzzle why these few do engage and the large majority does not. There is obviously no single straightforward answer (or cause) to that.

Considering some key factors

Economic factors

The role of economic factors in causing terrorism is complicated. There is a widely held assumption that poverty is a strong key root cause of terrorism, but the research evidence on this is surprisingly mixed. Some studies find a significant link between poverty and terrorism (e.g. Lai, 2007; Azam and Thelen, 2008), but most have identified only weak or ambivalent connections (e.g. Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Freytag et al., 2011). The general consensus is that while poverty might play a role in causing terrorism, it is a much weaker one than most would expect, and in fact other factors seem to play a much more significant part.

If poverty was a direct cause, then surely most terrorists could reasonably be expected to come from poor backgrounds, and terrorism itself should be more common in poorer regions?

Neither of these claims, however, is true. Terrorism occurs across a spread of countries ranging from the richest nations to the most deprived. Table 5.2 below shows the 10 countries which suffered the highest levels of casualties as a result of terrorism during the years 1986–2002. This list includes some of the world's richest countries which boast very high levels of GDP per capita. None of the countries on the list could be described as desperately poor (Piazza, 2006).

Further, it is widely recognised that relatively few terrorists come from the most deprived backgrounds of their own communities. On the contrary, they are much more likely to come from what constitutes the middle and upper classes of their communities (bearing in mind that the middle class in a refugee camp will be very different to the middle class in a British city). Surveys have also found that support for terrorism tends to be stronger among the middle and upper classes than among the lower class. For example, Krueger and Maleckova's (2003) survey of 1,357 Palestinian adults in the West Bank and Gaza found that support for terrorism against Israeli civilians was stronger among professionals (43.3 percent) than among labourers (34.6 percent). Similarly, there was more support among those with secondary education (39.4 percent) than among illiterate respondents (32.3 percent). Other surveys elsewhere in the Middle East found that people who owned a computer or mobile phone were much more likely to express support for terrorism than respondents who did not own these items (Fair and Shepherd, 2006). In a Lebanese Shi'a sample, Haddad (2006) failed to find a significant link between income and support for Hezbollah, with support being spread across different social classes. Personal religiosity was the most significant predictor of support, followed to a smaller extent by satisfaction with the performance of the Lebanese government.

Population size

The larger the population of a country, the more likely it is to suffer from terrorism. Indeed, research suggests that population size alone is currently the best single predictor of terrorism we have. The effects of all other predictors are massively increased if they occur in a country with a big population (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2009).

Why does population size matter? Two issues are probably important. First, the bigger the population, the harder it becomes for the State to keep track of everyone, including potential extremists. Sprawling cities with massive populations provide melting pots for extremists and radicals to disappear into. Second, there is a simple numbers game in operation. While the overall

Table 5.2 Top ten countries suffering casualties due to terrorism, 1986–2002

Country	Casualties 1986–2002	Average GDP per Capita US$	2001 Human Development Index Rank
Kenya	5,365	1,211	123 (Medium)
United States	4,011	27,816	6 (High)
India	2,779	2,358	115 (Medium)
Israel-Palestine	2,257	12,651	49 (High)
Sri Lanka	1,815	3,365	81 (Medium)
Iraq	1,646	3,413	106 (Medium)
Russian Federation	1,314	8,377	60 (Medium)
Saudi Arabia	1,037	10,348	68 (Medium)
United Kingdom	984	19,627	14 (High)
Colombia	835	5,615	62 (Medium)

Source: Piazza, 2006.

number of people in any population who are prepared to become terrorists is generally tiny, as the size of that overall population increases, so does the number of potential terrorists. Terrorist campaigns can be carried out by isolated loners or disconnected small groups, so the risk rises as the overall population increases.

Civil liberties and human rights

The more repressive a state becomes, the more likely it is that terrorism will emerge. Repression can be measured in a number of ways but can include the loss of civil liberties, the restriction of freedom of expression and an increase in human rights abuses. In a study looking at the experience of 97 countries over a 20-year period, it was found that those countries which became increasingly repressive during this time were also the ones most likely to witness the outbreak of terrorist violence (Piazza, 2006). Overall, the level of human rights abuses in a country is a far stronger predictor of terrorism than any of the economic-related measures that have been proposed.

Lack of political representation

Countries which curtail or severely restrict democratic politics are much more likely to produce internal terrorism. A simple measure of how many political parties are represented in the law-making institutions of government provides a surprisingly good predictor of future terrorism. The lower the number of parties which are present, the more likely it is that domestic terrorism will occur (Piazza, 2006). Similarly, a lack of representation in other arenas (such as a lack of workers' trade unions) also shows a link with increased violent extremism. In short, the more curtailed political representation is in any given society, the greater the risk of domestic terrorism erupting in that culture.

Contagion and media effects

The outbreak of terrorism in one country increases the risk that terrorist conflicts will also erupt in neighbouring countries (e.g. Lai, 2007; Blomberg and Hess, 2008). The terrorist groups are not necessarily the same or directly linked, rather it seems that the example of the neighbour inspires radical groups in nearby countries to take violent action. Proximity to an existing terrorist conflict is thus a risk factor for neighbouring states. It is often assumed that the media plays a significant role in the contagion process, but the ability of the media to spread terrorism has not always been accepted by experts. Initial research on the subject failed to find a link between media coverage and a rise in terrorism. While it was often assumed that media coverage did lead to more terrorism, the evidence for this in the 1970s and 1980s was very weak (Picard, 1986). While an increase in the overall level of terrorism was not found in this early research, what was found was a clear contagion effect: terrorism *tactics* which received more coverage were more likely to be copied in the future. The overall amount of attacks was unchanged, but terrorist groups did show a shift towards the types of attacks which received more media attention (Weimann and Winn, 1994).

More recent research has suggested the effect is now even stronger possibly due to the impact of 24-hour news channels, the internet and social media. Reviewing terrorist attacks from 1998 to 2004 suggests that increased coverage is now followed by an increase in the overall amount of terrorism (Rohner and Frey, 2007). Further, the link seems to be reciprocal: more attacks leads to more coverage, and more coverage is then followed by a further increase in attacks.

Overall, the evidence available today suggests that both a contagion effect exists – increased media coverage of a particular type of terrorist tactic leads to an increase in similar types of attacks being carried out – and that a magnitude effect exists – more coverage is linked with more attacks happening overall. Exactly how strong these effects are is still not entirely clear, especially given the mixed nature of some findings. Nevertheless, given the intense interest the media often shows with regard to terrorism, the findings make for sobering thought.

Radicalisation and micro causes

Most research on micro causes is based on individual cases of people who actually became radicalized and engaged in terrorist activities. When rewinding their life stories, the turning points are often easy to identify, and are frequently found to be a personal crisis of some sort (e.g. the death of a family member, the loss of a job or other non-political events, cf. Nesser, 2010) or that they were socially and spiritually alienated and in some form of distress (Sageman, 2004: 98). However, when 'running the movie forward', it is virtually impossible to identify those few who turn into the pathway towards violent extremism from those rather similar persons who follow the mainstream.

Research on individual radicalisation and engagement in violent extremism points to the pivotal role of social relationships in these processes (Horgan, 2014; Nesser, 2015; Sageman, 2004). Although a few lone-actor terrorists engage in violent activities alone, even they are usually inspired by some kind of militant ideological community, virtual or in real life (e.g. Gill, 2015). However, for the majority of those engaging in militant activities, the social ties to radical individuals and groups are the means through which they become engaged in militancy and often come prior to their own radicalisation at the level of ideology and acceptance of violence.

One of the pitfalls of trying to explain the emergence of and engagement in terrorism through the notion of causes is that it tends to miss the importance of agency in these processes. The discussion on whether the emergence of terrorism can be understood mainly as an outcome of root causes or as an outcome of individual processes of radicalisation and choices relates to a more general debate in the social sciences over what is more important in shaping human behaviour – structure or agency. *Structure* may be seen as the recurrent patterned arrangements which influence or limit the choices and opportunities available, whereas *agency* is the capacity of individuals to act independently and to make their own free choices. Whereas some social theorists have argued for the primacy of structure over agency (e.g. the traditions of Karl Marx and structural functionalists like Emile Durkheim), methodological individualists, interactionalists and rational choice theorists (e.g. the tradition of Max Weber) have argued that structure is merely the aggregate of individual actions, and that social phenomena must be explained by showing how they result from individual actions and the intentional states that motivate the individual actors. Other theorists try to demonstrate how agency interacts with structure (Giddens, 1984) or see the relationships between structure and agency as a dialectical one (Berger and Luckman, 1967). This is probably a more fruitful approach also when we try to understand the emergence of terrorism.

Some conclusions on root causes

The issue of root causes of terrorism will remain a significant source of both research and policy attention, if only because terrorist conflicts can be so bloody, protracted and expensive. As early as 2008, analysts estimated that the 9/11 attacks and the government reactions to them had cost the US economy over \$3 trillion (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008). In such a context, any insights

which provide some hope of avoiding (or detecting at an early stage) similar future conflicts will have appeal.

The challenges for making progress in our understanding of the root causes of terrorism as we go forward revolve around two key factors. First, we need shared clarity on what we mean by 'terrorism'. We are unlikely to arrive at a widely agreed definition of terrorism shared evenly across a spectrum of research studies, but we can at least have clarity on how each study defines terrorism and what groups and conflicts are considered within that study's framework (and which ones are excluded). This can do much to help distil some of the white noise in reviews of root causes. The second key element is a need for shared clarity on what we mean by 'causes'. As we have seen in this chapter, causes can operate at different levels from large-scale geo-political processes to mundane individual-level personal factors. The relative importance of different causes varies enormously depending on the perspective taken not only in research terms but also in terms of policy interventions.

In the end, terrorism is too important a subject for us not to be interested in what causes it. The past decade alone has seen considerable progress in identifying the role and significance of a range of factors. Coming decades are likely to see a deepening sophistication in our understanding of terrorism's causes, insight which will hopefully play a positive role in avoiding and ameliorating future conflicts.

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7

NATIONALIST AND SEPARATIST TERRORISM

James J.F. Forest

Terrorist groups pursuing a nationalist or separatist ideology have much in common with other kinds of terrorists. They incorporate similar kinds of tactics as other terrorists, attacking government and non-government targets, killing and wounding scores of victims, all in the pursuit of political objectives. They are typically motivated to engage in terrorism by a range of sociopolitical grievances that could include injustice, government ineptitude, endemic corruption, and repression. However, there is one vital distinction to keep in mind: *territorial control* is far more important to nationalists and separatists than it is for any other category of terrorism.

Among most ideological types of terrorists—including anarchists, religious extremists (from Christian anti-abortionists to Islamic jihadists), right-wing, left-wing, animal rights and environmental extremists—we can find groups and individuals who portray their rationalization for violence in global terms, and may even consider themselves to be part of an international movement. In comparison, nationalists and separatists have a significantly domestic focus: the lines drawn on a geopolitical map, and the power to shape the future of a specifically defined territory, are of critical importance. Their demands for distinctive or unified statehood are generally how we distinguish this type of terrorism from others who are driven primarily by political philosophies or a desire for social or policy changes.

The ideologies of nationalism and separatism

The objectives of nationalist or separatist movements are often rooted in grievances such as injustice (real or perceived), discrimination, and marginalization suffered by a social or political minority. In some instances, a small proportion of a population within a country may suffer repression from the government and/or the majority population, and over time this leads to the rise of demands for an independent nation-state. As Byman (1998, p. 155) notes, "Brutal repression is often the handmaiden of successful nationalism." Discriminatory government policies could include limiting access to education, jobs, and land ownership based on ethnicity or religious affiliation. In some cases, we have seen policies that encourage unbalanced economic growth between urban and rural, and that disadvantage one specific segment of a population, leading them to become disenchanted with their political system and leaders and to want something different. Among poor rural peasants in parts of a country where public investment has been comparatively low, it is common to find disproportionate levels of unemployment and

illiteracy, human rights abuses, and a lack of political representation. These social and political contexts are often created or left unresolved by the state; in many cases, the state is portrayed as unjustly keeping the members of a particular group from something that they feel is rightfully theirs.

For example, it is not uncommon for Catholics in Northern Ireland, Basques in Spain, or Tamils in Sri Lanka to see themselves as a threatened or ill-treated minority, leading them to rationalize the need for a separate state of their own. The same holds true for Muslim groups in Kashmir, and Sikh separatist groups who were responsible for terrorist attacks in the Punjab region of northwest India for about 20 years, beginning in the early 1980s (Reinares, 2005, p. 121). One of the most well-known terrorist groups of all time—the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)—was established in 1964 with the goal of liberating Palestine from Israel. Many of the early leaders of the PLO, including Yasser Arafat, were inspired by a leftist philosophy grounded in the principles of mass struggle, opposition, and revolution (Baracskay, 2011), but quickly recognized the value of promoting Palestinian identity as a means to bring about cohesiveness and a sense of shared destiny among the local population (Schiff and Rothstein, 1972). The group adopted a strategy of advancing Palestinian nationalism through terrorism, and in doing so was able to draw the world's attention to the conflict in the Middle East.

A tendency to portray the sociopolitical environment in terms of "us" versus "them" fuels suspicion and distrust towards those members of the system who have more power and influence than others. Some leaders of nationalist or separatist groups have promoted a belief in the superiority of their cultural heritage (history, values, language, traditions, and so forth) among the minority population they represent (Eidelson and Eidelson, 2003). Asal and Reythemeyer (2008, p. 437) describe this as "othering"—a "process of clearly articulating groups and individuals that have a lesser moral or ethical status than members of... the racial, ethnic, geographic, or language group they purport to represent." For some adherents of this perspective, a conviction of moral superiority leads to a sense of entitlement and special destiny, a better future that is being intentionally blocked by other members of society.

Nationalist and separatist movements are thus fueled by a range of strong emotions including fear, prejudice, and self-determination. Meanwhile, the values and principles of liberty and justice for all have been promoted by Western democracies, most prominently the United States, adding ideological fuel to the fire of those calling for independence. This was most poignantly seen during the anti-colonial movements during the first half of the 20th century, particularly in Africa and Asia. And yet, there are also significant constraints to how far the pursuit of independent nationhood may be acceptable to the international community. The way in which we as human beings have organized our macro-level ways of dealing with each other globally, often referred to as the "Westphalian nation-state system," was created in 1648 when representatives of European states signed a series of documents that became known as the Treaty of Westphalia. These documents established several principles and traditions that over time made nation-states the primary institutionalized actors in a global system of relations, while other non-state entities (especially religion) saw its power and influence significantly reduced.

Territorial integrity—with international political boundaries—was recognized by all delegates, and the overall objective of Westphalia was to craft a way of maintaining peace between these states. Two very important concepts to emerge from this period were national self-determination and sovereignty. In other words, it was agreed that a state should be allowed to make its own decisions; further, everything that takes places within a state's borders is considered to be its own business, and meddling in another country's internal affairs is considered to be a violation of its sovereignty. These principles underscore a wide variety of debates and decisions

made today at the United Nations, World Trade Organization, G20, and other organizations in which the members are nation-states.

Today's nationalist and separatist movements aspire to follow in the footsteps of the 34 new states that have been founded since 1990 (the majority of them created by the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia). Some relatively new states were created by joining together two former ones, such as Germany (formerly East and West Germany) and Yemen (formerly North and South Yemen), while four successfully seceded and gained independence from their former states—East Timor (from Indonesia), Namibia (from South Africa), Eritrea (from Ethiopia), and South Sudan (from Sudan). However, as noted later in this chapter, political violence (including terrorism) has not played a prominent role in the successful creation of most new states over the past half-century.

In general, the political ideologies of nationalism and separatism are rooted in widely supported ideals of self-determination and supported by a historical record which indicates that independent statehood is not an impossible goal. However, the structural and political barriers to realizing the aspirations of independent statehood may seem virtually insurmountable for a small ethnic minority within a particular society. A group of people today who may aspire for a sovereign state of their own—like Basques in Spain, Kurds in Turkey, or Chechens in Russia— face tremendous hurdles in bringing that vision to reality. In the Kashmir region of India, various nationalist and separatist movements (many of which, but not all, have also been Islamist) have been seeking an independent state since the 1950s. In each of these cases, the governments of Spain, Turkey, Russia, or India do not have a vested interest in allowing self-determination and autonomous geographic territory for these ethnically identified groups within their countries. And the international community is often reluctant to recognize any self-declared "states" like the failed efforts of Somaliland or Kurdistan.

As a result of the significant obstacles to achieving independent statehood, some nationalist or separatist groups or movements have come to rationalize and justify violence as the only means by which they may acquire the power that will bring about the changes they seek. Among these insurgent groups and movements, the tactics and strategies of asymmetric warfare (including terrorism) have been embraced as necessary for confronting the more powerful government forces. The remainder of this chapter will focus on this small but important category of nationalist and separatist entities.

Political violence and terrorism among nationalist and separatist movements

In 1961, Frantz Fanon—a French Algerian doctor—published a groundbreaking book, *Wretched of the Earth*, that argues that Western powers had dehumanized non-Western people by destroying their cultures and replacing them with Western values. In his view, colonized masses suffered a perpetual identity crisis and were forced to deny their heritage. Therefore, he argued, the only course of action possible was guerilla warfare revolution—essentially, achieving freedom can be seen as inherently violent.

During the 1960s, the global environment was awash with various kinds of political activism and turmoil, with widespread protests in many countries demanding greater civil rights and self-determination. As noted earlier, injustice—real or perceived—is one of the most common characteristics of the grievances that animate nationalists and separatists.

Fanon's central argument about the necessity of violence became rapidly popular among a relatively small number of anti-colonial, nationalist, and separatist movements throughout the world, many of them fueled by an overarching concern about the contours of the geopolitical map and a burning desire for the power to control a specific, clearly defined physical territory.

Some have called for a wholesale redrawing of the map, with a new geopolitical entity carved out of an existing one. In other cases, nationalists have wanted to change an ethnically heterogeneous nation-state into an ethnically homogeneous one, essentially forcing out of the territory anyone who is not of a specific ethnic background.

Leaders of these movements portrayed the current situation as not only unjust but also intolerable, arguing that change, perhaps even violent change, is necessary (Homer-Dixon, 2002). Acts of violence were characterized as justifiable retaliation against the established government or members of the majority (Eidelson and Eidelson, 2003). As Fernando Reinares (2005, p. 120) notes, one of the underlying objectives of this violence has been "to affect the distribution of power and social cohesion within a given state jurisdiction." Leaders of these movements also promoted a strong sense of "othering"—drawing on the insecurities and fear among members of a community to argue that they were profoundly threatened by "others." This was most notably the case among a unique sub-category of nationalist groups known as "ethno-nationalist" or "ethnic terrorism."

Ethnic identity has often played an important role in the ideological aspirations, membership, and support networks of groups pursuing a nationalist or separatist political agenda. As Daniel Byman (1998) has illustrated in his research, "ethnic terrorism differs considerably from violence carried out for ideological, religious, or financial motives," largely because the focus of ethnic terrorist groups includes "forging a distinct ethnic identity" apart from the state and "fostering ethnic mobilization." Groups in this category attempt to forge a national identity and mobilize an ethnically identifiable community; acts of political violence are used to make a statement about the group's identity, while also polarizing other members of that ethnicity and forcing them to either ally with the terrorists or oppose them (Byman, 1998). This focus on exclusivity and othering means that, almost without exception, membership in an ethnonationalist terrorist group requires being born with a specific ethnic identity.

In responding to these acts of political violence, governments have sometimes resorted to a form of (mainly unproductive) harsh punishment towards an ethnic group. This, in turn, can mobilize more support for the terrorist group among the broader population (Byman, 1998, p. 155). Some ethnic nationalist groups have even determined that provoking a harsh response from the government can be a beneficial goal to pursue: force the government to lash out blindly, they argue, and create a backlash that would increase popular support for our call for self-determination. For example, Byman describes how the Jewish extremist group Irgun sought to conduct operations against the British occupying forces of Palestine in an effort to compel the British security forces to intern, interrogate, and otherwise harass the Jewish population as a whole. As noted earlier, the grievances that animate many of these nationalist groups are already often grounded in perceived injustice, discrimination, and marginalization suffered by a minority within a population. Thus, a group's incorporation of this "provoking" strategy can emphasize their own perceived justification for violence among a broader population. Further, in some extreme instances—like the Kurds in Iraq under Saddam Hussein—an ethnic group has suffered brutal repression, and thus in their eyes the only solution for their survival is a nation-state of their own.

Nationalist (and especially ethno-nationalist) groups can also tap into potential fundraising and recruitment streams through their diaspora in other countries. They will routinely attempt to convince members of their diaspora that they have a "duty" to "support the freedom fighters" back in the home country by providing weapons, finances, logistical support, and sometimes new recruits. A broad range of groups have found some success particularly among diaspora members in rich Western countries, through pledge drives, contribution cans located next to cash registers in convenience stores and pubs, and direct door-to-door solicitation.

To sum up, when a cohesive ethnic identity is combined with a political ideology of nationalism or separatism, it has resulted in some of the most prominent terrorist movements in history, including groups formed among Basques in Spain, Kurds in Turkey, and Tamils in Sri Lanka. These and others described below reflect the central tenets of nationalist and separatist terrorism that are likely to be seen again in our future.

A global sampling of nationalist and separatist terrorism

Since the mid-1950s, hundreds of nationalist and separatist movements have come and gone. In several cases, multiple groups were formed and competed against each other for recognition by the local population as the legitimate "vanguard" of the movement. Some of them initially embraced various aspects of Marxist revolutionary ideologies, others called for democratic independence. Some began as non-violent movements but evolved to incorporate various forms of political violence—including terrorism. Of those that can be clearly labeled terrorist groups, a small number are particularly notorious in terms of lethality and longevity. While there is a fair amount of diversity among these groups, each one reflects the essential characteristics of nationalist or separatist political violence described earlier in this chapter.[1]

IRA/PIRA

Sometimes, nationalism may be seen in the form of irredentism, generally defined as the desire to merge a particular territory and its population with an already existing state—the classic example being the multi-decades struggle in Northern Ireland, led by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and its progeny, the Provisional IRA (PIRA). This group first emerged in 1922 as a nationalist militia committed to a unified and independent Ireland. After a lengthy anti-colonial war against the British, the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 had divided Ireland into two separate states: six provinces in the north became Northern Ireland, and the remaining 26 became the Republic of Ireland. This led to a civil war between pro-treaty and anti-treaty factions. By the end of this war, which the anti-treaty factions lost, the IRA was basically a group of fighters opposed to the treaty and the partition of Ireland. In 1925, the group added an ethnic component by calling for the revival of the Irish language and culture.

For decades in Northern Ireland, the Protestant (pro-U.K.) majority increasingly discriminated against the (anti-U.K.) Catholic minority, making it harder for Catholics to obtain good jobs, education, or political influence. Under Protestant Home Rule in Northern Ireland, Catholics were excluded from entire industries due to traditions of patronage within Protestant-run businesses (shipyards, linen mills, etc.) as well as civil service. They were also excluded from political representation. As a result, during the 1960s, a civil rights movement emerged, with marches and protests in places like Belfast. Some of these turned violent, with Protestant mobs attacking Catholic neighborhoods, and then Catholic mobs retaliating with their own attacks. The Protestant-dominated police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, violently cracked down on Catholics, but allowed Protestant mobs into Catholic neighborhoods.

Over the course of several years, the communal violence spiraled out of control, and British military forces were eventually called in to help improve the security situation. But then on January 30, 1972, in an event that became known as Bloody Sunday, British soldiers opened fire on a massive civil rights street protest, killing 13 unarmed Catholics. At this time, the IRA splintered into two groups, one that wanted to pursue a political route to resolving the conflict, and another that felt it would be necessary to take up a campaign of violence. This latter group called itself the Provisional IRA (PIRA). Both groups found a significant amount of support

throughout the Catholic communities of Northern Ireland and among communities in the Republic of Ireland. For the next 30 years, the PIRA became notorious for car bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, punishment beatings, extortion, and other related activities. Their operations were funded by various kinds of criminal activity—including bank robberies, counterfeiting, and racketeering—as well as overseas donations, including money and weapons from the Irish diaspora in the U.S.

The PIRA targeted local police, soldiers, judges, prison guards, and other representatives of the government, as well as Protestant civilians and the paramilitary groups they had formed, like the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster Defense Association (groups which, it should be noted, engaged in various forms of terrorism on their part). In the early years, the PIRA used snipers, assassinations, and small bombs within Northern Ireland, but over time its operations expanded to the Republic of Ireland and to Great Britain. During the 1970s through the 1990s, their attacks ranged from the Prime Minister's residence to civilian areas such as pubs, shops, subway stations, factories, and shopping centers, though in those cases they often gave advanced warning in order to minimize civilian casualties. The group's largest bombing occurred in 1993 at London's financial district, which caused over $1 billion in damage.

The PIRA also became increasingly involved in the political process, through the political party Sinn Fein. This dual-track approach at pursuing its objectives gave us the phrase "the Armalite and the ballot box" in reference to the Armalite rifle which became a popular weapon of choice among the PIRA. In 1998, Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA signed the Good Friday Agreement, in which they vowed to use only peaceful means to pursue its goal of a united Ireland. However, not everyone agreed with the peace process, and this led to the emergence of dissident (or "splinter") groups such as the Real IRA (RIRA) and the Continuity IRA (CIRA). The RIRA was responsible for the largest terrorist attack in Northern Ireland, when a car bomb detonated in the town of Omagh on August 15, 1998, killing 29 people and injuring more than 200. Over the past several years, the RIRA and CIRA have been responsible for several small bombings, kidnappings, and murder, though they are also known to be increasingly involved in criminal activity, including protection rackets and smuggling. The memberships of both groups are small, but they remain lethal examples of modern-day nationalist terrorism (Horgan and Morrison, 2011).

ETA

Another prominent example of a long-lasting nationalist movement responsible for terrorist attacks is *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA, translated from the Basque language into "Basque Homeland and Freedom") (BBC News, 2017; Council on Foreign Relations, 2008). Ethnic identity has played a much stronger role for this group than it has for the IRA and its splinter groups. ETA's ideology calls for an autonomous nation-state for the Basque people who live primarily in northern Spain and southwestern France. They share a common language (Euskara) and a history that dates back to centuries of territorial autonomy. Although Basque nationalism has deep roots, the foundations of ETA are traced to the Franco regime starting in the late 1930s. During these years, the Spanish state systematically suppressed all Basque cultural expressions, including use of the Basque language, and exiled their political organization, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). The government also replaced Basque clergy, assassinated political dissidents, and encouraged Spanish-speaking migrant workers to flood the Basque regions of Spain. These were all part of the Spanish government's effort to unite Spain as one country under the same set of regulations, but this was seen by many Basques as oppression of their historic civic, cultural, and economic rights.

Throughout the 1950s, the PNV attempted to raise international condemnation of the way the Spanish government treated Basques, but to no avail. In 1959, a group of students launched a movement called Ekin (to act), which was initially focused on raising political and cultural awareness by spreading propaganda and flying the Basque traditional flag. They were critical of the more passive political efforts of the PNV and called for more activism in pursuit of Basque autonomy. Many of these students were inspired by national liberation movements in Vietnam, Algeria, and Cuba, as well as Che Guevara's writings about a revolutionary vanguard and Frantz Fanon's writings about the need for violent action to liberate an oppressed people. These ideas, in time, led the movement's leaders to shift from promoting Basque culture within the Spanish state to fostering an entirely independent, sovereign Basque nation-state. And they began to use violence as a means to achieve this goal.

Victims of ETA attacks have most often been security forces, government officials, politicians, and other figures of authority. The first known victim of ETA attacks was a police chief, Meliton Manzanas, who was killed in 1968. In December 1973, ETA assassinated Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, who was killed when an underground bomb was detonated beneath his car. Overall, research indicates that ETA has killed over 800 Spanish government officials, judiciaries, security service members, and businessmen over a 50-year time span. Because of its campaign of terrorism, hundreds of ETA members are imprisoned throughout Spain and France.

Following the fall of the Franco regime in 1979, the new democratic government in Spain granted significant autonomy to the Basque region, including allowing for its own parliament and control over taxation in the region. However, this did not put an end to ETA's terrorist attacks. In fact, the group was responsible for killing 91 people in 1981 alone. In 1995, the group used a car bomb to attack Jose Maria Aznar, who had been an opposition politician during the 1970s. He survived the attack, however, and years later became Prime Minister of Spain. ETA specialized in targeted bombings and assassinations, but in recent years they were also responsible for more indiscriminate public attacks, like in December 2004 when they detonated bombs at five gas stations outside Madrid, and in 2008, when they bombed the Madrid airport, killing two and wounding over 50 and causing millions of dollars in damage.

It should also be noted that ETA has not been the only Basque nationalist group of concern here. Some, like the "Gazteriak" (meaning "youth" in Euskara) or the Iparretarrak (a separatist group in France), are focused on the Basque territory within their own respective nation-states; in France, the Basques want their own autonomy, as do the Basques within Spain. Meanwhile, another group—Gora Euskadi Askatuta—wants a new sovereign state to be established that is comprised of both French and Spanish Basque territories.[2] Further, it is also important to acknowledge that while Basque communities typically support nationalism or some form of independence, the majority do not support the use of violence toward achieving these goals. In January 2011, ETA declared a "permanent ceasefire," and while they have not held true to similar declarations in the past, there has been no return to violence as of this writing, fueling optimism and hope that one of Europe's most enduring nationalist conflicts may finally be at an end.

LTTE

In many cases, a nationalist or separatist movement will incorporate terrorism alongside more widespread use of conventional guerilla tactics. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is a case in point. Their attacks against military forces in Sri Lanka were punctuated by terrorist attacks against civilians (primarily, but not exclusively, members of the Sinhalese majority population), and during the 1990s the LTTE even became the world's undisputed leader in the use of suicide bombing attacks.

There are significant religious and linguistic divisions between the majority Sinhalese (roughly 74 percent of the population) and the minority Tamils (roughly 12.5 percent); the Sinhalese are mostly Buddhists and speak Sinhala, whereas the Tamils are defined by their name-giving language and are mainly Hindus. During British colonial rule, the minority Tamil population was favored and became the most prosperous, educated, and employed group. However, once Sri Lanka was granted independence, the Buddhist majority Sinhalese took power and began to implement laws that took power away from the Tamils. From the 1950s through the 1970s, periodic outbreaks of communal violence between Sinhalese and Tamil communities exacerbated widespread feelings of insecurity and ethnic hatreds, which in turn fueled a surge in Sinhalese nationalism.

After Solomon Bandaranaike was elected prime minister in 1956, his government enacted a law to make Sinhala the state's sole official language, and also passed legislation that gave preference to Sinhalese over Tamils in access to government jobs, university admission, and other socioeconomic opportunities. In 1972, the country adopted Buddhism as the official state language. Responding to these events, several Tamil separatist groups were formed and took up arms against the state. In 1976, a Tamil leader named Velupillai Prabhakaran established a group called the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers.

The declared objective of this group was creating an independent state for the minority Tamil population in Sri Lanka. But one of the first things Prabhakaran did during the 1980s was eliminate virtually all of the other Tamil groups, who he saw as rivals competing against him for power, recruits, and financial support among the Tamil community. In 1984 he also established a naval wing, called the Sea Tigers, and began incorporating the use of suicide bombings, inspired by the use of this tactic in Lebanon by Hezbollah, which forced France and the United States to withdraw their peacekeeping forces from the country. He also built up an extensive fundraising system, drawing support from members of the Tamil diaspora in India, Europe, and Canada. Taxation and extortion among Tamils also became a prominent source of funding for the group.

Throughout the 1990s, the Tamil Tigers pioneered and perfected the use of the suicide belt, using a combination of military-grade explosives packed with ball bearings (Bloom, 2009). They also developed extensive paramilitary capabilities, including long-range artillery, mortars, anti-aircraft weapons, and armored vehicles. Heavy indoctrination and radicalization were also a key component of the group's evolution. Members of the Tamil Tigers were known for wearing a cyanide capsule around their neck, preferring death if ever captured by Sinhalese forces. One of their most notorious attacks was the murder of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi, who was killed in 1991 by a female suicide bomber. The group also killed Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993. Finally, after a long series of failed peace negotiations, the Sri Lankan military launched an all-out offensive, eventually cornering and killing the leaders of the Tamil Tigers in 2009. Today, it remains to be seen whether the government is willing and able to address the longstanding political and socioeconomic grievances that have animated Tamil separatists for so many decades. Failing to do so, some observers believe it is only a matter of time before we see the return of political violence in some form or another on this island nation.

PKK

Approximately 25–30 million Kurdish people live in a region encompassing southern Turkey, northern Syria and Iraq, and western Iran. They are the world's largest identifiable ethnic group without a state to call their own, even though their ancestors have lived in this geographic area for over a thousand years. The majority of people claiming Kurdish ethnicity reside within Turkey's borders, and it is here that their drive for independent statehood has been the most

prominent and fierce, led primarily by the Kurdistan Worker's Party (in Kurdish, *Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan,* or PKK) (Bruno, 2007).

Similar to the LTTE and other Tamil groups described above, Kurdish nationalist and separatist groups have capitalized on widespread grievances about cultural and political rights for Kurdish people. Under its founding leader, Kemal Attaturk, the government of Turkey banned the teaching of Kurdish in schools and Kurdish broadcasting in an effort to secularize and standardize Turkish society. For years, Kurds were not allowed to practice their religion and culture. Kurdish language and cultural expression were banned, and the very concept of their identity was not recognized until as recently as 1991 (Khalil, 2007). Kurdish communities are concentrated mainly in southeastern Turkey, the most rural and economically weakest regions in the south of the country, and they suffer disproportionately compared to the rest of Turkey. The PKK has blamed the poverty, backwardness, and neglect of this region on Turkish imperialism and ethnic discrimination.

The PKK was founded by a group of students led by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978, who sought to incite a popular, Marxist-oriented revolution among the Kurdish people and to establish an autonomous Kurdish homeland. They initially attracted many landless peasants, as well as poorly educated and unemployed Kurds, but Turkey's denial of Kurdish ethnic identity and cultural rights also laid the conditions under which more educated and wealthy Kurds also came to believe in the ideology and cause of the PKK. Furthermore, the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric of the PKK's earlier years was eventually replaced by a stronger focus on ethnic identity, religion, nationalism, and self-determination. Funding sources have included local smuggling (one of the main supply routes for drugs from Asia to Europe passes through this Kurdish region) and fundraising among Kurdish diaspora networks in Europe, where PKK operatives engage in money laundering, drug trafficking, and extortion schemes (Eccarius-Kelly, 2012).

The group launched its first attacks in 1984 in the Anatolia regions of Turkey. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, operating out of bases in Syria and northern Iraq, the group engaged in guerilla attacks against Turkish government facilities and personnel in Anatolia. By the early 1990s, their militants numbered a few thousand and had killed nearly 10,000 people (Reinares, 2005, p. 121). Their most frequent victims have included policemen, governors, members of the gendarmerie, state officials, and politicians. They have also threatened teachers and civilians working on public works projects, and have burned schools, health clinics, and government projects to undermine the state's influence and authority in the region. And the group also targeted civilians who participated in the government's village guard system, as well as any other Kurds who were seen as collaborating with the Turkish government. However, their attacks against civilians have sometimes undermined support for the PKK among Kurdish communities throughout the region, as well as the broader Kurdish diaspora worldwide.

In 1999, the PKK's founding leader, Öcalan, was captured by Turkish authorities, and he has on several occasions in recent years called for his followers to abandon the violent struggle and engage in a political effort for change. But as of late 2015, PKK terrorist attacks have continued in southeastern Turkey, killing mostly soldiers and police officers, and the Turkish government has responded by imposing curfews and deploying additional military forces to the region (*The Guardian,* 2015). Given the deep-seated grievances and motivations behind the violence in this region, it appears unlikely that we will see an end to this conflict anytime soon.

Nationalist and separatist terrorism in India

As mentioned earlier, several violent separatist groups have been based in the Kashmir region of India. The conflict over the Kashmir territory began immediately following the end of British

rule in India and the creation of two independent states of India and Pakistan. Many Muslims (the majority of the population in India-administered Kashmir) view the Indian military as foreign occupiers and want the territory to be a part of Pakistan. Among the most prominent of the terrorist groups here is the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), meaning "Army of the Pure," which began in 1993 with the support of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). LeT grew out of the Pakistani Islamist political movement Markaz Dawah waal-Irshad (MDI) founded in 1989. While its ideology is religiously-oriented, the central emphasis of the group has been on liberating Kashmir. In December 2001, the group drew international attention when it attacked the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi. Although in recent years the group has adopted different names—including Jammat ud-Dawa (JUD)—and stopped claiming responsibility for attacks, members of LeT were responsible for the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, in which 164 people were killed.

India also has a number of separatist groups in the northeast of the country, far away from the conflict in Kashmir. By some estimates, nearly 10,000 people have died from attacks by terrorists and insurgents in the East Indian state of Assam over the last 20 years. One of the main terrorist groups here is the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), which was founded in 1979 and seeks to establish an independent country of Assam, ruled by a socialist government. It began as a student-led resistance group opposed to immigration into the region but evolved into a terrorist organization by the late 1980s. Part of their motivating grievances include high unemployment, corruption, and the lack of development in the Assam region despite abundant natural wealth and resources. The group has assassinated political opponents, attacked police and other security forces, blown up railroad tracks, and attacked other infrastructure targets in Assam. It has also extorted millions of rupees from local businesses, especially tea corporations, and is said to have several thousand members.

The National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) was formed in 1989 to fight "Indian neo-colonialism" and establish an independent country of Tripura.[3] NLFT's ideology is all about confronting the "oppression" of tribal peoples by the Indian government. Like many ethnic nationalist groups, land alienation and inequitable control of resources are also central undercurrents here. This group has targeted state officials, local elections, and infrastructure projects. They have also extorted money from local communities, smuggled weapons in from Bangladesh, and abducted local residents for ransom—in fact, this region was a major hotspot in terrorist-related kidnappings during the early 2000s.

A similar group is the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muviah (NSCN-IM), considered the largest and most formidable of all the ethnic Naga separatist groups in northeastern India, with 4,500 members.[4] The Nagas are a diverse group of 3–4 million who stem from different tribes and speak different languages but came together in common cause during the first half of the 20th century. The Indian government created the state of Nagaland as a full-fledged state of the Indian Union in 1963, but the conflict continued. India signed the Shillong Accord of 1975, granting the region more autonomy. But the NSCN-IM rejected this as a sell-out and vowed to continue the struggle for a fully independent homeland. The group's ideology is both Maoist, socialist, and Christian. Their funding comes through extortion, bank robbery, and involvement in the global drug trade (especially involving neighboring Myanmar, a prime source of opium).

And next door in the state of Manipur is the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), one of Northeast India's oldest terrorist groups and a sworn enemy of NSCN-IM. The UNLF is an ethnic Meitei group that was founded to achieve independence from India and establish a socialist government.[5] At roughly 1.4 million, Meiteis are about 57 percent of Manipur's population, and are opposed to the perceived cultural and economic influence of ethnic Nagas. Overall,

by several estimates, there are at least two dozen nationalist and separatist groups in India, many of whom have incorporated terrorist tactics and strategies in pursuit of their political objectives.

Summary

Other separatist and nationalist groups in recent decades have included the Fronte de Liberazione Naziunale de a Corsica (FLNC) in France, the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) in Canada, and the Puerto Rican Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN) in the United States. In the Philippines, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was established in 1969 with the declared intention "to bring about the liberation of the Moro homeland"[6] and fought against the government for nearly three decades. Similarly, the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM) fought to achieve independence from Indonesia for the indigenous tribes in West Papua and was responsible for several terrorist attacks primarily against armed guards at mining and logging operations, government, and military institutions. The East Turkistan Liberation Organization, based in China and Kyrgyzstan, is comprised of ethnic Uighurs who are Muslims of Turkish descent[7] and was blamed for the May 2005 assassination of the First Secretary of the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Many suspect that this group is an ally of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, an organization based solely in China that is dedicated to establishing an independent Islamic state in Xinjiang Province (Rashke, 2010).

And finally, some of the world's most notorious ethnically-related terrorist attacks in recent years have been carried out by Chechen nationalists. The conflict between the indigenous inhabitants of Chechnya, in the northern Caucasus, and the Russian government can be traced back to the end of World War II, when Soviet authorities forced a massive resettlement of the Chechen population to Central Asia. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Chechnya declared itself an independent state, but Russian troops soon invaded the territory in what became the First Chechen War (Sherlock, 2007; Robbins, 2007). This, in turn, led to the establishment of several insurgent and terrorist organizations who represent the desire for Chechen independence, including the Shamil Basayev Gang, the Mosvar Barayev Gang, the Riyad us-Saliheyn Martys' Brigade, the Dagestani Shariah Jamaat, and the so-called Special Purpose Islamic Regiment. Because Chechens are predominately Muslim, many of these groups have embraced some aspect of radical Islamist ideology and are sometimes included in discussions of religious terrorism. However, it is clear that the core objective they all pursue, and the main theme of their appeals for recruitment and financial support, is the establishment of an independent geopolitical entity.

Throughout all these examples, common themes appear with regard to group characteristics and local/national contexts. In each case, we see members of a distinctly identifiable population who share grievances against an established social and political system in which they felt disadvantaged, and an overall sense of injustice. In many cases, widespread discrimination based on ethnicity or religious affiliation has limited access to education, jobs, and land ownership. Often, members of an international diaspora have provided financial and logistical support for a nationalist or separatist terrorist group, even though relatively few may agree with the argument that violent means are necessary or justified in order to achieve their objectives.

Overall, self-determination is an ideological cause that large numbers of people may sympathize with, whether a group is seeking independence from an occupying force (as in Palestine or Kashmir), the geopolitical unification of Ireland, or an autonomous homeland for Basques, Kurds, Tamils, or Chechens. All of these examples highlight the ways in which political discontent, socioeconomic grievances, and identity claims may lead a group of people to embrace

terrorist violence. As noted earlier, terrorism does not occur in a vacuum: analyzing context is vital for understanding the emergence of terrorist activity and ways to confront it successfully.

Conclusion

The most successful counterterrorism strategy is one that is tailored to address the specific contexts, actions, and impacts of a particular terrorist threat. Government responses to nationalist and separatist terrorism have been most successful when significant attention is paid to the deepseated grievances that motivate political dissent more generally. Byman suggests that successful government policies to address nationalist terrorism must empower the aggrieved members of a community, win over moderates into participating productively in the political system, and encourage self-policing by members of that community (Byman, 1998). Trust must be nurtured throughout all segments of the population that improvements can be made without violence, and that justice can be ensured for all members of a society. For their part, members of a global diaspora have less incentive or interest in supporting a violent separatist or nationalist group when the ideology of that group no longer resonates.

The good news—based on the historical record and scholarly research—is that no terrorist movement can last indefinitely (e.g. Cronin, 2006; Jones and Libiski, 2008). In some cases, a terrorist group's leadership cadre are captured or killed (as in Sri Lanka), while other terrorist groups have given up the armed struggle and embraced a political process (as seen in Northern Ireland and Spain). The truth is, terrorism is not—and has never been—a winning strategy. As Brian Jenkins observes, "terrorism remains a strategic failure in that no terrorist group has ever achieved its stated goals" (Jones and Libiski, 2008, p. 11). They have not brought down any national economies or political regimes. Even those who have been around the longest (the IRA/PIRA, ETA, FARC, etc.) have largely failed to acquire the power to make significant or lasting changes. This should give us some sense of optimism. Nonetheless, given the prominence of nationalist and separatist movements throughout history, it is certainly likely we will see at least some new movements of this kind emerge in the future, and among them a small percentage may (despite lessons learned from the past) embrace the tactics and strategies of terrorism in pursuit of their political objectives.

Notes

1 Portions of the following discussion and descriptions of terrorist groups build from Forest (2015, pp. 159–178).
2 See the profile of Gora Euskadi Askatuta at: www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3603.
3 The START profile for the National Liberation Front of Tripura is available online at: www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3644.
4 The START profile for the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muviah (NSCN-IM) is available online at: www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4585.
5 The START United National Liberation Front (UNLF) is available online at: www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4584.
6 The Moro people differ from the rest of the population in terms of language, economic occupations, and cultural characteristics, and they are Muslim in this otherwise heavily Christian country. The START profile for the Moro National Liberation Front is available online at: www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=202.
7 The START profile for the East Turkestan Liberation Organization is available online at: www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3588.

8

LEFT-WING TERRORISM

Leena Malkki

Introduction

Since at least the early 1970s, it has been common to categorize terrorism based on political motivation. This way, (non-state) terrorism has been divided, for example, to left-wing, right-wing, single issue, and religious terrorism. This handbook follows the same tradition, as it includes chapters on left-wing, right-wing, religious and national-separatist terrorism.

During the last two decades, left-wing terrorism has commonly been perceived as a relatively minor phenomenon, even if at times predictions have been made about its return. This has not always been the case. When the terrorism studies in its modern form started in the early 1970s, a large bulk of the research concentrated on left-wing terrorism. Left-wing terrorism is, indeed, most strongly associated with the revolutionary movements that operated in several countries from the 1960s until the 1980s. This chapter provides a short introduction to those movements that have been commonly identified most famous left-wing terrorist groups, as well as the features that researchers have claimed are typical for such groups.

What is left-wing terrorism?

Typologies of terrorism based on political motivation have perhaps been attractive due to their apparent simplicity: the most visible part of terrorism campaigns has often been the political objectives. The categories are not, however, as clear-cut as it may seem at first. For example, many national-separatist terrorist groups have also been influenced by left-wing ideologies (the INLA in Northern Ireland and the PFLP in Israel/Palestine are examples of that). The influence of left-wing ideologies in the development of terrorist strategies and legitimation of violence, thus, extends beyond the campaigns discussed in this chapter.

There is some ambiguity in what is usually included in the category of left-wing terrorism. The revolutionary campaigns inspired by left-wing ideologies in the 1960s–1980s are widely seen as the most typical manifestation of this type of terrorism. This time period will also be the main focus of this chapter. Sometimes, also anarchism-inspired campaigns from the late 19th and early 20th century are put under this heading (but will not be discussed here). Another question concerns the second part of the term; namely, what kind of violent campaigns should fall under terrorism? It is not always easy to draw the distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare.

It is good to note that left-wing terrorism does not form a coherent category, as there are big differences between those cases usually put under this heading in almost any imaginable dimension, including the group size, historical context, level of professionalism, political effects, the role of terrorist tactics in the overall campaign and ideology. At one end, there are groups such as the Symbionese Liberation Army which operated in the United States in the mid-1970s and never had more than a dozen members, while groups such as Sendero Luminoso in Peru represent the other end of the spectrum. It was also common, especially when it comes to the Latin American cases, that several kinds of tactics were used in various stages of the campaigns.

It is possible, however, to identify certain common features in the campaigns motivated by left-wing agendas. These features are not present in every case to the same degree. However, together, like threads in a rope, they give some meaning to the term.

Ideology and worldview

Ideologies and political objectives that inspire terrorist campaigns tend to reflect the *zeitgeist*. Therefore, the left-wing terrorist campaigns have been most common in times when left-wing ideologies have been *en vogue*. The period from the 1960s until the early 1990s is indeed one period which witnessed a multitude of political and social activities inspired by left-wing ideologies – including campaigns in which terrorist tactics were used.

David C. Rapoport (2004) has named this period the 'New Left Wave' in his influential model of terrorism waves. This assertion finds support in empirical evidence. According to an analysis conducted by Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson (2009), left-wing inspired terrorism indeed peaked around that period, then rapidly declined in the 1990s.

It is good to note that while wider political movements provide an important context to terrorist campaigns, such campaigns are usually perpetrated, or even supported, only by a small minority of those who are part of the larger movements. This has also been the case with left-wing terrorism. The relationship between the terrorist movements and wider political trends has been a delicate question. The non-violent left-wing movements have often fiercely distanced themselves from the violent campaigns, claiming that they have nothing to do with them.

A common feature of left-wing terrorism is its opposition to capitalism and support for a revolution that would lead to a profound alteration of power relations and a society governed according to communist principles. There have been diverging views on who would be the most important revolutionary actors (e.g. workers, peasants or underclass) and how exactly to make that revolution happen. These questions have also created fierce disagreements within the movements. In the larger milieu of left-wing movements, most terrorist campaigns were situated in the anti-Soviet end of the spectrum. This meant that they despised the 'revisionist model' of Communist revolution which they thought only played into the hands of capitalist and imperialist forces. They were more sympathetic to ideals and models deriving from Chinese and Cuban experiences and underlined the necessity of violent revolution.

Another trait typical for the New Left terrorist campaigns of the 1960s–1980s was their international orientation and opposition to imperialism. Many of them saw themselves as part of a worldwide imagined community of revolutionary movements. The wars of national liberation in the Third World were interpreted as part of this anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggle. Some of them looked at China as a leader of this community, or at least as an important model or source of inspiration. The strength of international orientation varied and the international context seemed particularly important for small revolutionary movements in the Western countries.

Strategy of armed struggle

The popularity of an ideology alone does not, however, explain the resort to terrorism as a strategy or tactic. The common ideological characteristics outlined above do not separate the violent campaigns from the non-violent ones. What made terrorism as strategy appear attractive to the most radical fringes of left-wing movements in the 1960s–1980s has more to do with inspiring examples of alternative ways to bring about revolutionary struggle[1] than purely ideological questions.

While the worldview that informs left-wing terrorist campaigns indeed draws from left-wing ideologies, their analysis of the current methods and strategies for change hardly represent the mainstream leftist traditions. While the question of violence is definitely discussed in the texts of Marx and Lenin, small violent acting as a vanguard of revolution before the masses were organised was not what they had in mind (Cohen-Almagor 1991). Instead of Marx and Engels, or even Lenin, the use of terrorist tactics has been more inspired by writings of such figures as Franz Fanon, Che Guevara, Carlos Marighella, Mao Zedong, and Régis Debray.

These writings are based on interpretations about a series of guerrilla campaigns during the 1930s–1960s which made the use of violence seem like an increasingly feasible option also for small revolutionary groups operating in urban areas.[2] The series of inspiring examples and important writings can be traced back to the guerrilla campaign led by Mao Zedong from the late 1930s onwards. The success of that campaign was interpreted as a proof that it is possible to beat a much stronger enemy if you are just patient and persistent enough.

Another example testifying for the possibility to achieve victory over a powerful enemy was provided by the Vietnam War. Besides its tactical learnings, the Vietnam War also played a strong symbolic and mobilizing role. For young activists, way beyond the ranks of those who engaged in political violence, the war was a culmination point of all those things that they thought were wrong in the world. It was a war in which predatory capitalism and imperialism of the Western countries, the United States being the worst of them, was showing the full colours of its ugly face.

While the writings of Mao have been compulsory reading for anyone planning guerrilla warfare, an even more important inspiring example to the armed struggle in the form of terrorism was provided by the Cuban revolution in the late 1950s. The alleged learnings from Cuba were popularized in the form of *foco* theory, summarized and made famous by Ernesto 'Che' Guevara (1961; Moreno 1970) and Régis Debray (1967/1972). Their recollections and conclusions from the Cuban experience were not always very true to the actual course of events (Childs 1995), but what is more important here is that their writings made the armed struggle look like an increasingly viable option.

Whereas theories of revolution generally stated that certain preconditions need to exist before a revolutionary situation can develop, the *foco* theory claimed that it was not necessary to wait for those conditions to fully build up. Instead, violence can act as a catalyst of revolution, speeding up the course of history. This struggle would be initiated by a small vanguard which operated in the countryside and created close relationships with the peasant population, building up its ranks until it was ready for a full-scale armed confrontation. This vanguard, and not the political party or any other actor, would also lead the revolution.

The *foco* theory was actively marketed by Cuba, and the writings of Guevara and Debray were widely spread in America and Europe. Even if the *foco* theory became discredited quite quickly after the death of Che Guevara in 1967 and backlashes were experienced, e.g. in Bolivia, the Cuban revolution and the persona of Che Guevara remained widely admired among revolutionaries.

The *foco* theory was strongly based on the idea that revolutionaries would work in rural areas, 'the mountains', and the urban environment was considered to be the graveyard of a revolutionary movement. A rural insurgency was not, however, a geographically feasible option for all locations. One such location was the Southern Cone of South America, where the revolutionaries developed an urban version of the revolutionary struggle during the 1960s (Marchesi 2014). The internationally best-known campaign was certainly the one of Tupamaros in Uruguay in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

The idea of urban guerrilla most famously put into words is by a Brazilian revolutionary Carlos Marighella in his book *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* (Marighella 1969/2002), which was published in 1969. It quickly became popular among the radical revolutionaries around the world and was translated into several languages. In urban guerrilla struggle, a small but committed, clever and disciplined group of people attacks the government, security forces, big businesses and 'foreign imperialists' in a variety of ways, including sabotage, assaults, kidnappings and occupations. These fighters operate clandestinely, taking the best possible care of security. Instead of large numbers, their strength is believed to be based on their courage, moral superiority and ability to catch the enemy forces by surprise, putting them on the defensive.

The idea of urban guerrilla found a receptive audience in urbanized Western countries. The influence of Marighella and the concept of urban guerrilla is strongly present in the written material produced by groups such as the Red Army Faction in West Germany or the Weather Underground in the United States. For such groups, it seemed to provide a strategy to continue their quest for revolution despite their diminishing numbers, as the larger protest movement started to fade away in the early 1970s (Della Porta 1995; Koopmans 1993; Rubenstein 1987).

Tactics that are most often associated with left-wing terrorism are bombings, hijackings, assassinations and kidnappings. It is commonly thought that left-wing terrorist attacks have been mostly discriminate, targeting people, institutions and sites associated with imperialism and capitalism (Hoffman 2006, pp. 227–240). The most iconic attacks perpetrated by left-wing terrorist groups follow this image (for example, the kidnappings of Hanns-Martin Schleyer and Aldo Moro discussed below). There is empirical research that suggests the left-wing terrorist attacks are not necessarily more discriminate than those of the right-wing to the degree that the common stereotypes suggest (Fleming, Stohl & Schmid 1988, p. 159). Even though indiscriminate violence was often indeed perceived as counterproductive by left-wing groups, it has also been used, as evidenced by the history of some Latin American groups. Moreover, there has been a lot of variation in what kind of targets exactly the left-wing terrorist groups have chosen (Drake 1998).

Examples of left-wing terrorism

Terrorism was not the term used by the left-wing revolutionaries of their actions. The actions were often called (urban) guerrilla or armed struggle. The line between terrorism and urban guerrilla is in many ways blurred, not least because groups used or were looking at using different kinds of tactics depending on the situation and their stage of development.

This is most evident in the case of the Latin American campaigns. The continent has witnessed several types of violence during the last decades, including urban terror, but also rural insurgencies and state terror (Holmes 2015). The role of Latin American campaigns as inspiration to left-wing terrorist campaigns in the Western countries is undeniable, but another question is which of the Latin American cases can be put under the banner of terrorism. If one follows the categorization of terrorism, guerrilla war and conventional war put forward by Ariel Merari (1993), the majority of the campaigns would be excluded. This is because according to

his classification, one clear difference between strategies of guerrilla war and terrorism is that guerrilla war indeed attempts to establish control over territories while terrorist campaigns do not generally have such ambitions.

Having said that, the Latin American campaigns do deserve attention in this context. Especially the urban guerrilla campaigns come close to what we understand as terrorism. Furthermore, some of the rural-based campaigns utilized tactics that can be called terrorist as part of their larger campaign and are often mentioned in the terrorism literature.

The campaign of Tupamaros (*Movimiento de Liberación Nacional–Tupamaros*) in Uruguay is the clearest example of the use of terrorist tactics within the Latin American context in the sense that it used violence based on its symbolic power rather than physical effect. The importance of Tupamaros as a model was already mentioned. Its high-profile, innovative and at times whimsical actions captured the imagination of many revolutionaries in Latin America, the United States and Europe.

Uruguay was probably the last country in which one would have expected a revolutionary movement to take a strong foothold. In the debates about revolutionary struggle in Latin America during the 1950s and 1960s, Uruguay was often mentioned as an example of a country in which the conditions for revolution did not exist. The country was well-developed, democratic and tranquil compared to other countries on the continent. From the 1950s onwards, however, the conditions that had enabled prosperity and stability started to deteriorate. The economic growth rates turned negative, and the state had to cut down the social security system. The political leadership was unable to provide solutions for the challenges, and the political system, even if democratic, had become closed, making it difficult for any challengers of the two big parties to gain power through the parliamentary system (Waldmann 2011; Marchesi 2014).

By far the most influential and credible challenge to the governing parties was presented by the Tupamaros, which was founded in 1965. The group aimed at bringing out a socialist revolution in the country and did not expect that to happen without the use of force. The strategy adopted by the Tupamaros was urban-based, mostly because the country was geographically inhospitable for rural insurgency.

After keeping a low profile for the first years, the Tupamaros started its campaign in 1969. The tactic that it initially applied can be called armed propaganda – actions that were designed to send a message through coercive action, but at the same time avoiding putting human lives into risk (Brum 2014). Many of the operations were made possible by good intelligence that the group was able to gain through infiltrations and good connections. For example, the Tupamaros stole the accounting ledgers of an investment bank and brought them to the door step of a state prosecutor, leading to the revelations about the bank's secret double accounting system. In another operation, the Tupamaros revealed a secret stack of gold ingots of a wealthy family. It was also able to raid the naval academy of the Uruguayan army, forcing the entire academy to march in underwear around the yard while the Tupamaros loaded weapons to their escape vehicles and raised their flag to the pole, among many other things. All these operations were done for the most part without firing a single shot. With these actions, the group managed to ridicule the ruling elite. The actions quickly made it internationally famous and provided it with an image of glamourous Robin Hood revolutionaries.

During 1970, the Tupamaros started to change its tactics from armed propaganda towards methods more commonly associated with terrorism. This included a series of kidnappings of important foreign officials with the intention to pressure the government to release imprisoned members of the group. It also started a campaign of bombings against civilian infrastructure, such as banks, discotheques, American companies and movie theatres. These actions had decisive effects on the future of the Tupamaros. First, its support among the population started to

decline, especially after it murdered one of its hostages, USAID Public Safety Program director Dan Mitrione (Brum 2014). Second, the task of defeating the Tupamaros was handed over from the police to the army. What contributed to this decision was the prison escape of over 100 members of the Tupamaros in September 1971. It did not take long for the army to destroy the Tupamaros. By the end of 1972, the group was completely demolished. What is noteworthy, however, is that several of its members have returned to politics after serving their prison sentences. Some of them have held high positions, including José Mujica, who was elected the president of Uruguay in 2009.

The Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*) in Peru, on the other hand, represents a more traditional rural-based insurgent group. It is undeniably one of the most destructive sub-state groups that have used terrorism tactics. What has added to the destruction has been the heavy-handed measures taken by the Peruvian state against the Shining Path. According to one estimate, during the years 1980–1992, over 23,000 people died as the result of political violence. Over 10,000 of them were 'presumed subversives' (Palmer 1995, p. 271).

The Shining Path is an example of a second wave guerrilla movement in Latin America which, instead of *foco* theory-style quick victories, relied on patient long-term, rural-based guerrilla campaigns (Wickham-Crowley 2014). It started to prepare for a revolutionary struggle in the late 1960s under the charismatic leadership of Abimael Guzmán. This happened against the backdrop of persistent social and economic problems affecting the rural areas despite attempts for reforms. Guzmán and his followers invested a lot of time on studying Marxist-Leninist writings and developed their own interpretation of it, which they strongly believed was the correct one that would lead the way to revolution (Gorriti Ellegoben 1999).

The overall strategy of the Shining Path was to build its presence in the rural areas, slowly weaken the government and finally take over the cities. Even though the Shining Path controlled over territories, their strategy clearly followed the familiar logic of terrorism. By selective killings of political authorities, it has attempted to call the legitimacy and capability of government authorities into question. The group has also been notorious for the brutal way it has targeted rural populations. During the 1980s, its campaign intensified until the group witnessed a serious blow when its leader, Abimael Guzmán, was arrested in 1992. The significance of Guzmán to the group was so crucial that some questioned whether the Shining Path was able to continue its actions. The loss of a leader certainly impacted the group severely. The Shining Path, however, exists still today, but in a much more diminished scale than during its heyday in the 1980s.

Even if the ideologues and strategists of the revolutionary struggle wrote mostly with the Latin American or Asian context in mind, their words also inspired young militants in Western countries. Admirers of Che Guevara and Carlos Marighella could be found in practically every Western European country. However, not all countries experience the same levels of the New Left Wave violence. Moreover, in almost all affected countries, the scope of violent activities is much more limited than in Latin America. Still, the attacks managed to draw wide attention and cause severe concerns.

The most serious terrorist campaigns on European soil took place in West Germany and Italy. This has led to the argument that the shadows of the Nazi past would at least partially explain the violent turn that the protest movement and the New Left took in these countries. This argument gets some credibility from the study by Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca (2009), which suggests that past dictatorship is among the key variables for the intensity of left-wing revolutionary terrorism in Western countries. Another key variable identified in his study was the large size of the population and a strong communist party. All in all, it seems that the intensity of the New Left Wave violence was most of all connected to the political situation in the country, as were the more specific manifestations that it got (see also Varon 2004).

The roots of the New Left Wave in Europe were in many ways in the wider social and political protests of the 1960s. This was the case also in West Germany. While the student protest movement had many transnational elements, including the opposition of imperialism, capitalism and the Vietnam War, it also had strong national ingredients. The conflict between the younger and older generation was strongly coloured by the political situation in the country and dealing with the Nazi past in particular. During the 1960s, a significant portion of German youths were feeling strongly alienated by the political system, which they thought was essentially a continuation of the Nazi rule, as the same people were still in key positions, and felt that there was no way they could make their voice heard through the parliamentary system. What further contributed to alienation was the heavy-handed policing of protests (Wasmund 1986; Varon 2004, pp. 31–33; Fritzsche 1989).

Terrorism as strategy entered the picture around the time when the mass movement started to wane. As the number of people involved in protests was in decline, it was felt that a new strategy was needed. Experiments with violent attacks had begun already during the late 1960s. For example, arson attacks were conducted in department stores in Frankfurt in 1968. Among those responsible for the arson attacks were Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin, who would become leaders of the most notorious German terrorist group, the Red Army Faction (RAF; *Rote Armee Fraktion*, also known as Baader-Meinhof Gang), which was established in 1970.

The RAF followed the tradition which viewed violence as a catalyst of revolutionary situations. By conducting an 'urban guerrilla' campaign in Germany, it hoped to create revolutionary conditions in the country and mobilize people to oppose the Vietnam War. In 1972, the group launched its first major offensive in which it attacked U.S. army bases, police stations and offices of the conservative Springer media concern. Soon after the offensive, almost the entire first generation of the RAF was captured.

Actions in the name of the RAF were soon continued by a new network of people, often referred to as the second generation. The campaign focused strongly on the imprisoned RAF members and attempts to pressure the government to improve their conditions and release them. In the mid-1970s, the RAF and other extreme left groups conducted a series of attacks for that purpose, culminating in the kidnapping of Hanns-Martin Schleyer in September 1977.

Schleyer was deemed an ideal target because, as the president of the Employers' Association of the Federal Republic and of the Federation of German Industry, and a former member of the Nazi Party, he was an embodiment of those things that the RAF opposed. The kidnapping led to one of the biggest manhunts in German history, but the authorities were not able to find the kidnappers. The episode known as the German Autumn culminated in the airplane hijacking conducted by the PFLP to support RAF's demands. When the hijacked plane was successfully raided by the German special forces, the kidnappers killed Schleyer. Soon afterwards, three imprisoned RAF members were found dead in their prison cells (Aust 1987).

After the German Autumn, the heydays of the RAF were over. Actions in its name continued until the early 1990s. During the 1980s, the attacks targeted mainly the economic and military power of the United States. Also, the release of imprisoned RAF members remained an active focus of the campaign. The group also experimented with joined actions, together with other European extreme left terrorist groups, such as the Red Brigades and the French *Action Directe* (Wunschik 1997, pp. 404, 98–299, 387–389; Merkl 1995, pp. 164–173). The RAF became, however, increasingly marginalised and irrelevant. Formally, the RAF announced its disbandment in 1998.

In Italy, another country strongly affected by left-wing terrorism, the violent actions took place in a politically different situation than in Germany. Italy was going through a period of rapid industrialisation, urbanization and economic growth, which resulted in various kinds of

growing pains, including violent protesting, conspiracies for coup d'état and terrorist attacks. Without going into the details of the history of the Italian 'Years of Lead', it suffices to say that left-wing groups were not the only ones plotting violent attacks in these years.

In terms of the scale of left-wing terrorist violence, Italy is in its own league in the European context. According to the study of Donatella della Porta and Maurizio Rossi, there would have been over 4,000 left-wing terrorist attacks in the years 1969–1982, half of which were claimed. This represents 47 per cent of all terrorist attacks in these years. Terrorists can be divided into two periods: years 1969–1976 witnessed relatively modest levels of violence, and in years 1977–1980, there was a rapid escalation, followed by rapid moderation (Weinberg & Eubank 1987).

Like in West Germany, also in Italy there were several leftist groups that used terrorist tactics. The best known of these groups was the Red Brigades (*Brigate Rosse*). While mobilizing the support of workers was every leftist violent actors' dream that rarely materialized in Europe, this did happen for a time in Italy.

The campaign of the Red Brigades can be traced back to Milan and other big northern Italian industrial cities. The key members of the group, many of them of working-class in origin, started their activities within the factories, organising acts of armed propaganda and spreading communiqués. In 1972, the group conducted its first kidnapping. The hostage was the director of Sit/Siemens. Following the model of Tupamaros, the Red Brigades held him hostage for a short time, questioned him and took photos of him being pointed to by a gun.

A couple of years later, the Red Brigades had come to the conclusion that the situation had worsened and it was necessary to target 'the heart of the state' directly. This led also to the escalation of tactics. In April 1974, the group kidnapped the state prosecutor Mario Sossi and held him hostage for four weeks, eventually freeing him in exchange for the release of imprisoned members of another leftist militant group (which, however, never materialised). A month later, the campaign claimed its first victims when the Red Brigades made a raid on the offices of an extreme right party, *Movimento Sociale Italiano*, in Padova and ended up murdering two people. While the security authorities had long considered the Red Brigades to be little more than a nuisance, after these incidents, the countermeasures intensified considerably, leading to a significant proportion of leading extreme left activists getting arrested.

Extreme left violence did, however, continue and reached its new peak around 1977. In the years after the kidnapping of Sossi, the Red Brigades committed a series of kidnappings, murders and kneecappings, as well as bank robberies to finance their activities. This wave of violence culminated in the kidnapping of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978 by the Red Brigades. After almost two months, Moro was murdered. The kidnapping led to another period of intensified countermeasures and eventually to the demise of the Red Brigades in the early 1980s. This demise was accelerated by the *Pentiti* laws, which provided those who turned themselves in voluntarily and shared their information with more lenient sentences (Weinberg & Eubank 1987; Drake 1989).

Left-wing terrorist groups were formed also in the capitalist and imperialist 'belly of the beast', the United States. These campaigns were, however, more modest in scale, as one might have expected (Falciola 2015). The best known of these groups was the Weather Underground. Starting as the radical fringe of the Students for Democratic Society, a major organisation of the protest movement, the group radicalised towards the use of violent means under the slogan 'bring the war home'. It withdrew its most radical plans after three of its members were killed in an accidental explosion when building bombs. From then on, the group resorted only to symbolic bombings (Varon 2004; Berger 2006).

The Symbionese Liberation Army, on the other hand, was willing to engage in more radical actions. With its less than 20 members in total during its existence, this group that operated in

California in 1973–1975 was certainly among the most minuscule of left-wing terrorist groups. The group would probably have fallen quickly into oblivion if it had not kidnapped Patricia Hearst, a young heiress of a media dynasty. The kidnapping turned it into the media spectacle of the decade, especially after it announced that Hearst had joined the group and participated together with other members in a bank robbery. The SLA is also a testimony to the power of transnational influences within the New Left Wave. In requesting food be delivered to the poor and talking about people's prison, the SLA was very clearly impressed by the Robin Hood style of the Tupamaros (Malkki 2010).

Left-wing violence inspired by the Cuban and Chinese examples was not limited to Europe and the Americas. In other continents, most of its manifestations were overwhelmingly rural insurgencies. Sometimes, these movements have used terrorist tactics, the Naxalites in India being one example of it (Gupta 2007). The closest Asian equivalent to the movements described above were, however, the groups that emerged in Japan in the aftermath of the student uprisings in the late 1960s. All these groups were international in their orientation. The best known of these groups was the Japanese Red Army, which developed close ties with the Palestinian groups and is best known for the rampage shooting that it conducted in 1972 in the Lod Airport in Israel (Igarashi 2007; Box & McCormack 2004).

Left-wing terrorism beyond the New Left Wave

By the mid-1990s, practically all major groups of the New Left Wave had ceased their activities. The most long-lasting group of the wave was the 17N (*Epanastatikos Organosi Dekaefta Noemvri*, Revolutionary Organization 17 November) in Greece, which was long famous for its ability to evade the authorities. The security authorities finally achieved a breakthrough and arrested many of its key members in 2002 (Kassimeris 2007; Karyotis 2007).

During the last two decades, left-wing terrorism has been a relatively minor phenomenon in the whole spectrum of terrorism. Several left-wing insurgencies, sometimes utilising tactics of terrorism, have continued to operate in different parts of the world, including, for example, India, Colombia, Peru, Paraguay, Philippines and Nepal.

In Europe, a few left-wing (or anarchist) groups have operated in Italy, Spain, Greece and Germany. The attacks they have committed follow the left-wing traditions by mostly targeting the government, businesses and security authorities. Most attacks have been small-scale acts of sabotage, seldom resulting in anything more than material damage. However, there have also been a few more serious attacks, for example, in Greece where left-wing violence has continued after the demise of 17N (Xenakis 2012).

Notes

1 Here, I draw from Mark Sedgwick's treatise (2007) on the role of inspiring examples in instigating global waves of terrorism.

2 My treatise on the evolution of the strategy is strongly influenced by Pekelder (2007). See also Strassner (2008).

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9

RIGHT-WING TERRORISM

The strategic dimensions

George Michael

Recent events suggest a resurgence of the political far right both in Europe and the United States. Several populist parties have made significant gains in 2014 European Parliament elections, which some observers fear could be a harbinger of future turmoil on the continent (e.g. Krastev, 2014; Poulos, 2015). The crisis of the welfare state, economic stagnation, and the problems associated with assimilating Muslim immigrants have occasioned a right-wing backlash in Europe. In the United States, the Tea Party has challenged the Republican Party establishment, but to date has not taken on an explicitly racialist orientation (Michael, 2013). But ominously, recent studies suggest an increase in right-wing terrorism in America.[1]

The primary feature of extreme right ideologies is nationalism. But typically, the extreme right rejects a civic nationalism in favor of an ethnic or racial nationalism which implies internal homogenization. That is, all residents or citizens of the national community share the same ethnic or racial characteristics (Perliger, 2013). Although right-wing extremism takes different forms in different countries, there has been a convergence of these movements over the past two decades. As Kaplan and Weinberg (1998) observed in their study, *The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical Right*, scattered elements of the extreme right in the West, faced with declining white birth rates, sweeping Third World immigration, diminishing life opportunities for working-class youths, and perceived cultural decadence, have come to feel like strangers in their lands. Communicating through chat rooms and other Internet media, they have found solace in the slogan "white power" and sought to develop a new pan-Aryan identity based on race and civilization that transcends national borders.[2] More and more, white nationalists see themselves as a white tribe under attack by people of color across the globe. The fate of white farmers in South Africa after apartheid is seen as a harbinger of the future if they do not act soon (Dees and Cohen, 2015).

Despite the far right's recent success in Europe, the legacy of World War II still looms large over the continent. The burden of historical fascism weighs down any political movement that extolls ethnic nationalism. Therefore, the electoral viability of the right-wing populist parties is far from certain. Moreover, the demographic transformation on the continent in which the native population continues to decline and the non-European population (mostly Muslim) continues to rise will make it all the more challenging for these parties to secure victories in the future. Likewise, the changing demographics in the United States in which it is projected that over half of the population in the country will be non-white by mid-century renders a racial

exclusionary party unfeasible at the national level (Miller, 2004). For these and other reasons, some elements of the extreme right have decided that a strategy of revolution and terrorism is the only viable alternative to effect their political and social goals.

There has been considerable debate in the extreme right subculture on the appropriateness of terrorism and violence. Even those who espouse terrorism do not always agree on what form it should take. Should clandestine cells be created? Or would lone-wolf terrorism be a more viable approach? Another question worth pondering is, who is the real enemy? That is, whom should right-wing terrorists target? Should non-white immigrants be attacked, or rather the political leaders and agents who encouraged their migration in the first place? Finally, what is the strategic endgame for right-wing terrorists? Do they seek to foment a race war out of which they hope to emerge victorious? Or would they be satisfied with carving out a separate piece of territory where they could establish their desired mono-racial or mono-ethnic state? These are some of the questions to consider when examining right-wing terrorism.

Who is the real enemy of the extreme right?

Historically, Jews have been identified as the primary enemy of the extreme right. This sentiment reached its apogee in Hitler's Third Reich and culminated in the Nazi Holocaust. Elsewhere in the West, extreme right narratives have often depicted Jews as rootless aliens who are involved in international intrigues against the unity of the nation. Jews have been identified as the leading agents behind the Bolshevik Revolution and international communism, yet also castigated as predatory capitalists and bankers.[3] Although Jews in the Diaspora have been a small minority, they nonetheless have often had a very prominent role in the political, economic, and social affairs of the countries in which they have resided. Furthermore, Jews have often taken a leading role in promoting liberal causes, such as reproductive rights, civil rights, the separation of church and state, and open borders immigration policies.[4] After World War II, the extreme right has condemned Jews as the primary agents of multiculturalism and multiracialism. As such, they are characterized as a malignant force that threatens the cohesion of the nation. This theme is often expressed in conspiracy theories in which Jews purportedly control the government, albeit from behind the scenes. In this vein, the notion of a "Zionist Occupation Government," or "ZOG" gained currency in the vernacular of the extreme right, first in America and later in Europe.[5]

Based on this worldview, it is not surprising that Jews have occasionally been the target of right-wing terrorism.[6] Although Jews have long been considered the traditional enemy of the extreme right, more and more Islam is seen as the principal threat, at least in Western Europe. The 9/11 attacks accelerated this process. In recent years, the specter of a Muslim Europe has become a basic ideological feature of the European extreme right (Zúquete, 2008). According to a Pew study, Muslims are expected to compose 8 percent of Europe's population by 2030 (Hackett, 2015). Assuming current trends continue, this figure would continue to grow in the century as median ages for native Europeans continue to increase and birth rates for native European women continue to decrease. Thus, fears of an impending "Eurabia" are not sheer fantasies.[7]

As José Pedro Zúquete (2008) observed, extreme right ideologies are not static, but evolve and are shaped by their surrounding environments. In recent times, there has been a discursive shift in the rhetoric of the extreme right in a decidedly pro-Jewish direction. Israel is lauded as a natural ally of Europe fighting Islamic barbarism in the Middle East. Several far-right populist parties warn of the Islamicization of Europe and seek to enlist the support of the Jewish community, noting that they would not fare well under a regime in which Islamists hold sway. The National Front has long railed against Muslim immigration in France and has distanced itself

from anti-Semitism. Likewise, the English Defence League has drawn support from established Zionist groups through its vocal support of Israel and condemnation of radical Islam (Busher, 2013). Even Nick Griffin, a longstanding British far rightist, decried the "blame the Jew" mentality and instead urged his followers in the British National Party to "get on with the real struggles" (quoted in Zúquete, 2008, p. 340). In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders, the founder of the Party of Freedom, proposed changing Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution, which guarantees equality under the law, with a new clause stating the cultural dominance of Christian, Jewish, and humanistic traditions (New Internationalist, 2010). Paradoxically, by opposing the decidedly anti-liberal features of Islam, the extreme right has been able to reposition itself as the defenders of true liberal principles, including free speech, safeguarding Jews, women's rights, gay rights, and animal welfare (Zúquete, 2015).

As Islam comes to be regarded as the primary enemy, it is reasonable to assume that its communities will become the targets of extreme right violence. This was illustrated in the case of the Bosphorus serial murders in Germany, which were carried out by the National Socialist Underground from 2000 to 2007 (Kulish, 2011). The group targeted primarily ethnic Turks. All totaled, 10 people were killed. When the police arrested members of the group, they discovered an alleged hit list of 88 names that included two prominent members of the Bundestag and representatives of Turkish and Islamic groups (Pidd and Harding, 2011).

Whereas some right-wing terrorists have targeted Muslims, others have attacked those that they hold responsible for their migration into Europe, as evidenced by the case of Anders Behrig Breivik in Norway. On July 22, 2011, the reclusive 32-year-old man detonated a van bomb at a government building in Oslo, which killed eight people. A subsequent shooting spree at a summer camp on the island of Utøya left 69 more people dead. Hours before he began his attacks, he uploaded his 1,518-page electronic book—*2083: A European Declaration of Independence*—on the Internet. In addition, he emailed his manifesto to roughly 1,000 selected recipients active in the anti-Muslim and right-wing networks (Gardell, 2015). In detail, he explained how he spent nine years methodically planning his attacks, procuring firearms and tons of fertilizer, while evading suspicion from authorities. In addition, he uploaded a video on YouTube entitled "The Knight Templar 2083," which contained numerous references to the Islamic threat to Europe interspersed with iconic images of Crusaders. The notoriety stemming from his attack, he predicted, would serve as a "marketing" ad for his manifesto, thus ensuring that there would be substantial interest in its contents.

Claiming to be a member of the Knights Templar—a medieval order that protected pilgrims in the Holy Land after the First Crusade in the eleventh century—Breivik saw himself as part of an unorganized and leaderless vanguard that would awaken Europe to the perils of Islamicization brought about by the immigration policies engineered by Europe's liberal parties. In that sense, the seemingly senseless shootings at the youth camp were meant to punish the ruling Labor Party for its "treasonous acts against Europe and Europeans" (www.npr.org, 2011).[8] Breivik envisaged a Europe reborn, purged from its internal enemies, mainly cultural Marxists and feminists. Rising from the ashes, his Crusader vanguard would defeat Europe's external enemies—Muslims—and restore the continent's glory as the world's leading civilization (Gardell, 2015).

Just how persuasive his message will be has yet to be seen. In the immediate aftermath of his attacks, representatives of the far right in Western Europe were quick to condemn his terrorism. There emerged no groundswell protest movement that came to his defense. At least in the near term, the general consensus was that Breivik's rampage was a public relations disaster for populist parties that favor immigration restrictions. Moreover, some representatives of the racist and anti-Semitic extreme right lambasted Breivik for his expressed solidarity with Jews and Israel.

For example, David Duke, the former Louisiana state representative and Klan leader, characterized Breivik as a man whose mind had been deranged by Zionism and had targeted innocent white youths. Breivik, he argued, could more aptly be characterized as an Islamophobic neo-conservative. The far right *American Free Press* characterized Breivik as a "radical Christian Zionist" who wanted to kill Norwegian officials for their opposition to the Israeli occupation of Palestine (White, 2011).

Others, however, were more forgiving. Writing on the *Occidental Dissent* website, William Rome did not condone the attacks, but pointed out that it would be hypocritical not to concede that Breivik had struck a terrible blow at the European elite that was responsible for policies that allow for large-scale Third World immigration into Norway (Michael, 2012a). Similarly, Harold Covington of the white separatist Northwest Front conceded that Breivik was probably a "Christian Zionist, neo-conservative freemason," but dismissed the theory that the attacks were part of a Jewish conspiracy to usher in repressive legislation against patriots. Instead, he believed that the attacks were a genuine case of lone-wolf resistance by "a White man who finally had enough, and who through some genetic fluke, still possesse[d] the old alpha gene or chromosome or whatever that is that once enabled White males to act on their convictions instead of tap, tap, tap on computer keyboards" (northwestfront.org, 2011). In Russia, many in the extreme right have championed Breivik for attacking the Labor Party, whose policies were responsible for the rising racial diversity in Norway. However, some Russian far rightists condemned Breivik because his manifesto expressed a positive attitude toward Jews and Zionism (Enstad, 2015).

Generally speaking, the so-called Counter-jihad eschews the anti-Semitism which was integral to the old extreme right. However, anti-Semitism persists in some quarters of the extreme right. For instance, in January 2015, Joshua Bonehill-Paine, an English far right activist, called for a mass protest in Stamford Hill in March of that year to fight the "Jewish menace." The event was cancelled, however, after Bonehill-Paine failed to mobilize support for his protest (Blood, 2015). A former member of the French National Front, Alain Sorel, declared himself hostile to Islamophobia and even sought to forge alliances with certain Muslim organizations in the name of the struggle against Zionist and American influence in France (Gandilhon, 2013). Inasmuch as anti-Zionism looms large in the worldview of radical Islamists, some elements of the extreme right have sought to cooperate with them. After all, the notion of a "Zionist Occupation Government" is not unlike the "Zionist Crusade Alliance" invoked by Osama bin Laden. But to date, the most significant outcome of this collaboration has been in the area of propaganda, including promoting Holocaust revisionism, championing the Palestinian cause, and delegitimizing Israel.[9] Although widespread Muslim immigration is seen as a threat to Europe, Jews are often implicated in this development. Perceived as the primary agents of multiculturalism, liberalism, and open borders immigration policies, Jews are seen as ultimately responsible for the white race's sorry predicament. Some extreme right movements see both Jews and Muslims as enemies.[10] Even Breivik, despite his anti-Muslim sentiment, fantasized of collaborating with al-Qaeda to bring down the hated system in Europe, as he explained in his manifesto.[11]

Is political violence appropriate?

The appropriateness of violence has long been discussed in extreme right subcultures. Some advocates of political violence argue that the electoral route to victory is unrealistic. Therefore, to attain their desired end state, violence at some point in the future will be necessary.

The archetypical blueprint for the white nationalist revolution is *The Turner Diaries*, a novel written by the late William L. Pierce, a former university physics professor and founder of the

National Alliance. Perhaps the most widely read book in the extreme right subculture, it has sold an estimated 350,000 copies since its first publication in 1978 (Segal, 2000). It tells the story of a cellular revolutionary group—the Organization—which conducts a terrorist campaign against the U.S. government that is controlled by a Jewish cabal working from behind the scenes. A struggle of apocalyptic proportions follows as American society implodes under the weight of racial strife. Eventually, the Organization acquires nuclear weapons, and a global atomic war ensues involving the United States, the Soviet Union, and Israel. For his service, the protagonist Earl Turner is inducted into a quasi-monastic inner circle of the Organization known as "the Order." In his final mission, he flies a small crop duster plane equipped with a nuclear bomb on a Kamikaze mission that destroys the Pentagon, thus delivering the fatal blow to the system. After victory in America, the revolution spreads throughout the rest of the world. The book closes with a millennial tone. Out of the ashes of devastation, the countries of the West experience a civilizational renewal and are once again masters of their own destinies (MacDonald, 1978).

Although most white nationalists concede that at the present time, the scenario depicted in *The Turner Diaries* is unrealistic, they still believe that someday violence will have to be used if their race is to survive. Other writers, however, have argued that such nihilistic violence will only damage the credibility of the white nationalist cause. For example, on the *Occidental Dissent* website, Hunter Wallace (2011) wrote a number of essays repudiating the vanguardist, or revolutionary wing, of the white nationalist movement. For his launching point, he took issue with an article by the late William L. Pierce titled "Why Conservatives Can't Win," which originally appeared in 1971. The essence of Pierce's argument was that, whereas the political left was offensive and guided by revolutionary goals, the political right was defensive and conservative. Therefore, it was not surprising that the history of conservatism has been one long march of retreat. As an alternative, Pierce exhorted the political right to offer something inspiring to the youth of America, such as his racial revolutionary program (Pierce, 1971).

For his part, Wallace derided the vanguardist fantasy of the inevitable collapse of the system, comparing it to the Christian fundamentalist prophecy of the Rapture. Both narratives hold that the elect will ultimately triumph through the sheer power of their faith alone. Too often, Wallace noted, vanguardists look askance at their fellow white Americans as brain-dead "lemmings." By rejecting mainstream society, Wallace (2011) noted that the vanguardists are often strangers in their own land. Deriding them as "totalitarian hippies," he averred that they are not engaged in any concrete political project, not unlike their 1960s counterculture counterparts who lived by Timothy Leary's maxim, "turn on, tune in, drop out." Rather than doing the hard work necessary to establish white nationalism as a viable mainstream movement, the vanguardists are prone to escapism as they wait for the inevitable collapse of the system (Wallace, 2010a).

Instead, Wallace urged activists to win the hearts and minds of their fellow white men and women. As he explained, the main reason that they live under laws inimical to their own racial survival was not because their enemies are more powerful than they are, but because they have convinced themselves that their own racial extinction is morally justified. Ultimately, violence would only serve to turn Americans against the white nationalist movement. For that reason, he urged supporters that the first thing they must do is rid themselves of the "vanguardist sociopaths who are constantly self-detonating and destroying [their] momentum" (Wallace, 2011). Wallace urged activists to focus their efforts in their own communities. He catalogued a number of victories that conservative activists had achieved in various American states, including efforts to gain support for initiatives restricting immigration and banning affirmative action. By contrast, the vanguardists had succeeded only in making those people in the "pro-White movement" look like kooks and idiots in public" (Wallace, 2010b).

For Wallace, violence made no sense as a tactic for no other reason than "the enemy has all the guns" and can "mobilize far more bodies on the field." Invoking Saul Alinsky's *Rules for Radicals*, he counseled that it was senseless to attack the enemy at his strongest point (Wallace, 2011). As Wallace pointed out, mere rhetoric extolling violence has landed a number of racial activists in prison, including Matt Hale, Bill White, and Hal Turner. However, the fact that Barack Obama was twice elected president even though a majority of the white electorate voted for his rival candidates—John McCain and Mitt Romney—suggested to some observers that this segment of the voting public was becoming less significant (Montanaro, 2012). And it is reasonable to assume that current demographic projections would only accelerate this trend. For this reason, the electoral approach seems less and less promising and violent resistance to attaining power more feasible. As the American extreme right theoretician Michael O'Meara (2008) exclaimed on the *Tyrannicide* blog: "The white race will be reborn not by electing Congressmen, hiring lobbyists, and participating in a system that seeks its destruction, but by returning to its original self—and to the challenge of creating an Aryan warrior aristocracy forged in the fire of Sorelian violence."[12]

What is the best revolutionary strategy?

If a strategy of political violence is implemented, what form should it take? The extreme right has pondered this issue over the past few decades. Some have advocated the creation of clandestine cells that will strike at the system. Emblematic of this approach was the campaign of the Order, an underground group that was active in the Pacific Northwest of the United States. Founded in the summer of 1983 at an annual Aryan Nations Congress in Hayden Lake, Idaho, a young charismatic member of the National Alliance—Robert Jay Mathews—ultimately recruited nearly 50 members into his organization.[13]

Abandoning all hope of the efficacy of legal political action, Mathews endeavored to build a clandestine resistance group, which would go on a crime spree and a terrorist campaign that gained nationwide notoriety and included counterfeiting, armored car heists, bank robberies, and four homicides (Aho, 1990). To be expected, the Order's exploits soon caught the attention of authorities, and the FBI identified the group as the most serious domestic terrorist threat in the country.[14] Undaunted, Mathews issued a "Declaration of War" against the U.S. government, which he sent to several newspapers. After an extensive search, the FBI caught up with him at Whidbey Island in Washington State. Refusing to be taken alive, he resisted in a standoff that lasted two days and single-handedly engaged in several shootouts with SWAT teams. Finally, the authorities lost their patience, and on December 8, 1984, dropped white phosphorous illumination flares onto the roof of the house in which Mathews had barricaded himself. This set off a fire that engulfed the structure, and Mathews perished in dramatic fashion. A concerted effort by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies eventually crushed the Order, and many of its members are now serving lengthy prison sentences.

Tactically, the Order did not really achieve much, yet it was significant insofar as it marked a change in the orientation of the extreme right. The U.S. government was now seen as the enemy, and the racialist movement began to take on a more revolutionary posture. No longer did it seek to preserve the status quo. Rather, it sought the overthrow of the U.S. government, which it reasoned was now under the heel of ZOG (Zionist Occupation Government). After the demise of the Order, the extreme right went into a period of retrenchment and soul-searching on the topic of revolutionary strategy. From this interlude emerged a change in tactics. The principal lesson drawn was that when an organization grew to the size of the Order, it would eventually fall prey to infiltration and soon be crushed. A new approach—leaderless resistance—

began to gain currency. Inasmuch as the extreme right is organizationally fragmented, leaderless resistance makes a virtue out of necessity.

First popularized by Louis Beam in an essay in the early 1980s, leaderless resistance proposed that the traditional hierarchical organizational structure was untenable under current conditions insofar as the U.S. government was too powerful and would not permit any potentially serious opposition (Durham, 2007). He reasoned that in a technologically advanced society such as contemporary America, the government, through means such as electronic surveillance, could without much difficulty penetrate the structure and reveal its chain of command. From there, the organization could be effectively neutralized from within by infiltrators and agents provocateurs. His essay was disseminated through computer networks of which Beam was a pioneer in exploiting during the 1980s. Beam argued that it became the responsibility of the individual to acquire the necessary skills and information to carry out what needed to be done. Members would take action when and where they saw fit. Organs of information, such as newspapers, leaflets, and now the Internet, would enable each person to keep informed of events (Beam, 1992).

Although some observers have dismissed the threat of leaderless resistance as overblown (e.g. Garfinkel, 2003; Burton and Stewart, 2008), the examples of Anders Behrig Breivik, and Timothy McVeigh before him, demonstrate the potential havoc that lone wolves can inflict. McVeigh's attack on the Arthur P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, killed 168 people and left many others wounded. What is more, the leaderless resistance approach has caught on with other extremist subcultures as well. The last several years have witnessed an alarming number of terrorist attacks carried out by lone individuals, or very small groups, both in the United States and abroad (e.g. Michael, 2012b; Simon, 2013; Spaaij, 2012; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2015; Bajekal, 2014). For instance, an attack in November 2009 by Major Nidal Hasan at Fort Hood, Texas, killed 13 people and left 30 more wounded. Nearly four years later, two brothers who sympathized with the global jihad—Tamerlan and Dzhokar Tsarnaev—carried out the Boston Marathon bombing, which killed three persons, including an 8-year-old boy. In France, in January 2015, two masked gunmen who identified with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula forced their way into the offices of *Charlie Hebdo* and executed 11 people. For obvious reasons, radical Islamists have gained much notoriety stemming from these and other terrorist attacks. However, other extremist movements have given rise to self-radicalized terrorists as well. This was tragically illustrated on June 17, 2015, when Dylann Roof open fired with a handgun in a church in Charleston, South Carolina, killing nine African-Americans and injuring one more.

Roof confessed to police officials that the purpose of his attack was to start a race war (Payne and Bothelo, 2015). Soon after his attack, it transpired that Roof was the owner of a website called "The Last Rhodesian" (Goad, 2015). Shortly before his attack, Roof posted a 2,500-word manifesto that was replete with white nationalist and extreme right themes (O'Connor, 2015). According to Roof, the Trayvon Martin case was the event that "truly awakened" him to the issue of race. To him, it was obvious that George Zimmerman "was in the right." This event prompted him to type in the words "black on White crime" into Google. The first website he found was operated by the Council of Conservative Citizens.[15] On the site, he found "pages upon pages" detailing black-on-white murders. At first, he was in disbelief and soon realized that something "was very wrong." How, he wondered, could the news media be "blowing up the Trayvon Martin case" while virtually ignoring black-on-white murders? To his dismay, he soon learned that Europe was experiencing racial violence as well. From that point on, Roof set out to learn more about race. Soon, he found out about the "Jewish problem" and was "racially aware."

For Roof, blacks were the most immediate threat to whites in America. He blamed much of their violence against whites on "Jewish agitation." Still, Roof believed that the majority of American and European Jews were racially white. As he saw it, the problem was that Jews appear white, yet see themselves as minorities. If somehow every Jew could be turned blue for 24 hours, he reasoned, there would be a mass awakening, as whites would see them for what they really are. But he counseled that if whites could persuade Jews to abandon their Jewish identity, then they would be just like other whites and share the same racial interests. According to Roof, there were both "bad" and "good" Hispanics, noting that white Hispanics make up the elite of most of their countries, but at the end of the day, "they are still our enemies." East Asians, however, were identified as possible allies. Explicitly rejecting traditional patriotism, Roof noted that he hated the sight of the American flag. As he explained, how could whites in America be proud of anything when they were being "murdered daily in the streets" without fighting back? Based on that reasoning, he wrote derisively of veterans commenting that they believe that the nation owed them something for "protecting our way of life." But, as Roof lamented, he was not sure what way of life they were talking about. Instead, he mused, "How about we protect the White race and stop fighting for the jews (sic) [?]" (O'Connor, 2015).

In conclusion, Roof contended that he had no choice but to strike out at his perceived racial enemies. In his own words, he chose Charleston because it is the most historic city in his state and at one time had the highest ratio of blacks to whites in the country. He lamented that people in the white racialist movement did nothing but talk on the Internet. For that reason, it was necessary for him to take the struggle into the real world. When one of his victims in the church pleaded for him to stop, Roof exclaimed: "No, you've raped our women, and you are taking over our country… I have to do what I have to do" (Payne and Bothelo, 2015). Interestingly, the church sits a mere half-mile from Fort Sumter, where the opening salvo in the American Civil War was fired.

Although some representatives of the white nationalist movement expressed empathy for Roof, they were quick to condemn his actions. Matthew Heimbach, the founder of the Traditionalist Workers Party, drove from Cincinnati to Charleston to pay respect for the victims, but he went on to say that Roof was nevertheless a victim because "he was a white man born to a society that actively hates him and his people, hates his culture and his identity" (itsgoingdown.org, 2015). Writing on the *National Vanguard* website, Kevin Alfred Strom (2015) opined that Roof understood much of the race issue, but his understanding was incomplete, which would ultimately make his violence counterproductive from a white nationalist perspective:

> Dylann Roof's actions were inevitable because our race still produces men of honor, and men of honor do not go gentle into that good night. … A man of honor is moved to action when his people are being exterminated and when that willful murder is covered up and justified by lies. … As long as our race survives, it will produce men of honor. Honor without discipline, organization, and understanding, however, is ineffective.

According to Strom, Roof's actions were misdirected because the blacks he targeted were the "least offensive, least dangerous, and among the most self-segregated Blacks imaginable short of actual separatists." For Strom, the real enemy was the "Jewish power structure," which forced the mixing of the races in America. Only with sober analysis, he counseled, could white nationalists attain their strategic aims.

What is the strategic endgame?

Faced with what they see as grim demographic realities, some extreme right activists have abandoned ideas of taking over their entire countries. Instead, they call for the creation of separate mono-ethnic or mono-racial states where they can practice their version of self-determination. For example, beginning in 2003, Harold Covington published a quintet of novels based on a white separatist insurgency in the Pacific Northwest region of the United States (Covington, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2013). Set in the not-too-distant future, the novels extol the exploits of the Northwest Volunteer Army, which wages a war of national independence. Eschewing grandiose schemes to foment a nationwide revolution, Covington argues for mounting a separatist guerilla campaign in a limited region. On his online *Radio Free Northwest* program, Covington exhorts racially-conscious whites to relocate to the Pacific Northwest to form a critical mass for the formation of his future Northwest Volunteer Army. Still, even Covington does not advocate violence under current conditions; rather, only when a certain period of crisis arrives will terrorism be called for (Johnson, 2011). For his part, in his manifesto, Dylann Roof categorically rejected the creation of a rump state for white separatists as outlined by Harold Covington's Northwest Front. To Roof, this was analogous to whites fleeing to the suburbs to avoid blacks or "just another way to run from the problem without facing it." Instead, Roof urged whites to stand up and fight. In a similar vein to Covington, Matthew Heimbach urged whites to reject their American identity for one based on race, as he explained in a talk to his supporters:

> We need to be getting away from symbols, like the American flag. This is the symbol of our occupation, this is the symbol of our genocide, this is the symbol of the nation, that has already said that they will use drones to drop missiles on political dissidents. Do any of us think, sitting in this room, we're not considered political dissidents? We are at war with this system, and if you think for two seconds that George W. Bush or Ronald Reagan would be friendlier to us than Barack Obama is then you have not been reading your history. (itsgoingdown.org, 2015)

But even carving out a territory consisting of a few American states is still a tall order. Instead, some activists urge like-minded racially-conscious whites to congregate together in select towns and neighborhoods. As the native South African activist Arthur Kemp explained in his book, *Nova Europa: European Survival Strategy in a Darkening World*, over time, white nationalists could begin taking over local governments. As their numbers continued to expand, successively higher tiers of government would come under their control. He cites the examples of the Boer colony of Orania in post-Apartheid South Africa and the Zionist project in Israel as successful case studies to be emulated by white nationalists (Kemp, 2015). But to date, such efforts in the United States appear farcical, as evidenced by Craig Cobb's attempt to establish a "whites-only" town in North Dakota beginning in 2011, which has occasioned protests from area residents and derision in the media (Lenz, 2013).

Other extreme right movements reject separatist projects as retreatist and argue that whites should not settle for a rump state in North America in the style of the Northwest Imperative. For example, the Creativity Movement (formerly the World Church of the Creator) exhorts whites everywhere to unite around a racial religion and take over the globe (Michael, 2009). But inasmuch as the governments of Western nations would reject such a project, such goals could only most likely be realized with the collapse of Western civilization itself.

Conclusion

Ultimately, when contemplating terrorism and political violence, attention should be given to the aspirations and capabilities of the extremist subcultures that give rise to these actions. For these factors will inform strategies, tactics, and targets.

At the present time, the future of right-wing extremism is far from certain. Several important political, economic, and demographic trends could have far-reaching effects. If current demographic trends continue, whites could be reduced to minority status in this century in both Western Europe and North America. This development is viewed in nearly apocalyptic terms in the white nationalist segment of the extreme right. Moreover, a festering economic crisis could create a greater pool of the dispossessed that will support radical movements in the future. An ominous development is the collapse of the center in both European and American politics as their party systems are ever more characterized by an ideological divide. As a consequence, right-wing extremism long relegated to the fringe could become more mainstream.

But as this chapter explained, right-wing extremism and terrorism could take numerous forms. Increasingly, the far right in Europe now sees Islam as the most serious threat, while populist parties actually court Jews for support. Although Muslims in America are far more assimilated than in Western Europe,[16] events such as the 9/11 and sporadic lone-wolf attacks by jihadists have heightened tensions between Muslims and their host communities. In the aftermath of 9/11, a massive homeland security apparatus has been erected in the United States. Furthermore, there is much greater intelligence sharing, not only among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, but also among foreign governments as well to combat terrorism. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the lone-wolf trend will continue not only for the extreme right, but other extremist orientations as well.

Notes

1 For instance, according to a 2014 study conducted by the noted CNN terrorism analyst Peter Bergen, since 9/11, right-wing extremists have been responsible for more deaths in the United States than Islamists motivated by al-Qaeda's ideology (Bergen and Sterman, 2014). Another study released in June 2015 by the New America—a Washington, D.C.-based think tank—found that right-wing extremists killed nearly twice as many people in America as had jihadists (Shane, 2015).

2 For a more recent analysis of this convergence, see Wright (2009).

3 The example of Jacob Schiff, who provided financial contributions for anti-tsarist revolutionaries in Russia, is often cited to make the case for Jewish malfeasance. Kuhn was also the head of the New York investment firm Kuhn, Loeb & Co., but also supported the Communists in their struggle against the Tsar in Russia, presumably for the pogroms against the country's Jewish population. For more on this line of reasoning from an extreme right perspective, see Britton (1952), and more recently, Duke (2013).

4 Arguably the most thorough analysis of Jewish involvement in liberal causes from a far-right perspective has been conducted by the noted evolutionary psychologist Kevin MacDonald. In his book, *The Culture of Critique*, he argues that there is considerable Jewish hostility to traditional Western culture, which is manifested in various intellectual movements including Freudian psychology, The Frankfurt School, and Boazian anthropology—to undermine the European-derived civilization of America and replace it with a society more congenial to Jews (MacDonald, 1998). According to his analysis, Jewish organizations have promoted policies and ideologies, which have undermined the cultural cohesion of the West, while practicing just the opposite for themselves. Specifically, Jewish organizations are chided for extolling multiculturalism in the West, while insisting upon ethnic exclusivity in Israel. For a review and synopsis of his research, see Michael (2006a).

5 The ZOG acronym was first introduced in the far right's lexicon in 1976 by an obscure neo-Nazi named Eric Thomson. Thomson wrote an article titled "Welcome to ZOG-World" (www.faem.com/eric/2000/et047.htm). By the 1980s, it attained wide currency in the extreme right subculture.

13

SOCIAL MEDIA, THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT AND TERRORISM

Katherine E. Brown and Elizabeth Pearson

Introduction

In 2015 the speed, scale and reach of social media gave terrorist organizations the capacity to reach some 2 billion individuals. By 2014 there were over 10,000 individual websites (up from 2,000 in 2003) making material available to some 3 billion Internet users in 2015 (Weimann, 2016). Weimann's early (2004) analysis of the thousands of terrorist websites found that every ideology was represented, including Hamas, the Shining Path, the Supreme Truth, and Al-Qaeda. As a result, terrorist recruitment, funding, propaganda, bomb-making know-how and the ability to choose and hit targets, have all been impacted, particularly by Web 2.0 (Mantel 2009). Brachman (2008, 116) shows how Jihadist theologian al-Suri in *The Call to Global Islamic Resistance* 'frequently discusses the Internet and new media technologies, recognizing them as critical vehicles for inciting global resistance'. Terrorists' shift towards the cyberworld simply mirrors society's expanding digital footprint and seamless movement between the 'virtual' and 'real'. Consequently, understanding content alone is insufficient; it is necessary to trace the social human connections, collaborations and networks through which such malleable content flows.

'Online radicalization' is a trending theme in terrorism studies, to the extent that an April 2016 Google Scholar search on this term, as well as 'internet radicalization', harvested more than 20,000 and 15,000 results respectively. Much work is focused on Islamist groups, particularly Daesh (also known as Islamic State, ISIS, ISIL), as this chapter will make apparent; however, no ideology is unrepresented on the Net, and this chapter is concerned with the spectrum of extremism, including far-right, socialist and jihadist movements. Our focus is on 'terrorism' as it is generally understood and therefore excludes non-violent groups and state-sponsored actors. Despite proliferation of research outputs, there are many unanswered questions in research into terrorism and the Internet. This chapter addresses some in four main parts. The first maps mechanisms of the 'radical' or 'extremist' online world. We discuss the uses to terrorists – communicative, social, symbolic and operational – of social media and the Internet. The second discusses the interaction of the online and offline realms, focussing on debates about cyberspace as an initiator, facilitator or 'force multiplier' of extremism in the 'real world'. The final substantive part assesses online counter-radicalisation efforts to date, categorised in two ways: 'negative' activities which seek to 'inhibit' terrorist movements online, and 'positive' counter-narratives which offer alternative content that challenges radical messages. The fourth section explores the

gaps in knowledge, and areas for future research, drawing together the main themes discussed. We then offer a brief conclusion.

Mechanisms of online terrorism: four roles of the Web

Use of social media by today's groups and their supporters or affiliates is firstly communicative, fulfilling the same role as traditional media used by violent radicals of yesteryear (Conway 2004; Nacos 2015). Social media serves as a public platform used to 'influence' broad audiences of potential recruits, motivate members and sympathisers, and to inform the public and news organisations of terrorists' actions and ideas. Its speed, scope and scale far exceed those of traditional modes of communication, and the advantages do not end there. The Net is also largely unregulated, easy to use and low in cost, providing relative anonymity and 'reach'. Additionally, the dynamic nature of social media means users amplify content to reach a wider audience. Boko Haram for some time distributed propaganda videos via YouTube, from where it spread (Onapajo and Uzodike 2012). Daesh developed their own Twitter app, 'Dawn', which automatically downloaded 'tweets' to a given account's timeline. This subverts attempts to close accounts and vastly increases reach through synchronisation with peak viewing times of different time zones. Dawn links to a variety of material, from skilfully produced online 'documentaries' of life in the new Caliphate to news of events such as the opening of a children's hospital. Messaging is multi-functional: promotional and reassuring, as well as vividly brutal (Winter 2015). Net messaging is also carefully constructed to create brand coherence and demonstrate allegiances across groups. After the acceptance of a *baya* (pledge) to Daesh, Boko Haram began to employ Daesh branding in its media output, mimicking particular actions such as special effects, camera angles or graphics in Daesh videos (Wyszomierski 2015; Zenn 2015).

Online messaging can also influence hard-to-reach audiences: youth or supporters and recruits far away. While Sageman (2008, 114) has argued the Internet is primarily a resource for those with 'already made up minds', and authors Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2009) note that the Net is 'largely ineffective when it comes to drawing in new recruits', there remains increasing evidence of its ability to attract recruits with no previous interest in extremism. Pantucci (2011) has argued, 'the increasing prevalence of the Internet and the easy availability of extremist material online have fostered the growth of the autodidactic extremist.' Conway and McInerney's research (2008) analysing YouTube posts and comments of a small group of individuals discussing material concerning the Iraq conflict shows this. The authors demonstrated how individuals browsing generic websites could be targeted and integrated into a specific network, highlighting one case of a young male 'Irish rugby fan' posting a comment about his wish to convert to Islam after watching a Martyrdom video. Within weeks several heavy users of martyrdom YouTube channels with radical links had targeted him for recruitment. Daesh recruiters have also specifically targeted young women in Europe via social media (Conway 2016). Such efforts represent an evolution of a trend noted by Speckhard and Yayla (2016) in Al-Qaeda recruiters to target individuals precisely because they had no prior connections to the jihadist network and were 'clean skins'.

A second role of social media is 'social'. This is achieved in part by 'narrow-casting', channelling internal private communications between members or sympathisers of extremist groups. The online environment can provide safe spaces for debate, organisation and networking, and risks of detection are perceived to be lower than offline. 'Broadcasting' on social media can assist in 'narrowcasting'. On 26 September 2015, just four days after Telegram launched its new 'Channels' tool, Daesh set up its own, '*Nashir*' ('Distributor'). Extremists favour Telegram because of its 'secret chat' function, which encrypts messages and avoids security service detec-

tions. Much extreme activity also takes place on the 'dark' or 'deep' Net. Here, sites are hidden, encrypted using Tor Hidden Services or password-protected and do not appear in any online search (Bartlett 2015).

New online personae through the use of 'skins' or avatars, together with direct access to the creation of group identity, mean the online space can afford individuals more power than they find offline. Communicating anonymously, the Internet is a location in which the limitations of offline identities disappear. Bermingham *et al.* (2009) note the more aggressive expressions within female content in a study of YouTube extremism. For Daesh, women's open online advocacy of violence is a core feature of their support (Hoyle, Bradford and Frenett 2015; Pearson 2015b; Saltman and Smith 2015). This is linked to greater online freedoms afforded women to violent self-expression compared with offline. Al-Qaeda used the online magazine *Inspire* to advertise women's ability to support them through propaganda or fundraising from the safety of '*purdah.*' In contrast, female offline violence is prohibited in all but the most exceptional circumstances by the majority of Jihadi theologians (Von Knop 2007). Online space therefore serves an important function in allowing the expression of sentiment not possible offline, although this may lead to 'dissonance' between online and offline personalities (Brachman, Levine and Baudrillard 2011, 25).

This private use of social media also intensifies the ability to radicalise. The Net works like a virtual echo chamber as confirmation biases are tapped, further polarizing group identities (United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2008; von Behr *et al.* 2013; Madden, 2008). Confirmation bias is heightened further as material is often tailored to specific audiences. The Hamas site *al-Fateh* ('The Conqueror') uses cartoon-like characters to appeal to children, while extreme-right groups have also appealed to young males with online versions of popular computer games that involve shooting homosexuals, black people and other minorities (Selepak 2010). Titles include 'Watch Out Behind You Hunter – shoot the fags before they rape you', 'Border Patrol – don't let those spics cross our border' and 'Kaboom – the suicide bombing game'. However, private online communities need not be hidden. Siibak (2014) describes how the Estonian extreme-right nationalist group '*Eesti Leegion*' (Estonian Legion) evolved in its Internet use in the late 2000s with members convening in communities on the SNS Rate site. These were either private sites, requiring authorised validation to gain admission, or 'publicly private' in that coded language was employed in public sites that could be understood only by intended communities.

Once online, every post, comment and emoji contributes to the symbolic foundations of the 'terrorist world'. Social media does more than simply reproduce or reflect the 'offline world'. Each user can contribute to the shared reality, and so we see both the formation of identity online and in the 'real world', in which it becomes meaningful. These symbols may echo and reproduce symbols employed offline. Jihadi online communities repost particular images, such as the extended right finger, the symbol for unity in God (*Tawheed*). Conway (2012) elaborates in her discussion on the 'radical milieu', which can be contrasted with simple 'sympathizers'. Waldmann notes the milieu possesses 'a form of social structure responsible for the observed in-group cohesion. It is not merely a sum of individuals holding similar political/cultural attitudes' (Waldmann 2010, 25). Web 2.0 enables creativity, interaction, and collaboration, permitting the collective contribution to a particular terrorist worldview. Bjelopera argues that:

> [Online] interactivity blurs the lines between readership and authorship that previous generations of terrorists and sympathizers encountered with pamphlets, newspapers and newsletters. This blurring … encourages people … to more easily see themselves as part of broader jihadist movements and not just … [online] spectators. (2013, 101–2)

Users become co-creators of the terrorist habitus. However, it is not an equal environment; despite popular conceptions of such communities as anarchical, they are often hierarchical in social structures and outputs. Klausen (2015) finds some Daesh Twitter accounts have more influence – a limited number of 'feeder accounts' are important in creating the overall shape and direction of the online terrorism world.

The fourth way in which terrorist groups use social media is operational – the connections to offline action are discussed in the second section of this chapter. Operational terrorist activities are carried out online – cyberterrorism – and include potential terrorist attacks on critical digital infrastructure: major e-commerce sites and governmental networks (Gellman 2002). Brill (2010) discusses a range of terrorist cybertactics, from 'hit-and-run' attacks to attempts to gain and maintain long-term access to the digital infrastructure of perceived enemies, or cyberinvasions to disrupt or disable technology-based targets such as factories or military communication systems (see also Rid 2013). There is also scope for online psychological warfare, as carried out by the Syrian Electronic Army in support of Assad. Engaging in spamming, website defacement, malware, phishing and denial of service attacks, they have targeted political opposition groups, Western news organizations and human rights groups. It has also hacked defence contractor and government websites who oppose Assad (Al-Rawi 2014). As terrorism is about generating fear, so is cyberterrorism (Thomas 2003).

Relationship between 'online' and 'offline' activities

Perhaps the most fundamental research question is, 'what is the relationship between the online environment and the likelihood of offline violent attack'? All studies assume some influence. This section looks at three areas in which the Internet and online social media are thought to influence action in the non-digital world: in initiating real-world terrorism; in reinforcing and sustaining terrorism; and acting as a 'force multiplier'.

Much research has focused on the Internet's utility to initiate interest in terrorist groups and recruit to them, i.e. to 'radicalise', and has generated much fear, given the reach of the Internet and the potential for unpredictable attacks (Mcfarlane 2010). However, studies mostly find the Net-radicalisation relationship is correlative rather than causative. One of the few to use empirical data, an analysis of 15 'radicalised' individuals found the Internet only complemented real-world radicalisation and did not necessarily accelerate the process (von Behr et al. 2013). Before Daesh, researchers found access to the Internet alone does not radicalise; rather, human connections and often 'real life' interactions are required for the 'first spark' of recruitment to a terrorist cause (Hussain and Saltman 2014, 75). It can be difficult to establish which has priority – online or offline – as groups and individuals need real-world issues and practices from which the online-realm springs. Fidler (2015) argues that 'the Islamic State is more a "boots on the ground" than a "bytes on the net" problem'. Reinforcing this cautionary note, Archetti (2015, 51) pleads: 'What must be kept in mind is that narratives are not merely the product of words, but of social practices'. Social media gives access to those narratives; however, it creates communities and builds meaning around these social practices.

Few cases have challenged the theory that the Internet alone is 'insufficient' for radicalisation. However, forewarning perhaps of the current vogue of Daesh recruitment of young women on the Internet is the 2010 case of the lone-actor British student, Roshonara Choudhry. She stabbed her MP, Stephen Timms, in revenge for his support of the Iraq war after watching hours of *jihadi* videos, mainly lectures by charismatic American preacher Anwar al-Awlaki (Hussain and Saltman 2014). Choudhry told police she was acting for Al-Qaeda, but investigators found no evidence of any offline links or online contacts with cell leaders or sympathisers.

She described attacking Timms after watching an Azzam video, which she interpreted as suggesting women might carry out defensive *jihadi* violence after all (Pearson 2015a). While there are lingering suggestions that the full details of the case are not known (Pantucci 2011), it shows that reliance on content-based analysis of terrorist action limits understanding of 'terrorist use of the Internet' (Ramsay 2010). It is important to consider the 'end-users' and how they engage with the messages they find on social media.

Lone terrorist actors are an interesting group; there is evidence of the importance of the Internet in influencing their actions, as few 'lone' actors are actually isolated online, although they may be offline (Gill, Horgan and Deckert 2014). Gonzalez et al. (2015) note that interactions with fellow extremists, or watching extremist media online, radicalizes about 20% of domestic lone-actor terrorists in the United States. Picart (2015) discusses the case of Colleen LaRose in the United States as a self-radicalizing individual who was allegedly recruited by the idea of glory and heroism of 'martyrs' in propaganda and online chatrooms. Simon (2013, 203–4) finds that lone actor conversations with those already holding extremist views are 'among the most influential aspects of the Internet for inspiring terrorist attacks by those who might otherwise never consider going to such extremes'. The Garland, Texas, attackers, for example, created a Twitter hashtag, #Texasattack, hours in advance, which they used to ask for advice and get support from Twitter users during the shooting. McDonald (2016) terms this not just 'premeditated' but 'premediated' violence. Such 'pre-sharing' online has been witnessed in 17 cases of lone-actor incidents, particularly noticeable among school shooters (Birdwell, Smith and Barton 2016).

Cases initially reported as examples of unaffiliated or auto-didactic 'online radicalisation', such as Nidal Malik Hasan, who in 2009 shot and killed 13 people at the Fort Hood military base, may turn out to be 'connected' to known groups. Hasan had not watched the online videos of Al-Qaeda propagandist Anwar al-Awlaki but was later found to have been in email contact with him (Brachman, Levine and Baudrillard 2011; Conway 2012). Terrorist groups are also increasingly aware of the value of non-affiliated but self-motivated individuals. In 2013, Al-Qaeda launched a new pamphlet online called the 'lone *mujahid* pocketbook'. Earlier, Abu Musab al-Suri claimed in *A Call to a Global Islamic Resistance* (posted in 2005) that supporters needed 'principles, not organisations'. Moreover, Hamm and Spaaj (2015) found a 21% decline in affiliated extremist attacks in the United States compared with lone actors, suggesting this is correlated with rising Internet influence.

Key to challenging the ability of the Internet to cause terrorism is the vast amount of extremist material online, contrasted with the relatively low numbers of radicals. Von Behr et al. (2013) point out that incidences of terrorism have not notably increased in the presence of the Internet. They suggest a key power of the Internet is that it 'affords more prospects for radicalisation', but that self-radicalisation is almost non-existent. Clearly the availability of a message – for instance, a *jihadi* video online – does not necessarily equate 'reach' – the message actually being accessed and consumed. Clearly, reach does not necessitate uptake. Online content may have many effects, including alienation from group goals. Responses cannot be predicted.

The second feature of Internet impact on offline activity is facilitating terrorist violence and broader actions. Holman (2016) suggests this facilitation is complex and constitutes an opportunistic link without which 'recruitment' could not occur. He stresses that online recruitment is not a 'one-way' action, echoing Sageman's (2004) 'bunch of guys' theory which highlights the importance of groups seeking the 'link' to organisations. Affiliates, for example, organize plots via peer-to-peer networks without centralized control. Younes Tsouli, the so-called 'Terrorist 007', whose online activities, including the distribution of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) video propaganda led to his 2005 arrest and subsequent conviction in the United Kingdom, is one such

'affiliate'. Although connected to a number of *jihadis* internationally, communication was never face-to-face and always online (Kohlmann 2006).

Another aspect of facilitation is fundraising. Extremist groups rely heavily on donations (Conway 2004). These are either directly solicited via organizational websites or indirectly through front organizations and/or charities; Al-Qaeda was found to use the same bank accounts as some humanitarian relief agencies (Thomas 2003). The Internet can facilitate wide transnational funding networks, for example enabling women in the United States and Canada to raise funds for the Somali Jihadist group al Shabaab (Hahn 2014). The 'dark' or 'deep Web' has a particular role here. Weimann (2016) cites a webpage in the deep Web with instructions for funding, 'the Islamic Struggle without Leaving a Trace', and inviting donations for *jihad* through bitcoin transactions.

Social media and the Internet also facilitate terrorist attack, enabling groups to live-monitor the impact of an attack and gain situational information. This can maximize fatalities, operational success and publicity. Al Shabaab's Nairobi attacks in 2013 were live-tweeted, enabling terrorists to deliver information to the public and media through what was effectively an alternative news channel, to issue further warnings and demands and to justify the attacks in response to Somali suffering and an attempt to garner publicity (Anzalone 2013). Analysis of the Mumbai attacks in 2008 in which Lashkar-e-Taiba activists carried out shootings and bombings across the city over four days indicated that the terrorists were in constant contact with Pakistan-based controllers who were able to keep track of constant up-to-date information from public Twitter posts and communicate it directly to the attackers (Fair *et al.* 2009; Leggio 2008; O'Rourke 2010). Khetan (2009, cited in Oh, Agrawal and Rao 2010, 37–38) demonstrates how this gave them information on the identity of a hostage and impacted on the assessment of the organisational benefits of killing him:

Terrorist: He is saying his full name is K.R. Ramamoorthy.
Handler: K.R. Ramamoorthy. Who is he? … A designer … A professor … Yes, yes, I got it … [The caller was searching on the Internet for the name, and a results showed up a picture of Ramamoorthy] … Okay, is he wearing glasses? [The caller wanted to match the image on his computer with the man before the terrorists.]
Terrorist: He is not wearing glasses. Hey, … where are your glasses?
Handler: … Is he bald from the front?
Terrorist: Yes, he is bald from the front … he is fat and he says he has got blood pressure problems.

As well as increasing the efficacy of ongoing attacks, the Internet facilitates the execution and planning of future attacks as well. Online surveillance permits the targeting of particular locations such as airports and garnering information on their vulnerabilities. Gill *et al.* (2015) found 9% of convicted U.K. terrorists in their study had chosen a target through online research. They also emphasized the particular ability of the Internet to school terrorists. There are tens of thousands of Internet posts relating to bomb-making and IEDs and have been for years (Chen 2011; Chen *et al.* 2008). However, the nature of instruction on how to construct them has changed significantly. Gill *et al.* (2015) compare Copeland's 1999 bomb attacks in support of extreme right-wing ideology on parts of London, and counter-*jihadi* Anders Breivik's 2011 Oslo bomb attack. Despite reading much online material, Copeland could not follow how to progress from one stage of bombmaking to the next. He changed his aims and created a different type of bomb. By the time of Breivik's attack, YouTube offered a video to get him over similar hurdles. The authors emphasize how the interactivity of the modern Internet has changed the technical

capabilities for those seeking particular skills. However, Holbrook (2015) in a detailed study of recent terrorist cases brought before the U.K. courts reveals unaffiliated individuals struggled to turn insights gleaned from the Internet into 'actionable' activity.

Another significant impact of social media on terrorism is the ability to amplify the impact of the violence as a 'force multiplier'. Terrorism thrives on 'the oxygen of publicity', and terrorist communication and propaganda become simultaneously continuous and instantaneous through the digital realm. Online communication allows the events to be relived and experienced virtually over and over, repeating the action. Physical acts of terrorism are 'propaganda of the deed' – namely, events driven by the opportunity to distribute. This was noted back in the 1970s, as Jenkins argued: 'Terrorist attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the electronic media and the international press. Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not at the actual victims. Terrorism is a theatre' (1974, 4). A 1996 example comes from the storming of the Japanese embassy in Lima by the largely unknown Peruvian group MRTA (Silke 2010). Two websites run by sympathizers were able to shape how the group, and the event, were represented in the media, placing significant pressure on government policy as a result.

Demonstrating awareness of this point, Daesh reportedly choreograph videos and stage productions of their actions, rehearsing executions and ensuring the aesthetics are 'right'. Social media increases the infamy of particular groups and individuals – e.g. with videos of executions that make individuals 'famous', personalising the events, and encouraging 'brand' loyalty to particular 'heroes'. So-called 'Jihadi John' attained celebrity status among Daesh supporters after carrying out a number of executions. The advantage of social media in brand-creation is that it appears personalized, thereby increasing the feeling of intimacy with viewers. This has allowed groups to 'upscale' their messages, from the local to the transnational. The extreme-right has been particularly effective in using the Internet in this way (Caiani and Kröll 2015).

The efficacy of interactive, visual, and multimedia material, rather than simple 'text', to radicalise and influence more broadly, is widely noted. This works too for extremist messages; they require 'content', not just speeches – bin Laden grew frustrated at the lack of success of his early sermon-orientated tapes in the 1990s (Burke 2016). Music is shown to be an important component of content. For the far-right, this is often linked to rock music (Futrell, Simi and Gottschalk 2006). Meanwhile, *jihadi* groups create battle hymns (*nasheeds*) that are repeated over and over in videos, on banners and in gifs that accompany websites and other material (Grätrud 2016). Research has shown inclusion of music and exposure to lyrics lead individuals to 'engage in deeper processing and consideration' of *jihadi* messages (Lemieux and Nill 2011, 144). However, producing such material is no guarantee it will be distributed, especially by mainstream news networks or social media sites. For example, Mohammed Merah, who carried out attacks inspired by Al-Qaeda in Toulouse, France, finished editing a 24-minute video clip, posted to Al-Jazeera, of a compilation of images from the GoPro camera that he had attached to his body armour before each killing. Al-Jazeera chose to not show it.

Anti-radicalisation initiatives online

The fight against online terrorism has two key weapons. First are 'preventive' approaches, promoting positive alternative narratives and counter-narratives. The second are 'repressive' modes, involving the removal or restriction of sites. This includes 'takedown' approaches, or the filtering of particular key-words, 'hiding' those words in searches (Briggs and Feve 2014). The counterterrorism fight lies in unlikely alliances of netizens and hacker groups, and government agencies. Indeed, some of the most effective campaigns have come from net-users from communities affected by

terrorism, as they often possess the credibility online with 'target' audiences that governments struggle to attain. The relationship is not an easy alliance, with policymakers repeatedly calling on social media platforms to be more aggressive and proactive. A 2016 U.K. Home Affairs Select Committee report suggested the Internet is a 'Wild West' that requires more social media company initiatives to counter extremism (Home Affairs Select Committee 2016).

The presumed efficacy of the counter-narrative approach is based on the assumption that 'the public is passive and that different members of an audience tend to change attitudes and behaviour in a similar way upon reception – or injection/inoculation, continuing with the hypodermic needle metaphor – of the same media message' (Archetti 2015). Online counter-narratives can also be understood as psychological and mechanical 'noise' which 'interferes' with the messages they are designed to counter (Weimann and Von Knop 2008). To make such a 'noise' strategy credible, Ashour (2010) argues that certain criteria must be fulfilled: each distinct element of a radicalisation narrative needs to be countered; the messengers themselves need to be credible; and a dissemination strategy that maximises existing global institutions is required.

'Jamming' is one 'interfering' and positive method used, and is an example of the ways in which netizens can impact on extremist propaganda as a form of collective rather than directed action. Humour can subvert messages of power and brutality. For example, users of 4Chan, an online 'bulletin board' primarily used to share images on particular themes, employed images of ducks to challenge Daesh propaganda (Gunter 2015). The campaign made global headlines as it ridiculed online images of fighters posing together in macho postures, replacing each face with the head of a toy yellow duck, frequently captioned 'Allah Quackbar' (see Figure 13.1 for examples).

Many counter-narratives emerge spontaneously from particular Internet communities in which extremism appears. 'Counter-Speech' was a project led by the British think tank DEMOS to collect data on content produced by Facebook users to challenge posts by 'populist far-right' hate groups (Bartlett and Krasodomski-Jones 2015). They found a combination of approaches were used to counter extremism online by individual netizens. A non-confrontational constructive comment and questioning strategy in response to such hate speech was common and most popular, along with the use of photos and videos. These had greater reach within Facebook and were often shared. The hashtag #BBOG (Bring Back Our Girls) in response to the Chibok abductions by Boko Haram in 2014 is further example of spontaneous mass adoption of a campaign aimed against terrorism.

Governments may never have the perceived authenticity of grassroots activism, but they have nonetheless sought to reduce and eradicate online extremism (United States Government 2011, 6). Governments act to influence the broader context of' Net radicalisation, with informational campaigns aimed at 'capacity building' to make 'vulnerable' populations aware of dangers online and improve their digital literacy. Saltman and Russell (2014, 3) suggest positive approaches might include 'engagement with extremist ideologies and narratives, development and dissemination of counter-narratives, and addressing the grievances perceived by those vulnerable to or experiencing radicalisation', as well as 'digital literacy and critical consumption education'. Governments worldwide have therefore created their own counter-narrative websites and social media campaigns to directly negate messages spread by terrorist groups and promote their own 'national values'. After the Al-Qaeda-supported attacks of January 2015 on the Charlie Hebdo offices and a Jewish supermarket, the French government created a video challenging Al-Qaeda and Daesh propaganda, suggesting foreign fighters would find a 'hell'. This campaign had the Twitter hashtag #Stopdjihadisme (Pietrasanta 2015). The worldwide and multilingual 'Say No to Terror' campaign is another example. Aly *et al.* (2014) describe it as 'a comprehensive communication campaign comprising a website, media, and social media presence'. The campaign uses a variety of multimedia content, including short videos and posters, for communicating a

Figure 13.1 4Chan 'Allah Quackbar' photographs.

counter-narrative to selected elements of the terroristic narrative. However, Neumann (2013) argues that for such 'counter-speech' to be effective it needs to be distanced from governments and clearly shaped by civil society organisations. This is perhaps why Saudi backing of the 'Say No to Terror' campaign is covert (Aly *et al.* 2014). It is also why the United States government has stressed the need for successful strategies against Al-Qaeda-inspired groups to come from American Muslim communities (Helmus, York and Chalk 2013).

Repressive moves to destroy and remove content are favoured by some scholars due to the direct impact they have on terrorist networks and on the ability therefore to disseminate information. In their Daesh Twitter census, Berger and Morgan (2015) recommend suspension of accounts to disrupt networks and effectively prevent their expansion. While acknowledging the 'whack-a-mole' effect in which suspended accounts (and websites) simply pop up again in a fresh guise elsewhere, Berger and Morgan assert, 'the consequences of neglecting to weed a garden are obvious, even though weeds will always return' (2015, 15). In particular, Berger (cited in Cellan-Jones 2015) suggests the removal of Daesh Twitter accounts is effective, as it 'wastes their time' in being re-established. Berger and Perez (2016) also suggest that users suffer devastating reductions in future follower counts after suspension, that networks are disrupted and that content is destroyed, given that suspension removes tweets in which photos, videos and other files are embedded. While Daesh Twitter supporters have countermeasures such as back-up accounts, suspension is still highly disruptive. Indeed, between 2015 and August 2016, Twitter used a campaign of suspension to successfully reduce ISIS supporter numbers by as many as 360,000 ('Combating Violent Extremism' 2016). This has served a deep blow to Twitter ISIS online networks, recruitment and funding.

'Hactivist' communities have also been hugely influential in striking coordinated attacks on Daesh media. The hactivist group 'Anonymous' that emerged from 4Chan has collectively reported thousands of Daesh-supporting Twitter accounts *en masse* on a number of occasions, resulting in their suspension. On one day in April 2015, for example, Twitter suspended 10,000 accounts associated with Daesh extremism (Hall 2015). Other methods of takedown include denial of service (DDoS) attacks to overload servers, SQL injection attacks (accessing and 'inject-ing' malicious database code) to hijack websites and corrupt them from within and 'doxxing' extremist sites, as when Ghost Security and the separate Ghost Security Group helped prevent an attack in Tunisia (Brooking 2015).

'Takedown' has been a key component of law enforcement and prosecutions on terrorism too. In 2010, the United Kingdom opened a Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit that in cooperation with companies addresses Internet activities that violate legal prohibitions against glorifying or inciting acts of terrorism ('The Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit' 2010). In April 2015, the European Union also set up an Internet Referral Unit to address terrorist content on the Internet, and a month later the French National Assembly adopted legislation that expanded the government's surveillance authorities' magnitude and ability to counter ter-rorist threats (EUROPOL 2015). In the case of suspected terrorist Sohiel Omar Kabir, the Department of Justice (DOJ) used his Facebook activity to identify his involvement in terrorist activity (The Investigative Project on Terrorism 2012).

Fake sites are also used by government agencies; these cause suspicion and paranoia among terrorist sympathisers by increasing doubt about the authenticity and reliability of online material. The Dutch intelligence service AIVD (*Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst*) car-ried out such an operation, administering a false *jihadi* website that enabled officers not only to access the details of users and monitor communications sent via the site, but also to infect with spyware the computers of radicals who downloaded material (Olmer cited in Torres Soriano 2012). Officials also organized the dissemination of a fake issue of the 'Voice of Jihad', the flagship online publication of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. Readers of the publication encoun-tered two completely different Issue No.14s simultaneously online, a situation that triggered major confusion (Torres Soriano 2012), and there is 'Operation Cupcake', a 2010 British secu-rity services operation to disrupt the Al-Qaeda *Inspire* magazine, whereby files were infected with viruses and recipes for cupcakes replaced the normal code and content of the website (Gardham 2011).

Such approaches are not without problems, however. There is potential for 'takedowns' to have perversely beneficial impacts for those targeted. In particular, Pearson (2015a) found Twitter Daesh supporters building community around suspension itself, constructing it as a form of 'online martyrdom'. Suspension was used to bolster narratives of institutional Islamophobia, and '*wilayat* Twitter' came to be regarded as an extension of the battleground of Syria and Iraq. Suspension did not 'waste time', as it was perceived as a Twitter 'life event', male supporters in particular using return from suspension as a badge of honour. They incorporated screenshots of suspension into online profiles, or used the number of times they have been suspended as 'handles', for example, @omgnotagain313.

Second, there are issues around civil liberties and transparency. Cowls and Brown (2015) out-line the key difficulties of repressive interventions in human rights terms and the international law. They list challenges to a number of freedoms: freedom of expression, the right to privacy, freedom of association and assembly and freedoms of thought, conscience and religion. There is no agreed definition of 'terrorism' worldwide (Schmid 2012), therefore there are questions over how to identify the extremist material that should be removed. There is also the question

of where and how material appears, whether in public, semi-private, or private, and the com-plex issue of the law and the location (geographically) in which content may originate, versus that in which it is deemed problematic. Given the potential costs to civil liberties, Neumann (2013) argues that the most effective way of tackling radicalisation online is not via denial-based strategies, because they risk countering the values that Western liberal democracies are trying to protect. Instead, he proposes using social media to gather evidence, intelligence and data on terrorist groups and individuals to bring them to justice.

One question raised is the degree to which private companies and service providers should bear the responsibility for extremist content, versus law enforcement and government. Social media providers such as Twitter have rules and limitations for users on the content that can be tweeted. However, they also have obligations toward their users. This can lead to inconsistency. The @HSM_Press official Al Shabaab account which live-tweeted the Nairobi Westgate Mall attack was removed as Twitter staff became aware. However, a similar account @HSMPress_ tweeted similar propagandistic material and remained active, as it claimed it was not affiliated to Al Shabaab (Sullivan 2014). Putting the onus on companies to delete and censor content may also impact negatively on freedom of expression. Filter lists and rules are not transparent; users cannot see how searches are blocked. Cowls and Brown (2015) cite an anonymous industry expert who cautions against reliance on industry without wider debate of the bigger policy questions: 'the danger is that the policy debate becomes coloured by the notion you can short-circuit hard legal questions by applying political pressure to industry. There needs to be more work to address these hard challenges' (2015, 82).

Third, there are issues around the sheer quantity of output and where to place the emphasis. Again, to use Daesh as an example, most of the supportive online content is in Arabic. However, Twitter takedowns tend to focus on output in the West, in European languages. This is not where the greatest content is produced, nor the key languages in which propaganda appears. There is therefore a skew to the expression of Daesh terrorism in particular locations rather than a coherent attempt to counter the core of the group. One of the difficulties of localised campaigns against transnational groups is fragmentation. For example, there are hundreds if not thousands of current worldwide and NGO programmes producing online narratives to counter this. This enables them to be location-specific but also represents a fragmentation of the response versus the coherence of Daesh strategising.

Gaps in knowledge/limitations in research

Conway (2016) notes that previous innovations in technology – tape recorders, television – have revolutionized terrorism, so we should expect the Net to do so too. What is needed is the empirical research to determine this. One of the key challenges of work on online extremism, or any online environment, is the mercurial nature of the Internet. Content appears, then is taken down; movements and trends evolve at great speed. By the time research is done, peer-reviewed and published, and policymakers ready themselves for the bureaucratic processes of response, it is already out of date. However, the sheer volume of data and the richness of its content – mes-saging, documents, videos, images, symbols – means there are many possibilities for new research (Prucha and Fisher 2013).

For current research there is a considered need to avoid simplistic technological determin-ism – the belief that a technology, due to its mere existence, must produce certain effects. It is important to focus efforts on understanding not merely the content that is available online, but the ways in which this content is used in the process of radicalisation. That is to say, most

research focuses on the 'supply' side of this debate, and the experience of radicalisation or use of terrorist material online is less well understood.

Much research has pointed to the need for civil engagement in countering extremism and the capacity-building of netizens (Briggs and Feve 2014; Hussain and Saltman 2014). Pilot research projects seek to determine the ways in which such interactions might work. There has been work at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, for example, to analyse youth responses to counter-narrative 'adverts' which appear in response to relevant online searches (Tuck 2015). 'Highly personal' messages were found to be the most effective (Frenett and Dow 2015). Such projects could be extrapolated and built on.

As this chapter makes apparent, there is also a skew in terms of research towards the current specific interests of government and whatever group or movement is perceived as representing the biggest security threat. The chapter has derived many more examples from the new phenomenon of Daesh than from other groups, because they are the current Western focus. At the same time, Europe is witnessing a rise in the populist far-right, there are separatist groups mobilising in Turkey and the Caucuses and narco-insurgents in South America (Morrison and Sanchez 2014), all of whom use social media and the digital world. There is clearly a need to widen research to other movements.

Conway (2016) has five other suggestions for future research: that it should deepen the individual experience; upscale to gather large-N samples of data; show greater consideration of gender; and learn from other disciplines and areas of Internet study. These last categories are important in situating the phenomenon of radicalisation against the broader social backdrop. At the same time, there is a tendency, as with offline terrorism studies, to decontextualize 'radicalisation' and to view it as a special case. This is despite evidence that online political extremists may well share key behaviours and characteristics with other forms of extremism, such as users of pro-anorexia sites (Graham 2015). Particular areas of interest may lie in comparisons with other youth movements, and better knowledge of the particular uses of different age demographics of particular sites. McDonald (2016) points to the mediatisation of not just terrorism but violence too. Teenagers who pause midway through a violent assault to post pictures posing with their victim is an example. An examination of youth and representations of violence on social media may shed light on extremism and broader violence too (United Nations Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force 2012). This is particularly important, as social media is a space dominated by a youth of 'digital natives' (14–24-year-olds), and can seem alien to counterterrorism officials seeking to 'protect' 'at-risk' youngsters from radicalisation.

Concluding points/summary

As Gill *et al.* (2015) point out, 'online' extremism is as multifaceted as 'offline'. It is a contoured space, with multiple functions and possibilities for terrorism, all of which must be painstakingly identified and disaggregated in order to see the specificity of activity and meaning, and counter each in turn. This chapter explores three of the key areas of research: the role of terrorist content in social media; the relationship social media and the online realm have with 'real world' terrorist events; and counterterrorism efforts online. As the final section of the chapter shows, there is considerable ambiguity in our understanding of terrorism 'online', due partly to a paucity of empirical data, and conceptual weaknesses. Nevertheless, as the connections between the 'digital' realm and other areas of life deepen and intensify, the ongoing intellectual and policy utility of this research is without doubt.

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TERRORIST GROUP STRUCTURES

Balancing security and efficiency

Joshua Kilberg

A crucial and often misunderstood aspect of the study of terrorism is the organizational structure of groups. What affects the organizational structure of terrorist groups? How does the structure of a group affect its behavior? This chapter will seek to address these questions and, in the process, will argue for the importance of understanding organizational structure as a critical tool in counterterrorism analysis.

Terrorist groups strive to balance efficiency with their need for security. On one hand, it must maintain its security in the face of counterterrorism efforts; on the other hand, it must strive for greater efficiency. While a simple idea, in practice, these two goals are at odds with one another. The extent to which a group copes with its security environment is what determines if a group will persist or not. A terrorist organization with the right structure for its environment is a group that has adapted and reached the right balance between security and efficiency.

When examining terrorist group organizational structures, both the internal and the external forces acting on the group have an effect on a group's behavior (and on its success). *Internal forces* are those arising from a group's motivations and the choices it makes while planning and executing attacks. *External forces* are the forces acting on the group that are beyond its control; they describe the environment in which the group operates. To understand organizational structure is to understand how a group deals with these internal and external forces.

This chapter is organized as follows: first a brief review of the previous research related to terrorist group organizational structures. Second, four organizational structures are introduced. Third, some general trends of how organizational structure is affected by the group's environment and how structure, in turn, affects the group's behavior. Finally, some concluding remarks.

Constraints on terrorist groups: balancing security and efficiency

Terrorist groups are constrained by the resources they have at their disposal, by the ideology of their supporters and by the counterterrorism efforts they face (De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2006, p. 1). For example, the more effective the counterterrorism effort, the more discerning a terrorist group will have to be when recruiting new members. In a more permissive environment, recruitment can be open and member vetting may be of lesser importance. By contrast, in a non-permissive environment – that is, where the group faces a well-resourced and effec-

tive security apparatus – recruitment may need to occur in secrecy and new members may be restricted to those with familial ties to ensure trustworthiness (Simmel 1906).

Like any illegal organization, however, terrorist groups must maintain some level of secrecy to survive. Without the right level of secrecy, a terrorist group becomes vulnerable to government forces. This need for secrecy, while necessary for survival, also constrains the group in terms of how it can communicate with its members and how it conducts its operations. In a permissive counterterrorism environment, for example, communications can be more overt, frequent and, therefore, more efficient. By contrast, a non-permissive counterterrorism environment will push the group to strictly limit their communications, which increases security but decreases efficiency.

Like other illegal groups, the organizational structure of terrorist groups is driven primarily by the need to maximize concealment and security; this is done at the expense of maximizing efficiency (Baker and Faulkner 1993). So, while secrecy and security is a paramount consideration for terrorist groups, the group must also effectively and efficiently accomplish tasks if they are to be successful. In this way, the types of tasks being performed are important. Social psychology and organizational theorists agree that it is the information–processing requirements – the type of data, its complexity and the intelligence of an individual required to accomplish the task – that dictate, to some extent, what form the group will take (Baker and Faulkner 1993, p. 844). For example, simple, routine tasks are accomplished more efficiently in a centralized structure, while difficult tasks are accomplished more efficiently in a decentralized structure. Therefore, if a terrorist group is not facing serious threat, it should organize itself in a more hierarchical way in order to routinize tasks (e.g., create a communications unit and a training center).

This finding is supported by the social psychology of small groups and organizational theory research, which argues that, for small groups, high information-processing, such as simple and routine tasks, are performed more efficiently in centralized structures.

The pressures within a terrorist group vary based on the level of clandestinity they must use in order to evade capture or death. For example, secrecy and concealment is not a high priority for groups like Hamas, who are able to operate overtly in the West Bank. For groups operating in states where the degree of state surveillance is high – such as the Red Brigades in Italy or the Red Army Faction in West Germany in the 1970s – their members live clandestine, isolated lives. The more clandestine a group is forced to become, the less connection there can be with their supporters and the general public. Groups pushed to adopt the highest levels of operational security must, in effect, sacrifice organizational structures that could improve efficiency.

Taking these views into account, two propositions emerge. First, terrorist groups face unique challenges, distinct from normal organizations. Second, the clandestine nature of some terrorist groups – when compared to the overt nature of others – is likely due to the permissive (or constraining) conditions within the group's home country.

Organizational typologies of terrorist groups

Understanding the machinations of organizations such as corporations has been a popular topic of study over the past several decades. Early studies in this area focus on the transaction cost argument that transactions move from markets (one-off interactions) to hierarchies as the knowledge specific to the transaction builds up (Child 1972). In other words, once it makes sense for transactions to become routinized, a hierarchy will emerge.

Networks occupy the middle ground between markets and hierarchies. Networks occur when organizations maintain dense interconnections – sometimes even with competitors – that cannot easily be explained by saying that these organizations are engaged in market transactions.

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Table 14.1 Terrorist group structures

Structure	Leadership? (e.g., clear leader or leadership structure)	Functional Differentiation? (e.g., a political wing or a propaganda unit)	Centralized command and control?
Bureaucracy	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hub-spoke	Yes	Yes	No
All-channel	Yes	No	No
Market	No	No	No

This middle way – networks – lack the large span of control and specialization made possible in a hierarchy but enjoy greater flexibility. Networks themselves can take various forms (detailed below), each of which possesses different characteristics.

As most of the research extant on organizational structure focuses on licit groups (i.e., groups operating within the law), it identifies efficiency as a paramount concern for groups in which profit, not ideas, is the main motivation. Keck and Sikkink (1998) offer a view that fundamentally differs from many of the aforementioned views. Their transnational advocacy networks, unlike firms, are motivated by values, not profit. Arquilla and Rondfeldt (2001), RAND Corporation scholars, have done the most work on conceptualizing the structure of illegal groups. These scholars note that since illicit groups face drastically different challenges from their licit counterparts, illicit groups must be examined differently.

No group is an exact match for any of the idealized types of structure below. In reality, many groups combine features of different types and change their structures over time. As explained in Table 14.1, the below structures are listed in order of most to least centralized.

Bureaucracy

A bureaucratic structure is the most hierarchical of all the structures. These groups have: "clear departmental boundaries, clean lines of authority, detailed reporting mechanisms, and formal decision making procedures" (Powell 1987, p. 69). The relationship between the agenda–setting leadership and its subordinate units is clearly defined and unidirectional (Heger et al. 2012). Child (1972) finds that bureaucratic organizations tend to be more rule-bound and require greater documentation of their efforts. An example of this type of group is Hezbollah; its command structure is dense, elaborate and centrally controlled (Ranstorp 1994). Like other large organizations, Hezbollah has separate departments, each with its own specialization.

Bureaucracies, then, provide clear and obvious lines of authority – everyone knows their place within the group and their responsibilities. There is a chain of command ensuring that all of a group's actions fulfill the strategic objectives of the campaign (Neumann 2011). Bureaucracies also ensure top-down coordination, leaving the group's leadership to respond to changing circumstances, enemy actions and other factors that may require a change of strategy. There is also the possibility of lower ranks of the group feeding information back up to the leadership, providing timely information of changes on the ground. This, in turn, improves the leadership's ability to respond and make strategic adjustments. Bureaucratic groups are highly likely to be nationalist groups with narrow goals such as territorial change.

The main disadvantage to an otherwise highly efficient system is that this structure provides little operational security. For a bureaucracy to work, it must be highly interconnected, with

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frequent communications between units and with the chain of command. This makes the group vulnerable to arrests and infiltration, because every member will be familiar – and therefore able to betray – the group's internal structures, processes and personalities. It also exposes the group to enemy disruption. Since a bureaucracy is reliant on top leadership for command and control, leadership strikes are expected to have a more pronounced effect than with other types of structures (although the research on this is mixed). In a famous scene from the film *The Battle of Algiers*, Colonel Mathieu, commander of the French paratroop regiment sent to disrupt the uprising by the Font de la Liberation Nationale (FLN) in Algeria, sketches out on a blackboard the organizational structure of the group. Colonel Mathieu outlines a bureaucratic structure in which each member has knowledge of just three members: the person that recruited them; and the two people that they themselves recruited. Through a campaign of torture, the French military eventually identifies the group's leadership. Had the FLN adopted a more decentralized structure, in which no one central leader holds centralized command and control, a structure in which decisions are downward delegated to the cells themselves, the French could have used any type of torture they wanted, but they still would have had great difficulty in dismantling the group.

Hub-spoke networks

Networks are a newer type of organizational structure that are less hierarchical (i.e., flatter), more decentralized and more flexible than bureaucratic structures. Networks generally lack the large span of control and specialization enjoyed by hierarchical groups but enjoy more flexibility. These networked groups can be further differentiated by their characteristics; each possesses different strengths and weaknesses (Krebs 2002). Overall, networked groups remain smaller and flatter than bureaucracies, yet possess some form of leadership, differentiating a network from a market.

The hub-spoke structure is like a franchise or a cartel where a set of actors are "tied to a central (but not hierarchical) node or actor, and must go through that node to communicate and coordinate with each other" (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, p. 7). These types of groups have a leader and employ functional differentiation but do not have central command and control. Rather, the nodes of this group have more individual autonomy to plan and carry-out attacks. Kenney (2003, 2007) employs a similar typology in his study comparing narcotics networks and terrorist groups. The hub-spoke structure can be found in groups of a variety of motivation but are most often religious or nationalist-separatist (Kilberg 2011). An example of a hub-spoke network is pre-2001 Al-Qaeda.

All-channel networks

This type of network requires "rapid, dense, multidirectional communications to function well and endure" (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, p. 287). It is for this reason that all-channel networks require the most multidirectional communication. The rise of the network form – and in particular, the all-channel network – is tied with the information revolution (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001). Diverse and dispersed actors can now regularly and easily coordinate and take action across great distances where, previously, this was not possible. All-channel networks do have a leader, but there is little hierarchy and no central control or functional differentiation in these groups. Decentralized groups are more likely to be religious, left-wing or right-wing and are more likely to have broad goals such as social revolution.

An example of an all-channel network is Al-Qaeda post-9/11. Following the invasion of Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda atomized in an attempt to evade destruction by U.S.-led forces. In so

doing, Al-Qaeda's leadership shifted away from a command-and-control role, in which the leadership had more of a say in day-to-day operations, to a group in which lieutenants and cell leaders were empowered to make more of the decisions. Owing to the vastly more difficult security environment in which Al-Qaeda's leaders found themselves after 9/11, the group's leadership became much less hands-on and more inspirational in nature.

Market groups

This term is used for groups with very little organization. Market groups have no discernible leadership, are not centrally controlled and have no functional differentiation (Powell 1990; Williamson 1973). These "groups" are almost more of a movement than they are a typical organization, and membership is essentially open to all. This structure is also referred to as the leaderless resistance model described by Beam (1992). In this type of group, a leader does not dictate individual behavior, and members lack any real oversight or direction from above. Because of its highly decentralized nature, a market group is prone to losing sight of the agenda. Furthermore, since these groups lack centralized command, their constituent cells may diverge from the group's stated goals and may prove to be counterproductive for the cause. While relatively rare, these types of terrorist groups do exist and are characterized by a diverse and decentralized group of individuals sharing little more than common cause and committing acts of violence under the aegis of a particular group. An example of a market structure terrorist group is the Earth Liberation Front (ELF). Under the ELF banner, distributed, often completely unconnected cells of environmental activists claim acts of eco-terrorism (Joosse 2007).

What forces affect organizational structure?

Terrorist groups are free to choose their targets and their methods of attack. They make these choices based on ideological reasons, but they are also constrained by the structure of the counterterrorism environment. Terrorist groups, then, are shaped by the character and capacity of the society and government in which they operate. In order to succeed – or at least persist – these terrorist groups must cope with a variety of challenges.

External forces

External forces are those exterior pressures and phenomena acting on a group. In order to maintain relevancy, and to successfully navigate their environment, terrorist groups must adapt to the external forces acting upon them.

Counterterrorism effectiveness: Put simply, the better a state is at fighting terrorist groups, the more likely the group is to be small and decentralized. Owing to a lack of good data, counterterrorism effectiveness, however, is difficult to compare between countries. Previous research suggests that countries with a high gross domestic product (GDP) per capita are more likely to be effective when fighting against terrorism (Kilberg 2012). The reason is simple: states with a high GDP per capita have more resources available to dedicate to counterterrorism.

Everything being equal, in a state with greater counterterrorism effectiveness, groups will be pushed to adopt decentralized structures. More decentralized groups, however, are more difficult to disrupt. In the face of strong counterterrorism efforts, it is mostly networked or market groups that are able to survive (Kilberg 2011). These decentralized groups tend to be most successful in a strong counterterrorism environment because they present fewer targets; communication is sparse, and leadership interdiction is less likely to have an effect than with a

centralized group. By contrast, in countries where the counterterrorism efforts are ineffective, hierarchical groups prosper.

Political freedom: Political rights and civil liberties in a state place external constraints on a terrorist group; exactly what type of relationship the existence and level of civil liberties have on a terrorist group is debatable. Some argue that a lack of political and civil freedoms in a state are directly linked with the incidence of terrorism (Walsh and Piazza 2010). On the one hand, when the political and civil rights of a population are diminished, access to decision makers and the ability to citizens to have their voices heard are reduced. In states lacking freedom, citizens will be more likely to resort to terrorism because they lack access to non-violent political expression.

On the other hand, a more dictatorial state is free to use harsh methods of repression when confronting terrorism. In these situations, a terrorist group might prefer a more decentralized structure with anonymous cells, which can be more resistant to coercive counterterrorism efforts (Kilberg 2012).

Durability of a polity: States with stable systems of government are more adept at dealing with threats and maintaining power. Any polity – totalitarian, democratic and everything in-between – that has endured for decades has proven that it can effectively confront challenges to the state, such as terrorism. In less durable polities (i.e., in states where there has recently been a change in the system of government), terrorist groups will tend toward adopting a larger, more hierarchical structure. This is because there is a very real chance of that group seizing power from the current government. Any group that hopes to replace the government in such a situation will strive to adopt a governance structure mirroring the state. It is also because unstable states are less effective in their counterterrorism strategies.

Older, more established, polities tend to push groups to adopt market or all channel structures (i.e., decentralized), not bureaucracies. The stability of long-lasting polities confers some advantage to the state. This advantage is observed by the constraints it places on terrorist groups. Only those groups with decentralized structures can operate in older, more established polities.

Internal forces

While it is certainly true that a group's structure is chosen in part due to external factors acting on the group, forces within the organization also shape its structure. For example, certain targets (such as choosing hard targets) and certain attack types (such as armed assaults) require coordination and a relatively high number of terrorists in order to be successful. Consequently, groups choosing these attack features will only do so if their internal structure permits it; the choices a group makes speaks to the internal forces at work.

Hard target selection: A group's target selection shapes the structure it adopts. Groups that successfully attack hard targets, such as police and military targets, need to possess a more complex set of organizational characteristics. The reason for this is simple: attacking a hard target means the group will almost certainly encounter armed resistance. If a terrorist group is to persist, it must have enough capability to withstand a response. By contrast, attacking a soft target, such as a shopping mall, does not pose the same risk to a group since the target is often unarmed civilians. Groups which do not attack hard targets do so for one of two reasons. First, their mission does not require attacking hard targets, or attacking hard targets would be counterproductive. For example, some groups may avoid human casualties altogether, opting instead to attack unoccupied targets to minimize the risk. Second, a group may not possess the aptitude (or the required numbers) to attack a hard target. Previous research indicates that if a group has a centralized structure, then it has the capacity to pull off hard target attacks (Kilberg 2011).

Group goals: The variation of the goals of terrorist groups vary widely. This variation may affect the chosen structure of the group. Some seek broad goals, such as complete social revolution, seeking a new empire or regime change; others have far more narrow goals, such as preserving the status quo, forcing a policy change or securing territorial change (Jones and Libicki 2008). It is argued here that the more esoteric and far-fetched the goal, the more loosely organized the group, since there is no operational imperative that selects a more centralized structure. In other words, groups with broad goals simply wish to express their grievances in a violent way. Conversely, groups that have narrow goals, such as maintaining the status quo or seeking territorial change, are much more likely to believe that they will achieve their goals and therefore will adopt a more hierarchical structure in anticipation of achieving their goal. In a study about the end of terrorism, Jones and Libicki (2008) conclude that less than 10 percent of all groups ever achieve victory. However, everything being equal, narrower goals are more achievable than broad, poorly defined goals.

Groups can be categorized into five non-exclusive categories: left-wing, right-wing, religious, nationalist/separatist, and single issue. Left-wing groups in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s had a particular character and some common tactics (Rapoport cited in Cronin and Ludes 2004). Nationalist struggles, owing to their large well of potential support, tend to represent the longest lasting groups. These groups include the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna in Spain and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. Religiously motivated groups often have similar organizational structures to nationalist groups since they both have a deep well of potential support (Post 2005).

The impact of leadership: The overall importance of a leader is mixed. For market and networked groups, the leader has little to do with the day-to-day operations of the group (in the case of a market group, there is no real leader). For these structures, the leaders occupy a role of figurehead or deity from which ideology and inspiration are drawn but planning and executing attacks are not. For bureaucratic structures, the leader plays a key role in the operations of the group (Rowlands and Kilberg 2011).

The so-called kingpin strategy has been used for decades as a strategy to break up illegal organizations such as drug cartels, the mafia and terrorist groups (Kenney 2003). The logic behind this strategy is that targeting the leadership of an organization should disrupt operational and strategic functioning of the group. With the destabilization of these core elements of the group, its capacity to conduct operations should diminish, and its cohesiveness should decline. With enough disruption, it may even be possible to induce distrust, infighting and atomization of the group, which in turn may even lead to the collapse of the organization.

Conclusion

In providing a review of terrorist group structures, this chapter explains the internal and external forces affecting terrorist organizational structure. As secret organizations, terrorist groups are not only driven by efficiency, they must also protect themselves from infiltration and threats (Volders 2016).

In terms of external forces, the counterterrorism environment shapes the structure of groups. The more open the society, the more decentralized the organization. A similar relationship exists in terms of the wealth of a state (used as a rough proxy for counterterrorism effectiveness), as well as polity durability. Ideally, there would be a measure of counterterrorism effectiveness and/ or capacity that would allow intra-state comparison. At present, such a measure does not exist. This is an area for future research. In terms of internal forces, several factors shape the structure a group adopts in complex ways: target selection, group motivation and leadership.

22

CYBER TERRORISM

Marcus Rogers

"Cyber Terrorism": these words in and of themselves send shivers down the spines of government leaders, military brass and the general public. Since 2001 and the events of 9/11, terrorism in all of its manifestations has become the "bogeyman" hiding under the bed (Rousseau, Jamil, Bhui, & Boudjarane, 2015; Stohl, 2006). Governments have used "protection from terrorism" as the "raison d'être" for new laws, regulations, and increases in budgets for intelligence agencies (Canter, 2009; Coady, 2004; Victoroff, 2005a). The media has embraced the fascination and generalized fear of terrorism and attributes almost every violent event, no matter how minor, to terrorists, either foreign or domestic. The film industry has elevated terrorism and/or the fight against terrorism into its own genre. This societal anxiety toward terrorism over the past decade or so has pushed research in this field into the forefront. Unfortunately, not all of the research has been scholarly or at least empirically-based (Matusitz, 2008). A fair amount of the research has been conducted from a military or intelligence framework, or worse, a journalistic approach that uses unsubstantiated anecdotes and a dubious reliance on informants or supposedly ex-terrorists.

Regardless of the hype and/or sensationalism surrounding terrorism, the truth remains that terrorism is a fact of life, globally, in the 21st century. No country seems to be immune from the reach of terrorists. Modern technology such as relatively cheap international airfare, the ubiquitous Internet and the World Wide Web have extended the reach of these violent organizations to almost every known part of the world. It is this factor of technology and how it is being co-opted by the terrorist groups that is the focus of this chapter.

Let us begin this exploration of terrorism and its use of cyber space and cyber technologies by agreeing on a definition of terrorism that we will then use to try and understand what exactly cyberterrorism is, what is the real threat of cyberterrorism, what if any unique psychological characteristics cyberterrorists have, and finally what can be done to mitigate the risk of cyberterrorism.

While there are numerous definitions of terrorism that run the gambit from intelligence-based to societal and anthropological, the following will be used as the foundation for this chapter:

> The organized use of violence to attack non-combatants or innocents... or their property for political purposes.
>
> *(Coady, 2004)*

This is a very concise definition that captures the core of terrorism, regardless of how that terrorism is expressed (e.g., bombings, shootings, or cyberattacks). This definition extends well internationally and divorces itself from the mechanism by which the violence is carried out. Being agnostic regarding the choice of how the violence is manifested allows for a much broader and, more importantly, realistic analysis of terrorism and by extension cyberterrorism (Canter, 2009; Coady, 2004; Silke, 2003). Using this as a foundation, we will focus on behaviours that are purposeful, include violence or the threat of violence, and are not aimed at the military or governmental agency that is directly or indirectly tied to the military.

Current landscape

It would be an understatement to claim that in the terrorism space there has been plenty of activity. In the past few years, we have seen unrest in the Middle East that has been referred to as the "Arab Spring", and international relations with North Korea, China, and Iran have been stressed and strained. The presence of international armed forces in the Iraqi theatre and Persian Gulf has ignited tensions with fundamentalist groups such as the Taliban, Muslim Brotherhood, and ISIS. Terrorist threat reports, terror alerts, and coverage of bombings and mass shootings are almost commonplace and not unexpected on the nightly news.

Given the increased attention being placed on the various groups, actors, and nation states, we would expect to find very concrete examples of cyberterrorism, or at the very least, terrorists using technology as a force multiplier. However, to accurately determine what, if any, is the extent of this activity is quite controversial. The media would have us believe that cyber terrorism is running rampant and the "Huns are at the gate". The intelligence agencies claim success in thwarting cyberterrorist attacks, but since they were thwarted, they did not actually occur; thus there is no subsequent record of the event. Certain private sector companies have claimed they were the victims of cyberterrorism, but a "root cause analysis" often points back to a nation state or state sponsored entity. Were these cyberterrorist attacks, or examples of cyberwarfare operations? The infamous Sony attack is an excellent example. Initially it was deemed to be the work of hackers, but over time it became apparent that it was more likely a state-sponsored, if not a national intelligence agency(ies') offensive cyber operation (i.e., China) (Sanger, 2015). It is obvious that clearly delineating what constitutes cyberterrorism is extremely difficult, yet very important.

Not cyberterrorism

Before we delve deeply into the weeds, let's set the boundaries or scope for what will *not* be considered cyberterrorism. This is actually easier than defining what it is. Cyberterrorism is not hacktivism. Hacktivism, while targeting cyber space and its technology, does not have the goal of causing fear or violence. Its goal is to make a political statement in such a manner that the group gets media and thus the public's attention (Murphy, n.d.). Cyber operations or cyberwarfare are not cyberterrorism. Cyber operations or cyberwarfare largely target military or strategic targets; any damage to purely civilian or non-combatant systems are usually considered collateral damage. This is no different than traditional warfare (Kallberg & Thuraisinham, 2015). Lone hackers attacking healthcare or banking systems are not cyberterrorists, they are petty criminals or in some cases members of criminal organizations, not terrorist groups (Rogers, 2006).

Once we eliminate all of the actual non-cyberterrorists, we are left with very little (if any) research or data on cyberterrorism. This is because most of the research or media stories have focused on the above noted activities or actors; these are the proverbial low-hanging fruit – they

might not really be cyberterrorists, but they are identifiable and willing to talk or participate in research studies – therefore, "close enough".

Psychology

Previous work (including by this author) has tended to focus on how terrorists use technology. It has examined the terrorists' efforts to recruit and market (propagandize) for their organization or group and how the Internet is used for fundraising or covert communications (Denning, 2001; Silke, 2008). While fascinating, this is no different than describing how any modern business uses the Internet/technology and tells us nothing important about cyber terrorism.

Thus, the days of assuming that technology and cyber space were only being used by terrorist groups as marketing and recruitment tools are over. This is no longer the reality of how terrorists place importance on cyber space. This is not to say that these groups are not still using social media to get their messages out, to recruit new members, and/or attract media attention. However, this is just standard business practice in today's wired, globally-connected world.

Several authors have stated that they are doubtful that terrorist organizations attract members with enough technical acumen to allow them to conduct cyberattacks at the level required to be worthy of being coined as acts of terrorism (Denning, 2001; Wilson, 2010; Yunos, Ahmad, & Yusoff, 2014). Two things are troubling about this assertion. The first being, what is the threshold for determining an act to be terrorism? Do we define it solely based on the target or the victim(s) of the attack (e.g., civilian businesses, critical infra-structures), or by the intent of the attackers? If the attacker's objective is to cause widespread fear in hopes of furthering their ideological or political beliefs, is this sufficient to be categorized as terrorism? Do we focus on a group's philosophical beliefs or their instrumental beliefs (Coady, 2004)?

The second troubling aspect of the previous statement is that it almost completely misses the reality of today's younger generation. The generation of young people most at risk of becoming radicalized into terrorism because of frustration, the desire to find meaning, or simply to satisfy the need for glory and excitement, are the "wired generation". This generation has been referred to as "Digital Natives" because of their familiarity and comfort with technology (Prensky, 2001). While there is some controversy whether this cohort is fundamentally different from previous generations in relation to social norms, ideologies, and other cultural norms, it is self-evident that their comfort with technology is unique. Digital natives are those individuals born after 1980 (Prensky, 2001). Businesses have had to re-think their working environment and policies related to personal technology in the workplace due to the high value that these young people place on technology and being constantly connected (Prensky, 2001). Unlike previous generations, where only a select few "geeks" or "techies" understood and used technology, the current generation is just as much at home on the Internet and social media as they are in the physical world (Bennett, Maton, & Kervin, 2008; Gasser & Simun, 2010). Technology holds no mystique and is seen as merely a tool that is used to carry out tasks, keep in constant contact with friends and/or loved ones, or to be entertained. This marginalization results in the majority of young people being more than technically qualified to conduct attacks in cyber space.

Not only is insufficient skill not a limiting factor for cyber terrorism, the current generation of so-called digital natives views cyber space and technology as a right. The ability to be connected 24/7 is viewed as an inalienable right, similar to the freedom of speech and freedom of association. Cyber space is as much a part of their day-to-day lives as the real world is. Self-worth is often tied to the number of friends or "likes" one has. Negative comments online can be so devastating as to cause individuals to take their own lives (van Geel, Vedder, & Tanilon, 2014). Cyber space and technology are integral components of this generation's existential experience.

Their social selves are very dependent on cyber space and the technologies necessary to be and stay connected.

This connection to cyber space makes it a logical medium to carry out attacks that, while they may not have a direct connection to violence in the physical world, are devastating to the denizens of cyber space. As a society and culture, we are even more dependent on technology and this dependence (now both psychological as well as technological) is only going to increase. The dependency may soon become physiological as well, given the advances in connected medical devices (e.g., pacemakers, insulin pumps), health technologies, wearable devices, and the Internet of Things (IoT) and Virtual and Augmented Reality (VR & AR). These are all game-changers in the discussion of cyber terrorism. The often espoused statement "who cares about terrorists online as they cannot kill people from cyber space?" is no longer valid; now they can, and in the near future, this will become even more frighteningly possible (Janczewski & Colarik, 2008; Matusitz, 2008; Wilson, 2010).

The shift by nation states into the realm of cyber operations is a clear indicator of the "weap-onization" of cyber space (Pomerleau, n.d.). Cyber operations can be defined as: "Cyberspace operations is defined as the employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace" (GAO, 2011). Cyber operations include offensive network operations as well as the more traditional passive defensive operations designed to detect and protect infrastructures. These offensive operations include direct attacks at the "enemy's" cyber infrastructure in an attempt to destabilize or cripple that infrastructure (Kallberg & Thuraisinham, 2015). Obviously, the military has decided that cyber targets have a value and are part of the doctrine of war in the 21st century, so why wouldn't terrorist groups? Research on terrorist groups has shown that many of these groups are students of modern warfare and read the same materials as students attending West Point or any such other military college (Winterfeld & Andress, 2012). We need to stop underestimating the enemy!

It would appear that researchers examining terrorism are woefully out of touch with the reali-ties of how ubiquitous technology is and how enslaved we are to it. As the importance of cyber space increases, not just from a cyber infrastructure perspective, but also from a personal and cultural identity, the more logical it is that attacks will occur here. In fact, we may have already witnessed real-world examples of cyber terrorism. Examples often cited are attacks against Sony, cyber jihadist activities directed toward Egypt, and attacks directed at various U.S. government systems (although it becomes murky trying to differentiate between terrorist acts, state-sponsored or condoned, and military cyber operations) (Stern, n.d.; Stohl, 2006). Despite these examples and the fact that the younger generation consider cyber space as part of their social self, little if any empirical research has been published on cyber terrorism. The majority of published "research" on cyber terrorism uses an ethnographic approach that relies very heavily on unsubstantiated anecdotes (Horgan, 2012). Anecdotal-based research is problematic in and of itself. It is even worse when the subjects of the research are prone to exaggeration regarding their exploits and skills, and potentially score high on dishonesty and amorality scales (Rogers, Seigfried, & Tidke, 2006).

Automated tools

The claims that terrorists do not possess the requisite skills or knowledge to conduct cyberat-tacks are further weakened by the reality of automated tools. It is a well-known fact in the computer underground that you do not necessarily have to be technically skilled at coding to be able to attack something or someone in cyber space. You can actually buy the services of some-one to carry out the attack, or buy a made-to-order/customized automated tool on the Dark Web. These customized tools, such as Zeus or ZBot, have been available on the hacker black

market for years and have changed the nature of cybercrime. Now any type of attacker profil-ing has to take into consideration that it might be profiling a tool as opposed to a real person (Rogers, 2003a,b).

Several terrorist groups possess more than enough money to hire top hackers to create cus-tomized tools, and in some cases, actually pay hackers (not affiliated with the terrorist group) to carry out the attack. The net worth for Al-Qaeda and the Taliban has been estimated to be in excess of $3 billion, and for ISIS at $2 billion (obviously exact numbers are difficult to come by) (Haltiwanger, 2014). Therefore, if we actually believe that terrorists lack the technical ability themselves, the economic resources of these groups allow them to purchase automated tools from those who are more technical, thus making the argument a moot point.

Personality characteristics

The decades of research on traditional terrorists have revealed that there is no real stereotypi-cal generic terrorist personality (Silke, 2008). The types of people drawn to terrorism are as diverse as the beliefs of these groups themselves (Canter, 2009). To claim that one could pro-vide a profile of a terrorist would be analogous to claiming that one could provide a profile of a generic criminal or hacker; this would be meaningless, as it would be too generic. So how do we go about understanding the psychological makeup of a terrorist that uses or targets tech-nology? I have purposely decided to use the wording "Terrorists that focus their attacks on technology or cyber space" as this provides a much more meaningful, if not accurate, descrip-tion of the problem we are trying to deal with. It does not make sense to define a terrorist by their choice of attack vectors (e.g., plane terrorist, bomb terrorist). If we continue to think this way, we will be creating artificial silos that will further impede our ability to understand these individuals.

Let's look at what we do know: terrorists are not "insane" or necessarily suffering from some sort of psychopathology (Victoroff, 2005). This notion has been debunked and was never accu-rate, but it did give us a false sense that these people were the exceptions, and generally speaking, the human race was not so evil. As such, despite evidence to the contrary, this notion of the psychotic terrorist has persisted. The media has long embraced this stereotype as well, which may also account for its longevity.

Understanding cyber terrorists (terrorists who use cyber technology) brings us to the cross-roads of research on hackers, cyber criminals, and cyber terrorism. For the sake of this discussion, we will consider suicide bombers outside of the scope, as these individuals likely comprise a special sub-category of terrorism (Kaplan, Mintz, & Mishal, 2006; Post et al., 2009). The cur-rent body of work in the area indicates that radicalism and a sense of being disenfranchised are positively correlated with membership in a terrorist group. So too are a need for excitement and the desire for meaningfulness and glory (Victoroff, 2005b). These last characteristics are not that dissimilar from traits found in individuals that join the military establishment. Young people are often drawn to professions that can provide them with a sense of identity by being part of the larger group. An interesting finding has been that there appears to be a positive correlation between thrill-seeking and terrorist membership (Venhaus, 2010). Certain individuals seem to crave stressful situations (aka "thrill seekers") and can satiate these feelings somewhat by carrying out terrorist activities (Post, 1990).

As stated previously, the majority of terrorist members do not suffer from psychopathy nor are sociopaths (Post, 1990). Few would be diagnosed with any type of mental illness outside of what we would find in the "normal population" (Victoroff, 2005). The socioeconomic back-grounds are very diverse, as are the educational levels. As was stated previously, there is no

Table 22.1 Risk indicators

Trait or risk factor	Hackers	Terrorists
Disenfranchised	X	X
Stress-seeking	X	X
Seeking meaning	X	X
Seeking glory	X	X
Low social morality	X	X
Young males	X	X
High dishonesty morality	X	
Poor social skills	X	
Radicalized		X

generic terrorist personality profile, as environmental pressures play an equally important factor in determining terrorist membership as any psychological trait(s).

Let's recap: there is no one hacker psychological profile, and no one terrorist psychological profile, but what if we combine these groups and look at the intersection of the individuals for any risk indicators? We may discover something different. Granted, risk indicators are a far cry from a psychological profile, but they are necessary steps in the process. Table 22.1 lists the traits of each category separately (hackers, terrorists that focus on technology).

From Table 22.1, we can see that there is significant overlap between the traits or risk indicators between the two groups. Admittedly, this is a very rudimentary model, but it can act as a type of scaffolding in order to derive a more sophisticated framework for researching this topic. Both hackers and terrorists are primarily young males, with low social morality, are seeking fame and glory, stress-seeking, and feel a sense of being disenfranchised (Victoroff, 2005). It would seem that the other important components, like being radicalized, could be developed or result from socializing with individuals that also feel this way (Victoroff, 2005). As Akers (2000) indicated, differential association is a mitigating factor in deviant behaviour. Both hacking and terrorism fall into the general category of deviance, albeit at almost opposite ends of the spectrum. By associating with radicalized youth, this becomes the reference point for how the hacker begins to feel about themselves and the outside world that exerts pressure on the group. The identified overlaps support the theory that we can extrapolate from the findings of studies on computer criminals and hackers to cyber terrorists.

Further evidence to support the assertion that we can extend our understanding of cyber criminals and hackers to cyber terrorists focuses on the organizational structure similarities between the two groups. Matusitz (2008) concluded that cyber terrorist groups may use a somewhat flattened hierarchical model consisting of a loose network of individuals. The structure is also decentralized with flexible structures and associations. By using the lens of social network theory (Degenne & Forse, 1999), he concluded that social connections were very important.

The current research on cybercriminal organizations (e.g., Anonymous) have identified that this criminal group also consists of a loose network of individuals, with a decentralized and flexible structure (Broadhurst, Grabosky, Alazab, Bouhours, & Chon, 2014). These organizations are highly dependent on social connections to carry out and coordinate their attacks. These affiliations are very dynamic and flexible, resulting in different members participating in different attacks and for different reasons (Broadhurst et al., 2014). This characteristic makes stopping these groups very difficult if not impossible to achieve.

Weaponization of technology

Both cyber terrorists and cyber criminals share the same "weapons". For both groups, technology is not only the target, it is the weapon as well. For both of these groups, hacking tools and methods such as botnets, distributed denial of services attacks, cross-site scripting attacks, SQL injection, buffer overruns, Trojan horses, and other near zero-day attacks, allow them to disrupt and infiltrate their targets (Broadhurst et al., 2014). Since the theatre for these attacks (whether by terrorist groups or cybercriminals) is cyber space, both of these groups are presented with the same limitations and opportunities that are inherent in today's Internet technology (Janczewski & Colarik, 2008). The same vulnerabilities that allow a criminal group to steal millions of health records allow a terrorist group access to this information as well, or worse, access into a hospital's network where critical medical systems could be attacked and disabled (e.g., dialysis machines, electrical systems) (Liebowitz & Schaller, 2015). Ransomware attacks cannot only be used by criminals to extort money from hapless victims; they could be used by terrorist groups to disrupt critical command and control systems by encrypting databases, etc.

It is also clear that cybercriminals and cyber terrorists not only use the same "cyberweapons", they also target similar if not identical victims. For the most part, the victim is not a person or single work station, it is usually a network or some component of a country's critical infrastructure, such as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), air traffic control, or financial servers (Janczewski & Colarik, 2008; Kaplan et al., 2006; Weimann, 2011). Often the attacks focus on key systems and servers that allow for a "toe in the door" in order to launch further, more invasive attacks.

This "weaponization" of technology and choice of targets further emphasizes the overlap between cyber terrorists and computer criminals. Thus, as was stated previously, we can use what we know about the psychology of cybercriminals as a foundation for understanding the cyber terrorist.

Psychology of cybercriminals

The current findings indicate that hackers are not more educated, nor do they possess higher intelligence than everyone else (Baggili & Rogers, 2009; Rogers et al., 2006; Woo, Kim, & Dominick, 2004). There does not appear to be any correlation between cybercriminals/hacking and ethnicity, nor religious preference or educational background (Taylor, Fritsch, & Liederbach, 2014). In order to avoid trying to provide a picture of every conceivable type of cybercriminal, we will focus more on the lone wolves, that while they may be part of a loosely organized criminal group or gang, they are not professional criminals merely extending their trade to the Internet (Rogers, 2006). The psychological makeup of these individuals has been well studied in the fields of white collar and organized crime, and is beyond the scope of this chapter. We will also limit the extrapolation to individuals who become part of terrorist groups and target technology, but not to professional mercenaries or professional soldiers tied loosely to nation states or tribal identities. These, again, are presumed to be a different category that has its own distinct psychological makeup (Canter, 2009; Victoroff, 2005).

What do we know, then, about hacker psychology? Although older research has shown a negative correlation between hacking and low socioeconomic status (SES), the significant drop in the cost of technology and its "ubiquitousness" have offset this finding in more recent studies (Rogers, 2014). Current research indicates that hackers are usually younger (16–25 years), score higher on amoral dishonesty scales (Rogers et al., 2006; Rogers, 2014), and tend to set their moral compasses based on a personal moral code as opposed to an internalized societal

morality (Rogers *et al.*, 2006). Other studies have concluded that hackers are opportunistic and lack mature interpersonal skills and/or person-to-person communications. The majority of the studies, to date, have focused primarily on the personality characteristics and/or traits related to Goldberg's Big Five (Saucier & Goldberg, 2002). The Big Five or its derivative tests (NEO, PI-R, OCEAN) are thought to measure the personality traits of Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. Amorality, Dishonesty, and Authoritarianism, and Moral decision–making have also been studied within the cybercriminal community (Rogers *et al.*, 2006; Rogers, 2014). The various studies have concluded that cyber-criminals, aka hackers, score low on Extraversion (they are more introverted), low on Openness to experience, low on Agreeableness, high on Authoritarianism, high on Amorality, and follow an internal moral compass for Moral decision–making (Rogers *et al.*, 2006). There is also some support, as was mentioned previously, that hackers are risk takers and may suffer from autistic conditions (Ledingham & Mills, 2015).

What is not clear is that while hackers are significantly different from non–hackers on the traits previously listed, are they significantly different from other criminal classifications (e.g., white-collar criminals, fraudsters)? The last comment aside, we do have a framework, however shaky, to begin understanding cyber terrorists. Once we can better understand the cyber ter-rorist, from a psychological perspective, then we will be better able to harden potential targets and potentially make an early identification of individuals at risk of becoming cyber terrorists. This predicative component deserves a cautionary statement. As with other early indicators of deviance, whether it is criminal insiders or moles within government organizations, simply possessing or displaying any of the risk factors or traits does not mean that the individual is 100 per cent certain to become a deviant. Human behaviour is not so simplistic. Other factors, such as environmental stressors, situational contexts, or even mental illness, play a role regarding if and when the risk factors lead to the behaviour (Shaw, 2006). In many instances, the factors never lead to aberrant behaviour. It needs to be made clear that we do not and will not pos-sess (at least anytime soon) a crystal ball that will show us who is going to become "bad" and who is not.

Despite the similarities between hackers and cyber terrorists, we need to be aware of at least one major difference: Hackers and cyber criminals are motivated financially, as there is a lot of money to be made from cybercrime (Hua & Bapna, 2013; Rogers, 2006). This economic motivation means that there are limits as to what they will do and how far they will press their attacks. The same is not true for terrorists. We need to recognize that using technology to launch an attack, or targeting technology, does not erase the fact that cyber terrorists are still terrorists, first and foremost. Terrorists don't have defined parameters or rules for their engagements. The more damage, the better. The more carnage, the more the world will sit up and take notice (Ahmad & Yunos, 2012; Stohl, 2006; Wilson, 2010). These individuals are usually very highly motivated by their religion, ideology, or sense of injustice at a very visceral level (Victoroff, 2005). They are not generally interested in financial gain (while they use technology to raise funds, they don't plan their attacks with the notion of a nice return on their investment).

It is very important that we understand how large the gap is between the passion and motivation of cyber terrorists and hackers. The same conventional wisdom that we use to protect and defend systems and networks from hackers is not going to work against cyber terrorists. The strategy of making the cost of the attack too expensive given the outcome is almost useless when dealing with cyber terrorism (Ahmad & Yunos, 2012; Hua & Bapna, 2013). We need new strategies and new ideas based on a fundamental understanding of who our enemy is.

Conclusions

Terrorism appears to be here to stay. Terrorism as a part of our society is a sad truth that the very fabric of our culture needs to adapt to. Since we are a technology–dependent world, we need to also realize that cyber terrorism is a reality as well. Despite the advances we have made in technology and cybersecurity, we are susceptible to hackers, and as such, we are vulnerable to terrorists who choose to employ and attack technology and our critical infrastructures – aka cyber terrorists. We have witnessed the rapid evolution of our businesses and educational systems as they have embraced technology and the new knowledge-based global society. Just as these positive sectors of our society have adopted technology, so too have the "darker" sectors. It has been estimated that cybercrime has eclipsed international drug trafficking as a revenue genera-tor for criminal organizations. The profits are estimated to be in the billions of dollars annually. Given the high profit margins for cybercrime, there is no lack of talent or funding to support this criminal enterprise (Hua & Bapna, 2013).

While we seem quietly resigned to accept cybercrime as a part of our globally wired econ-omy, we still struggle to grasp the real threat of terrorism in cyber space. Whether it is a type of defence mechanism, to be in denial that the same technology that has brought so many advantages has also left us with a huge Achilles heel, or some kind of global blind spot, the con-sequences are the same. Until we better understand cyber terrorism, we will continue to be in a weakened state, unable to protect, defend, deter, and retaliate against cyber terrorism.

This chapter has attempted to show that due to the commonalities between cyber terrorists and cyber criminals, particularly hackers, we can extend our understanding of the risk factors and psychological characteristics of hackers to construct a foundation or framework to better under-stand the psychology of cyber terrorists. The element of "cyber" seems to be the unifying force that binds these two groups together. We need to leverage this to our advantage and start to be proactive as well as reactive to the threat of cyber terrorism. Knowledge gleaned from this exercise can be used to harden targets, mitigate the damage in the aftermath of these attacks, and potentially predict attacks and attackers before they strike or become too radicalized to be deterred.

If society continues down its current path, it won't be too long until we have more than enough data on terrorists who target and use technology to have robust and validated behav-ioural models. These new models will no longer require us to extrapolate from like deviant sub-groups, such as hackers. However, until such time, we will have to make do with what we have and resign ourselves to the fact that sometimes a model does not have to be perfect (just good enough) in order to make progress and benefit society.

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27

ISLAMIC STATE

Francis Gaffney

Islamic State is an extremist Islamic organisation that grew out of a violent insurgent group that has changed its name a number of times to reflect its geographic ambitions. Islamic State has previously been referred to as 'Islamic State in Iraq' (ISI); 'Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham' but also 'Islamic State in Iraq and Syria' – ISIS); 'Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant' (ISIL); and, more recently, as Daesh (from the Arabic al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham). However, this title can be understood in two ways – as a play on words and as an insult ('to trample down and crush' and 'a bigot who imposes his view on others') (BBC News, 2015; Wedeman, 2015).

The name changes have also been intended to reinforce the group's global ambitions, forming one nation based on a shared faith but also in an attempt to remove the previous colonial boundaries (Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916) that had split tribes along 'arbitrary' borders. In November 2015, the United Kingdom followed other Western countries in adopting the use of the name 'Daesh' to refer to the group in order to reflect that the group is not a *de facto* State by any international interpretation or recognition.

Islamic State is a transnational Sunni insurgent and terrorist group that claims the Jordanian terrorist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, as its founder and inspiration. Its religious legitimacy for its actions is based on an extreme Salafist/takfiri interpretation of Islam that essentially means that anyone who opposes its rule is, by definition, either an apostate ('murtad') or an infidel ('kafir'). Although much of the Middle East is Salafist, takfirism is widely considered too extreme for most (with even the ideologues who support Al-Qaeda criticising the absolutism adopted by Islamic State – the perceived indiscriminate violence and atrocities against non-Sunnis risked alienating its Muslim support) (Malsin, 2015).

Islamic State's successes thus far can be attributed to a number of factors: a large number of supporters it has attracted to its goals; significant cash reserves; shrewd use of social media and the Internet; and its capacity to operate as a military organisation. It has thrived in states where the respective administrations have failed to govern due to conflict or political instability (Maliki's Iraq, Assad's Syria, Hadi's Yemen, and the political vacuum left in Libya after the deposition of Gaddafi, but also in the Sinai Peninsula and Nigeria), seizing territory, critical national infrastructure (energy resources and financial institutions), and military equipment.

Within territory it has seized, Islamic State maintains structures observable in State-run towns and cities (*The New York Times,* 2014); shops, schools, roads, energy utilities (Hubbard and

Schmitt, 2014), infrastructure, welfare services, and security (Zelin, 2014). Such activities require large budgets, and this is achieved through multiple sources of revenue (Bahney *et al.*, 2015) such as oil sales (Solomon, Chazan and Jones, 2015), commercial and personal taxes, transport tolls, kidnap, looting, and racketeering Its monopoly over the management of these services provides another measure of control and a form of penalty for adjudged offences.

Islamic State's influence outside of the Middle East can be attributed to its strong ideological religious appeal that represents different things to different audiences (Cronin, 2015). It is the widespread belief of Salafists that the Muslim congregation can and should return to the simplicity and consensus that existed in the earliest days of Islam. Islamic State reinforces the perception that the influence (and interference) of the West in Muslim countries has made these countries corrupt, blasphemous, and decadent and, therefore, sanctions violent revolution and the overthrow of these 'puppet' administrations. Its occupation of large areas of Iraq and Syria underpins the focus of the group's efforts in the Middle East; however, a series of attacks inspired or directed by Islamic State have claimed hundreds of lives outside the region, including in the West. Such attacks are linked to religious radicals attacking the Western sponsors, or those perceived to be supporting such administrations (e.g. Russia in Syria).

Essentially, Islamic State's interpretation of Islam demands the harsh and absolute rejection of any innovation since the time of the Prophet. It argues that any diversion from the puritanical precepts that they draw from a literal reading of the Qu'ran (and the Hadith) is blasphemy, and must be eradicated. It follows, therefore, that Shi'ism, Sufism, or essentially anything (or anyone) that does not conform to their interpretation of Islam, should be destroyed and that all actions are in the interest of reviving Islam, returning it to its pure form (Bunzel, 2015).

The establishment of Islamic State

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi formed the Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad ('Group of One God and Holy War') organisation in Jordan in 1999. Following his release from prison (for possession of weapons), he moved it to Iraq in 2004, and after pledging its loyalty to Al-Qaeda (AQ), renamed it Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Zarqawi had been linked to Al-Qaeda while in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, and his AQI group was instrumental in the collapse of order in Iraq in the early part of this century – particularly in attacks on Shi'a.

Zarqawi believed an alliance with AQ would give him access to essential funding but also attract new recruits (and other avenues of funding) to his group. AQ also gained from the relationship Zarqawi's group – it gave it a much-needed presence in Iraq (where Western troops were also fighting) as another front for its jihadist goals. Zarqawi centred his activities in Fallujah in the Anbar Governorate – a home for many Sunni Muslims with a history of resistance to central government control – that gave him access to the main trade routes in the west of Iraq.

Many observers and media commentators (including Rabil, 2014; Jeffrey, 2014; Weiss and Hassan, 2015) have proposed that the fall of Saddam Hussein's Sunni Arab-dominated administration and the subsequent rise to power of the majority Shi'a population resulting in deep Sunni resentment was the most significant factor in Islamic State's growth and influence. The appropriation of energy resources from Sunni tribal areas to fund a Shi'a administration angered many Sunni leaders. Zarqawi took advantage of this animosity by the Sunni minority to this new Shi'a leadership (and its Western backers) to foment sectarian division. The sectarian focus, however, led to a major disagreement between Zarqawi's AQI and Al-Qaeda's senior leadership (Fishman, 2006). Zarqawi thought the focus should be fighting to oppose leaders in the administrations in the Middle East that did not adhere to the Sunni tradition, rather than conducting attacks against the West.

The fall of Hussein's administration, and the succeeding (Shi'a) Maliki government, caused many Sunni Army personnel to be dismissed. This left thousands of Sunni men unemployed (including many Ba'athists), disaffected, and marginalised (but still armed). With many weapons still readily available, the AQI's ranks swelled with new recruits. Many Sunni in Iraq were sympathetic to AQI's cause (driving the Western Coalition from Iraq and preventing a Shi'a Government) (Eisenstadt and White 2005). As Coalition operations started in 2004 to clear AQI-controlled areas in Anbar, the group moved north along the Tigris River Valley towards Mosul.

After Zarqawi's death in June 2006, AQI leaders (including Zarqawi's long-time friend, Abu al Masri) rebranded the group's number of factions into "Islamic State in Iraq" (ISI). Despite some commentators' assessments that Zarqawi's death would cripple the group, Masri initially managed to maintain much of the group's momentum (overseeing some of its bloodiest sectarian attacks). However, eventually he and his successor (Abu Omar al-Baghdadi) were both killed by a tank shell in 2010, severely limiting the group's ability to launch attacks until the appointment of its current leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in 2010. ISI rebuilt its capacity – made much stronger by the Coalition withdrawal in 2011/2012 – and by early 2013, the group was back to conducting the same number of deadly attacks (over a thousand deaths a month) as it had achieved when it was at its peak.

Although Baghdadi originally regarded the 2011 Syrian uprising as a distraction from his Iraq-centric campaign (he even forbade his Syrian-born followers from leaving Iraq to join the conflict), in mid-2011 Baghdadi did allow Abu Mohammed al-Golani to set up a base of operations in northern Syria. These efforts in Syria proved so successful (attracting recruits from both inside and outside the country) that it eclipsed the activities in Iraq.

In April 2013, Baghdadi (in an attempt to reassert his authority on both sides of the border) announced the merger of ISI with the Golani's Syrian Sunni opposition group (and sworn to AQ), Al-Nusrah Front, under the new name of the "Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham" (ISIS – it was also referred to as 'Islamic State in the Levant' – ISIL). However, after many disagreements between the two, the leadership of Al-Nusrah (including Golani) complained to Al-Qaeda's senior leadership and asked for a ruling.

In February 2014, after a number of months of negotiations and attempts at reconciliation, Al-Qaeda rejected the merger, ordering Baghdadi to curb his operations in Iraq, and appointed Golani as AQ's leader in Syria. Baghdadi refused to accept this ruling, increasing the division between himself and AQ (and therefore competition for Sunni support in the region). This forced AQ's senior leadership to rule that AQ was no longer affiliated with ISI, nor was it responsible for Islamic State's actions (notably the bombing of Shi'a mosques) and ordered it to disband. Baghdadi then, with the help of Amr al-Absi (a Syrian fighter), set about re-establishing himself in Syria, becoming a dominant force, drawing away many of the foreign fighters of Golani's Al-Nusrah group. ISIS/ISIL became a beacon both as an opponent of Assad's administration and as a successful Salafist/takfiri group.

On 29 June, Baghdadi changed the group's name to 'Islamic State' and declared the revival of the 'Caliphate' with himself as 'Caliph Ibrahim II' (Joshi, 2014). He demanded the Muslim world recognise his 'Caliphate' and him as 'Caliph' (DW, 2014), and for all jihadist organisations to pledge allegiance to his Islamic State or be declared apostate. By October 2014, his self-declared 'Caliphate' was in control of territory stretching from north of Aleppo to south of Baghdad and included the cities of Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq; about six million people on either side of the Iraq-Syria border were living under his rule[1] (representing a partial control of the former Caliphate). Since 2014 many groups (and individuals) have pledged allegiance to Baghdadi, describing themselves as Provinces ('wilayah') of this broader Caliphate.

The declaration was intended as a rallying call to all *observant* Muslims, but in particular those who shared the Salafist views expressed by his group, and so drew more support from like-minded groups in Syria (and the wider Middle East region) that might compete for recruits and resources. There has since been an ongoing power struggle between AQ and Islamic State for the role of global authority on Muslim undertakings (and for recruitment of more people willing to take up jihad). Not only was Baghdadi's group becoming more financially independent of AQ, its success in committing attacks against the non-believers and in the West (AQ had not carried out any significant attack since the July 2005 London bombings) was contributing to a very successful recruitment of new fighters to its cause versus joining AQ.

The failure of states to ensure security and stability within their territorial borders eroded their legitimacy and allowed groups such as Islamic State freedom to operate. Such operations/activities could be either as an insurgency to a perceived oppressor (who has become more intolerant and repressive as the hold on power deteriorated) or as a conscience to perceived corruption in an administration (by exposing their un-Muslim activities and Western influences). Islamic State attempted to provide Muslims with religious guidance, thereby legitimising its ignorance of national boundaries and challenging the legitimacy of traditional States in the region.

Islamic State's acknowledgement of high-profile attacks elevated its status with the world media (and governments) as the new primary exporter of transnational terrorism (usurping AQ's global jihadist agenda). Its proficient publicity apparatus (both Internet and its *Dabiq* publication) surpassed other jihadist originations in its global reach and sophistication.

Islamic State charter

There is no formal charter for Islamic State, however, on 12 June 2014, having captured the city of Mosul, ISIS released a 'Charter of the City' (wathiqat al madina),[2] which outlined its laws in 16 points. These included such things as: the daily prayers to be observed on time; the proscription of drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes; the banning of non-ISIS flags or paraphernalia; the banning of weapons; all shrines and graves to be destroyed (they were considered polytheistic); women to wear the niqab; and thieves to have their hands chopped off.

The Islamic State identifies with a hard-line version of violent Jihadi-Salafism (or jihadism). Throughout its existence, this has been a central tenet and is predicated on an extremist interpretation of Islamic texts and the life of Mohammed (and the example of his early followers) with its 'jihad' primarily directed against the Shi'a tradition (but also all non-Salafists) (Meijer, 2009; Wiktorowicz, 2006). Its two objectives appear to be the governance of territories it has seized to establish a Salafist concept of authority and to win support to gain more territory.

The Islamic State's aim is to restore the 'Khalifa' (Caliphate) that existed before the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement of the First World War and be governed by Sharia law. It sees the national boundaries as being unnatural, having been imposed by (Christian) European states. This objective advocates a strategy that could include violent jihad against local opposition but also (as a global adaptation) the defeat of Western powers that prevent the establishment of a true Islamist State. The 'Caliph' would also be one worthy to be considered a successor to Mohammed's political authority. Baghdadi's reported descent from the Quraysh tribe (the same as Mohammed), and his religious education, advances his claim and legitimacy to be called 'Caliph'. His choice of 'Ibrahim II' was an attempt to demonstrate his lineage to Ibrahim I, who ruled the Ottoman Empire in the 17th century.

Ideology

The Islamic State's ideology evolved within the context of the Iraq conflict in the early 21st century. This period saw the overthrow of the minority Sunni administration and Ba'athist Party in Iraq to be replaced by the majority Shi'a government supported by the West. This was accompanied by the arrival of a young generation of jihadis influenced by the more extreme Salafist tradition, and later the Arab Spring caused the destabilisation/or removal of many of the administrations in the region, with many States experiencing deteriorating security conditions.

Zarqawi contributed to two main tenets of Islamic State's ideology: anti-Shi'ism and the restoration of the Caliphate. Zarqawi called for the execution of Shi'a in Iraq (even AQ did not go this far in its interpretation of Salafist teaching), apostates, and non-believers, the elimination of idolatry (including Western fashions), and the promotion of true Muslim beliefs. Islamic State claim they are the successor and defender of Mohammed's approach, instigating a conflict between true Muslims and those they consider non-believers.

Another influential strand in Islamic State's ideology was that of Ba'athism, evident in its organisation (Baghdadi's two deputies) and political objectives. Following the fall of Hussein's administration, many ex-Ba'athists joined forces with the Sunni insurgency (and ultimately Islamic State) with sufficient joint benefits to overcome any ideological divergence.

Organisational structure

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is the self-appointed Caliph, who governs an administrative and religious organisation that includes close advisers, role-specific, regional, and provincial councils. It has a clear, top-down leadership that attempts to manage and grow its aspirational Caliphate. Under the Caliph, as part of the leadership, sit the Shura and Sharia Councils. These two councils oversee the compliance of all the other parts of the group's activities with Sharia law (including supervising the discipline, laws, police, and courts), and ensuring directives from the Caliph are carried out.

The councils (which include the Provincial, Military, Security & Intelligence, Religious Affairs, Finance, and Media) are responsible for the military and administrative order of the group, including asserting and maintaining control of seized territory, campaign-planning for the capture of new territory, financial management of seized assets, and communication.

The method of governance at the central level (with a mirrored regional structure) was similar to bin Laden's AQ in the late 1990s (Gunaratna and Oreg, 2010). The central management machinery was to be replicated at lower geographical levels and locations – each with a measure of autonomy to achieve the group's objectives within a local context/operating environment.

Islamic State divided its regions into a number of provinces or governorates (wilayat) led by a Governor (wali) who controlled a local structure of councils (this also included the subordinate sectors' led by 'sector emirs'). The number of provinces increased as more 'satellites' added their allegiance to the group's Caliph and ideology (Zelin, 2015). In addition to the Iraq Provinces and Syrian Provinces, other provinces included:

- Wilayat Khorosan (comprised mainly of factions split from the Afghanistan/Pakistan Taliban)
- Wilayat al Barqah (comprised of Libyan youth movements)
- Wilayat Fizzan (comprised of Ansar al Shariah in Libya)
- Wilayat al Tarabulus (based in Libya)

- Wilayat Gharb Afriqiya (based in West Africa and made of factions from Nigeria's Boko Haram)
- Wilayat al Jazair (Algeria)
- Wilayat Sana'a (Yemen)
- Wilayat al Haramayn (KSA)
- Wilayat Sayna (formerly Ansar Bait al Maqdis (ABM) in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula).

Islamic State's three strands of activity (terrorist activity, state–building/governance, and insurgency) require significant amounts of financial support. For strategic reasons, the group chose to raise its revenues locally (rather than relying on external donors); first, so that it could maintain its autonomy, and second, to avoid sudden changes in donor support. Initially, the fundraising activity was through criminality (petty theft, etc.), but as the group grew (and more significant amounts were needed), other sources were sought. The fundraising takes place throughout the organisation, at the Provinces, and sectors – each level retaining most of what it has raised (with a tithe back to the central leadership).

Leadership and membership

Apart from the declared most-senior leaders, the names and even the roles of the respective council leaders are difficult to ascertain (due to changes within the structure and the ongoing airstrikes on the group's leadership). Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Caliph, has two deputies – Abu Muslim al-Turkmani (a former Iraqi military intelligence officer who oversees the Iraq Provinces) and Abu Ali al-Anbari (a former Iraqi military officer who oversees the Syrian Provinces) – both are former Ba'athist Party members. The Caliph and his deputies set the overall objectives of the group for the subordinate Provinces to carry out.

As described above, the group's exact number of members is ambiguous, but it is thought to include several thousand people living in Iraq/Syria (as not all people in the areas under Islamic State control are voluntary supporters) and many more sympathisers globally (*The Telegraph*, 2016). Furthermore, not all the people fighting alongside Islamic State are true members; these include Ba'athist groups, Sunni tribes, and other Islamist groups. By the nature of the group's activities, many supporters outside of the region do not openly declare their support. Such support could include fundraising, financial donations, recruitment/radicalisation, and kinetic activity (including terrorist attacks).

Islamic State has been immensely successful in its recruitment of fighters and radicalisation to its jihadist ideals. This has been due in part to its perceived success in Syria and terrorist activity in the West, and in its use of the Internet (especially social media sites and apps) (Berger and Morgan, 2015; Winter, 2015). Its recruitment agenda has meant some radicalisation processes have become shorter, with networks expanding rapidly and spreading to countries previously unaffected by Islamist extremism (but this could also be attributable to population migration for persons displaced from the conflicts in the Middle East).

Key events

Islamic State extends is influence by taking advantage of both the environment in which it has conducted its activities (political instability in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, and the isolation of the Sunni minority in Iraq by the Shi'a government structures), and the delayed response from the international community in first acknowledging the potential risks posed by Islamic State, and then in the time taken to achieve some sort of consensus on how these risks could be mitigated/eliminated.

The evolution of Islamic State can be articulated in six stages:

1. **Establishment of Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTWJ)**
Following Zarqawi's release from prison in 1999, he travelled to Afghanistan and quickly established his own jihadi group, the JTWJ; his aim was to bring down the Jordanian monarchy, without success.

2. **Allegiance with Al-Qaeda – Establishment of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)**
Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Zarqawi moved to Iraq and pledged his group's allegiance to Al-Qaeda, renaming it in 2004 Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (TQJBR), also known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Following Zarqawi's death in 2006, Abu al-Masri was appointed leader, and the TQJBR, in an attempt to unify Sunni insurgent activity in Iraq, created the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC).

3. **Establishment of Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)**
On 15 October 2006, al-Masri established ISI, naming Omar al-Baghdadi as its leader. ISI's policy was to overthrow the Shi'a Government and establish an Islamic State. It quickly established a stronghold in the Sunni Anbar Governorate, announcing the creation of its independent Islamic State, but was not successful due in part to its loss of local support from its over-zealous punishment of those that did not follow its interpretation of Sharia Law, but mostly from the military offensives by Iraqi and Coalition military forces

In 2007, the U.S.-led Coalition and local Sunni fighters' backlash against ISI (the Sunni Awakening) drove ISI from Baghdad into Diyala, Salahideen, and Mosul. The organisation retained only a fraction of its leaders, cells, and capabilities, which were concentrated in Mosul (almost 80% of its leadership were killed or captured (Hashim, 2014)). However, in response to Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki's 2008 targeting of Sunni leaders (increasing sectarian tensions), support for ISI began to increase in Sunni tribal areas with an increase in attacks in Baghdad.

4. **Establishment of Jabhat al-Nusra (JN)**
In April 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi succeeded Omar al-Baghdadi as leader (after both Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu al-Masri were killed by a tank shell). He quickly rebuilt ISI's capacity and capability, and in July 2011 sent Abu Mohammed Golani and nine other Syrian operatives to set up a base of operations in northern Syria. In January 2012, Golani formed JN, which quickly established itself as the most successful fighting force in Syria.

5. **Merger of JN with ISI to establish Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS/ISIL)**
In 2013, al-Baghdadi announced that he was extending ISI into Syria and changing the name of the group to ISIL. In January 2014, ISIS took over Raqqa and declared it the capital of the emirate. Neither JN's nor AQ's leadership agreed with Baghdadi's unilateral declaration, and in February 2014, formally rejected the merger. In June 2014, ISIS captured Mosul and issued its 'Charter of the City'.

6. **Re-establishment of the Caliphate – Islamic State (IS)**
In January 2014, ISIL expelled JN from Raqqa and Iraqi Security Forces from key cities in western Iraq. Bolstered by these successes, on 29 June 2014 Baghdadi declared the re-establishment of the Caliphate (and renamed the group 'Islamic State') with himself as 'Caliph Ibrahim II'. Baghdadi's legitimacy as Caliph stems from his leadership of Jaish al-Ta'ifa al-Mansurah (one of the first jihadist groups to join MSC), his doctorate in Islamic Studies (University of Baghdad), and, most importantly, his claim that he is descended from Mohammed (in the Islamic tradition, it is believed only a descendant of Mohammed's tribe can be Caliph), allowing him to be the supreme religious and political authority of the Caliphate. Many of the national and international responses to date have massively reduced

its expansion in Iraq/Syria, but despite these losses, Islamic State has shown it is resilient and able to maintain concentrated attacks on several fronts.

Comment

Islamic State, in addition to its military operations, has also laid claim to some of the most horrific acts of terror observed in the West. Many of these events have elicited international responses, but also they have acted as inspiration for other would-be terrorists to emulate. These have included the very graphic and public beheading and burning of prisoners and Western hostages (also posted online) and terrorist attacks in Western cities and resorts (including suicide bombers, gun and knife attacks, and 'lone-wolf' attacks). Attacks such as those in Paris (January and November 2015), the Bardo Museum and Sousse beach resort, Tunisia (March and June 2015), the Russian passenger plane explosion of the Sinai Peninsula (November 2015), Brussels airport (March 2016), and an attack at a nightclub in Florida (June 2016) having become defining moments in the group's history of violence and atrocity (Homeland Security Committee, 2016). Although not all attacks have been directed by the Islamic State leadership, its acknowledgement of these being perpetrated by its adjuncts increases the perception that its message is far-reaching.

The reduction in Al-Qaeda's capacity and capability in recent years (although there are still some strong elements in south Yemen) is perceived to have been due to a concerted effort by international actors to mitigate its ability to operate but is also likely to be due to its progressive loss of support from its members (due to a lack of strategic direction, increasing internal discord, and their defection to Islamic State). Islamic State has taken its place in the embodiment of Salafist/takfirist jihadist ideals, transforming what had been for Al-Qaeda a powerful means of recruiting.

Since the re-establishment of the Caliphate, many new jihadists have flocked to its banner, many having been influenced by the sophisticated use of social media, but all to participate in a jihad against 'non-believers' (including Shi'a). Islamic State continues to appeal to an audience outside of the territories it has seized and controls, impacting global security measures. Its recruitment ideology and innovative use of the Internet for its radicalisation methodologies has thus far succeeded in fomenting division between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims in the region but also fuelling a wider distrust of Muslim advocates by distorting the understanding of the Islamic tradition.

Countering Islamic State's appeal and inspiration to would-be jihadists is unlikely to yield fruitful results in the short-term because of the diversity in the motivations of the individuals who answer its call. Furthermore, the success of Islamic State's rapidly evolving media exploitation (and its ability to adapt to increased security measures and countermeasures to take advantage of the ever-expanding media availability – including the new methods of social media messaging) works in its favour, as it is able to adapt faster to dynamic conditions than the more bureaucratic agencies it opposes.

The international community is finally reaching consensus that 'something must be done' to counter Islamic State activity. To date, international activity has been similar to how it dealt with Al-Qaeda's attraction and domination of jihadist activity and recruitment. In the years since its founding, Islamic State has lost much of its former territory[3] (and with the international community's increasing momentum to end the group's activities,[4] looks to lose control of the remaining urban areas under the group's control). In both Iraq and Syria, Islamic State has battled simultaneously with government forces, anti-government forces, Kurdish forces, and various elements from the international community. Over 60 countries have engaged in different

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28

THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY

John F. Morrison

Overview

The leadership of Oglaigh na hEireann has formally ordered an end to the armed campaign … All IRA units have been ordered to dump arms. All Volunteers have been instructed to assist the development of purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means. Volunteers must not engage in any other activities whatsoever.

(Seanna Walsh, 2005)

When former republican prisoner Seanna Walsh read out these words in July 2005, he was announcing the end of the violent activities of one of the world's longest-serving terrorist groups, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). Since their birth in 1969, the PIRA mounted a sustained terrorist campaign with the nominal aim of bringing about a 32-county united socialist Ireland, independent of the United Kingdom.

They depicted themselves as the 'legal representatives of the Irish people,' which led to their moral justification in 'carrying out a campaign of resistance against foreign occupation and domestic collaborators' (Coogan, 2000, p. 544). Their modus operandi included bombings, shootings, beatings, assassinations and kidnappings (Horgan and Taylor, 1997). This self-anointed moral justification for violence resulted in the deaths of 1771 people, and the injuries of countless others (Thornton *et al.*, 2001). These victims constituted members of the British, Northern Irish and Irish security services, politicians and republican and loyalist paramilitary rivals. However, predominantly they were innocent civilians who had no connection with any paramilitary, political or security services organisation. The Provisionals' campaign was one with the stated aim of fighting for, and protecting, the republican and nationalist communities of Northern Ireland. However, the victims of their violence consistently came from within these very same communities they claimed to both represent and protect.

It is impossible to achieve a comprehensive overview of the PIRA in this short chapter. Even if the entirety of this book were dedicated to analysing the group, there would be significant themes and events left unmentioned. Therefore, the purpose here is to introduce a number of key themes, issues and events relating to the Provisional Republican Movement. In order to grasp this introductory understanding, there is an analysis of the organisation from their inception in 1969 through the violence of the Troubles and up to their politicisation during the peace process.

Origins

The origins of the PIRA can be traced back to the split in the IRA in 1969 and the subsequent splintering of their political wing, Sinn Fein, in early 1970 (Morrison, 2014a). The split in the movement had been on the cards since the failure of *The Border Campaign*[1] of the late 1950s/early 1960s to gain any momentum or support. The IRA's new leadership under Cathal Goulding was evaluating the future trajectory of the movement. Under his leadership, it was proposed that they were to move away from violence, align themselves more closely with left-wing groupings and to abandon the traditional abstentionist policy.[2] By making these changes all at the same time, it is proposed that the leadership were changing 'too much, too soon' for many of the existing members. Prior to 1969, this was causing the factionalism within the organisation, predominantly at a leadership level (Morrison, 2014a).

Parallel to the internal debates within the Provisionals, the civil rights movement was emerging across Northern Ireland. Led by the Northern Irish Civil Rights Association (NICRA), the movement aimed to challenge discrimination against the Catholic minority of Northern Ireland. The discrimination they were challenging included issues relating to political representation, housing, policing, employment and education. In 1968 and 1969, violence and resistance from unionist and loyalist[3] counter-protestors were commonplace at the civil rights marches.

Throughout 1969 the tensions in Northern Ireland grew significantly, with the violent manifestations of this coming to the fore in August 1969. Sectarian rioting was commonplace around the country. However, it was the Battle of the Bogside, a communal riot that lasted for three days, from August 12 to 14, and the nationalised violence surrounding it, that saw the British government send the army to man the streets of Northern Ireland. With the Battle of the Bogside in Derry showing no sign of abating, in Belfast hundreds of houses were burned to the ground, leaving thousands of people, mainly Catholics, homeless. With the British government calling in their military forces to protect the streets of Northern Ireland, significant proportions of the republican communities were calling on the IRA to provide weapons and protection for the Catholic population of the North. The leadership refused these requests. Coupled with the wider strategic changes, this decision ultimately led to the split in the IRA, which saw the formation of the PIRA. Those remaining under the leadership of Goulding adopted the moniker of the Official IRA (OIRA).

Internal violence against the nationalist and republican communities

As with any newly-formed terrorist organisation, the initial period involves organisational development. This development ran in parallel to the ensuing violence on the streets of Northern Ireland, a campaign of violence that would last for approximately 30 years under the understated moniker of 'The Troubles.' While the split among existing members was fairly even, the influx of new recruits taking up arms and membership largely went on to join the newly-formed Provisionals. These new recruits included figures such as Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness, Danny Morrison and Gerry Kelly. It was these 'young Turks' whose future leadership would shape the trajectory of the PIRA's campaigns of politics and violence.

In the immediate aftermath of the split, much of the Provos'[4] violent attention was spent on their nascent feud with their former comrades. This feuding was especially prominent in west Belfast, where the two organisations were operating in close proximity. However, the feuding was not isolated to Belfast, or even Northern Ireland. While the groups both shared a common goal and enemy, a significant proportion of their initial paramilitary capabilities were concentrated on a series of attacks against their former allies. The violence directed against the OIRA

was as a result of the perceived threat they posed to the development of the Provisionals' membership and support.

Provisional violence within the nationalist and republican population was not solely directed against organisational rivals. In order to gain power and control within their own group and communities, they also conducted a long-standing campaign of violent vigilantism across republican areas of Northern Ireland. This saw the group targeting those they perceived to be posing a threat to their internal security, as well as individuals portrayed as being threatening to the social fabric of the nationalist and republican areas. Their vigilante campaign saw kneecappings, punishment beatings, expulsions and executions become commonplace on the streets of Northern Ireland. Through their extended vigilantism, they were presenting themselves as the protectors of the communities. Their actions and statements were saying to the communities that it was the PIRA, and not the RUC, who would protect them from the social ills of joy-riding, drug dealing and wider criminality. Their aim was two-fold: to gain passive and active support from within the communities, and to delegitimise the police force, who they portrayed as having no right to patrol the streets of Northern Ireland (Hamill, 2010; Silke, 1999).

A significant proportion of the Provisional's vigilante activity targeted petty criminals, drug-dealers and anti-social entities. However, some of their most serious forms of vigilantism were reserved for their own membership, or those who they felt were threatening to the security and survival of the organisation. In his autobiography, *Killing Rage*, former Provo Eamon Collins discussed in detail the operations of the internal security unit commonly referred to as 'the nutting squad' (Collins and McGovern, 1998). This was a section of the Provisionals whose purpose was to root out, interrogate and assassinate potential informers within the organisation. This was their own way of maintaining power and control over their membership while preventing the likelihood of intelligence leaks.

The PIRA similarly targeted those who they deemed to be 'collaborating' with the Northern Irish and British security forces. Numerous people were abducted and executed for their perceived interactions, relationships and collaborations with the security services. The remains of many of these individuals were left for their families and loved ones to grieve and mourn. However, there was a small group of 16 individuals who were separately abducted, killed and covertly buried by republican paramilitary groups. Their remains were disposed of in unmarked graves across both the Republic and Northern Ireland. Throughout the course of the Troubles, responsibility for these deaths was denied. However, in 1999 an acknowledgement of these abductions and murders was given by Republican paramilitaries, most notably the PIRA. As of March 2016, the PIRA had claimed responsibility for 13 abductions and murders, and the INLA had claimed one. These individuals collectively referred to as *The Disappeared* include members of the Provisionals who were accused of collaboration with 'enemy forces' as well as those members of the Republican communities who were accused of working for the security forces. Included amongst them was Jean McConville, a widowed mother of 10, killed in 1972. It was not until 1999 that the PIRA claimed responsibility for her abduction and subsequent murder. Even with this claim, her body was not recovered until August 2003, in County Louth. McConville was accused by the PIRA in west Belfast of passing information on to British soldiers. However, this claim has never been proven (Peake and Lynch, 2016).

Throughout The Troubles, the external violence of the Provisional IRA was clear for all to see. From the assassination of Lord Henry Mountbatten in Mullaghmore, County Sligo, in 1979 to the multiple bombings of the Europa Hotel in Belfast, the group wished to put forward a message of defiance against 'British occupation of their country.' However, in parallel to this was their less public face of community control and discipline. The vigilante violence of the group has been well documented (e.g. Hamill, 2010; Silke, 1999). However, in recent years, largely

through the statements of Maria Cahill and others, it has been revealed that the Provos were also involved in the development of a 'kangaroo court' system where victims of sexual assault at the hands of Provisional members were interrogated about their claims of abuse and strongly discouraged from reporting any assaults to the police. Cahill, the grand-niece of former leading Provisional Joe Cahill, told of how she was summoned to an interrogation as a teenager to assess whether she was telling the truth or not in her accusation against a leading PIRA member. Within this 'inquiry,' she was forced into a face-to-face exchange with the accused (McDonald, 2014). While there has long been the suspicion of the existence of such a system, it is only in post-Troubles Northern Ireland that the full extent of this is being revealed.

British attempts to counter the PIRA

When the British soldiers arrived in Northern Ireland in 1969,[5] the Catholic minority initially welcomed them, as they were seen as potential protection against loyalist mobs. But this relationship soon soured. Three core operations and events can be strongly linked to this souring: The Falls Curfew (1970), Operation Demetrius/internment without trial (1971) and Bloody Sunday (1972).

In mid-1970, there was growing violence and tensions in Belfast. In light of this, the British Army carried out a search for weapons within the Falls Road on July 3. Rioters throwing stones, petrol bombs and other missiles met them after their first search. In turn, they responded with the deployment of CS gas. What started as a riot soon turned into a gun battle between the OIRA and the British Army. With this surge in violence, the Army imposed a 36-hour curfew on the Falls Road area. During this, house-to-house searches were carried out in this predominantly Catholic area. As the searches continued, the soldiers were engaged in recurrent battles with both the OIRA and PIRA. The curfew was finally brought to a close on July 5 when women and children from the surrounding areas marched into the cordoned area with supplies for the locals. Over the three days of the Falls Curfew, the Army killed a total of four civilians. This included one who was run over by a heavily armoured car (Moloney, 2002).

By the middle of 1971, the PIRA bombing campaign of Belfast city centre was in full flow, snipers were regularly targeting soldiers and the paramilitaries were growing in strength. From January to August of 1971, there had been over 300 explosions and 320 shooting incidents across Northern Ireland (Taylor, 1997, pp. 91–92). This rise in violence led to calls for strong political and security responses. As a result, internment without trial was introduced in August 1971, under Section 12 of the Northern Ireland Special Powers Act (McCleery, 2015). During its initial deployment on August 9 and 10, a total of 342 people were arrested and interned. By the end of the internment policy in December, close to 2,000 people had been detained. Of these, the vast majority were Catholic/Republican. The introduction of internment was ostensibly brought forward to bring about peace in Northern Ireland. However, it resulted in the future intensification of paramilitary violence and civilian-led rioting and protests. While some paramilitary members were incarcerated, it also saw a significant number of innocent civilians imprisoned under suspicion of paramilitary engagement. With the introduction of internment, the paramilitary violence intensified. The fatal targeting of soldiers, police officers, loyalist paramilitaries and civilians significantly escalated from August onwards (English, 2003, p. 141).

Parallel to the rise of PIRA violence, the civil rights movement was growing in strength. While the campaign was still fighting for their original demands, they now also campaigned against the continuation of internment. On January 30, a crowd of around 10,000 gathered in Derry for an anti-internment march organised by NICRA. This was at a time when all parades and marches were banned. The Army had cordoned off parts of the original route. They had

set up barricades to stop entry into Guildhall Square, the original destination. The organisers resultantly rerouted the march to end at 'Free Derry Corner.' During the march, some participants diverted to continue their march through to where the army barricade was set up. As a protest ensued at the barricades, rubber bullets, CS gas and a water cannon were deployed to try and disperse the protestors. This escalated as members of the 1st Parachute Regiment opened fire on the crowd. Their actions ultimately killed a total of 14 male civilians aged between 17 and 41. This day was to become known as 'Bloody Sunday' (English, 2003, pp. 148–155). The initial response from the British Army was to justify the soldiers' actions, stating that they were responding to coming under fire. The resulting Widgery report, commissioned after a tribunal of investigation, exonerated the army while simultaneously implicating many of the victims in the process. However, a fresh public inquest was granted in 1998. When the final report of this inquiry, led by Lord Saville, was published in 2010, it fully exonerated all of the victims from any wrongdoing (Saville, Hoyt and Toohey, 2010). It in turn placed sole responsibility for the casualties at the hands of the army. This led Prime Minister David Cameron in 2010 to state that the deaths on Bloody Sunday were 'unjust and unjustifiable' (BBC, n.d.).

Provisional response

Each of the above 'interventions' was ostensibly justified as methods of bringing peace to the streets. Yet, each served to strengthen the perceived legitimacy of the Provisionals, who utilised each as recruitment tools (Gill and Horgan, 2013). They portrayed the nationalist minority of Northern Ireland as the victims of inhumane treatment at the hands of the security forces. These and other actions were used to validate their continued terrorist activity.

By mid-1972, they were attempting to portray themselves as peace-seekers. They offered to suspend all paramilitary operations if Prime Minister William Whitelaw would agree to meet with them. However, in order for these talks to take place, they demanded that all republican prisoners be granted political status, an independent (non-political) witness to be present in the talks, the meetings were to take place away from Stormont, there were to be no restrictions on the team selected by the Provisionals and that it should include the detained Gerry Adams. These demands were all, eventually, met. With this, the PIRA announced a cessation of violence on June 26, 1972. The negotiating team the Provisionals had brought together was one that represented both the old leadership and the new membership coming through. In the talks, the Provisionals' demands were significant. They called for a declaration of intent from the British to withdraw troops from Northern Ireland by January 1975, an amnesty for political prisoners and recognition of the right of the people of Ireland to act as a unit to decide the future of the island (Bishop and Mallie, 1987, pp. 176–179).

Just 48 hours after the talks had ended, the truce was over. The PIRA believed that the British Army had broken their part of the truce. In response on July 21, the Provos detonated over 20 bombs across Belfast. In total, nine people were killed and 130 were injured. While two of the dead were soldiers, a further five were civilians. The bombings took place across less than two hours and left the security forces completely stretched. So brutal was the day of attacks that in 2002, on the 30th anniversary of what is now known as 'Bloody Friday,' the PIRA issued an apology (see CAIN Web Service, 2002).

The majority of the PIRA campaign took place in Northern Ireland. However, their violence also stretched across the Irish Sea. While the OIRA had bombed Aldershot in 1972, it was not until March 1973 that PIRA activities first ventured across to England with four car bombs planted in London in one single operation. Two were defused. However, the remaining two, one outside the Old Bailey, exploded, killing one and injuring 180 others. The active service unit

(ASU) responsible for these bombings included two young sisters, Marian and Dolours Price, and the future Junior Minister in the Northern Ireland Assembly, Gerry Kelly. This attack was to spark the start of an extended campaign of violence in England. Targets ranged from a bus carrying servicemen and their families to the bombings of pubs in Guildford and Birmingham. Most notorious of the PIRA ASUs in Britain was a group retrospectively known as the Balcombe Street Gang. The team comprised of Joe O'Connell, Eddie Butler, Harry Duggan and Hugh O'Doherty. However, their membership was constantly shifting. Their aim was to generate panic amongst the British establishment. In autumn of 1974, they started to strike targets, including pubs frequented by soldiers and institutions symbolic to the British establishment.

The Balcombe Street Gang serves as an illustration of the organisation of the PIRA's small units. Each member had a strictly defined role. O'Connell was in charge of gathering intelligence, plotting the mission and assembling the bombs. Duggan planted the bombs, while O'Doherty was lookout. For his part, Butler was a 'spare' man who stayed in the background until needed (Bishop and Mallie, 1987, pp. 201–203). This England bombing campaign was to continue intermittently until the 1990s. The targets and purposes of their attacks ranged from the targeting of the political establishment with the Brighton bombing of 1984 to the ending of a ceasefire with the targeting bombing of Canary Wharf in 1996. The England bombing campaign also serves as a noteworthy illustration of a strategic shift in the late 1970s. It was then that the group reorganised from their traditional military structure to a more cell-based system. Within this new structure, each cell was theoretically isolated from the larger organisation, designed so as not to compromise the wider group if arrested. A number of cells were placed across Britain, waiting for the order or the opportunity to carry out their attacks.

The 'Long War'

In the initial years of the Troubles, it was the stated aim of the leadership of the Provisional to bring about a swift military victory over the British. The political and security forces of the state likewise believed that they would be able to bring about an end to the PIRA without much endeavour. By the mid-1970s, it was clear that neither were going to have their wish granted. It was within this context that both sides entered secret meetings in 1974 leading to the 1975 PIRA ceasefire. These meetings turned into negotiations, which the PIRA negotiating team believed were leading to British 'withdrawal.'[6] As the process continued without any resolution, it became clear to the leadership, and the wider movement, that the British had no intention of leaving Northern Ireland. Resultantly, the ceasefire and talks were brought to a close with a resumption of violence. The failure of these negotiations can be seen as the beginning of the end of the old-guard Southern leadership and the beginning of the Northern dominance of the 'young Turks' led by Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness and others (Morrison, 2014a).

This gradual change of leadership was facilitated by a parallel strategic and organisational shift in the movement in the mid to late '70s. In the early years, the movement was being led from Dublin. However, as the paramilitary campaign intensified, there were calls for structural change (McKearney, 2011, p. 141). Resultantly, the PIRA was divided into the Northern and Southern Commands. The Northern Command was in charge of 'war-zone' related activities, namely the planning and execution of operations. The Southern Command provided logistical support to sustain the campaign. This included the hosting of training camps, bomb factories and quartermaster duties. This operational change brought further prominence to the growing influence of the Northern leadership.

With no immediate end to the armed campaign in sight, the PIRA leadership adopted 'the long war' strategy (McKearney, 2011). No longer were the Provos aiming for a speedy retreat.

They stated that they were now going to partake a 'war of attrition' so as to bring about a demand from the British people for withdrawal of their troops. In turn, they wished to make Northern Ireland ungovernable and economically unviable. The military activities were to be supported by an international and national publicity campaign designed to gain support for the ongoing conflict. It was under this new doctrine, much of which was designed from within the prisons (see Moloney, 2002; Morrison, 2014b), that the terrorist campaign was sustained until the late 1990s.

Prisoners

Throughout the history of Irish republicanism, prisoners have held a revered position. They are portrayed as sacrificing their lives for 'the cause.' In the midst of the Troubles, this life sacrifice took on a more literal meaning. In 1976, the British government withdrew the Special Category Status for all paramilitary prisoners. As a reaction to no longer being recognised as political prisoners, PIRA and INLA prisoners went on the 'blanket protest,' refusing to wear prison uniforms. In its place they wrapped themselves in prison blankets. In 1978, their protest escalated to incorporate a 'no wash' protest, in response to reported attacks by prison officers on prisoners leaving their cells to wash. In protest, prisoners refused to 'slop out,' instead covering their cell walls with excrement.

With little to no progress being made in having their demands met in 1980, seven prisoners, led by Brendan 'Darky' Hughes, engaged in a simultaneous hunger strike. Their demands were for the right to wear civilian clothes; exemption from prison work; freedom of association; organisation of their own leisure activities; and the restoration of remission. After 53 days, with a number of strikers close to death, they called off their protest. They had been misled that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had agreed to meet their demands. Resultantly, a second hunger strike was called on March 1, 1981, led by Bobby Sands. For the purpose of maintaining pressure on the British government, the strikes were staggered. A new hunger striker was to join each week until demands were met. The early days of the strike failed to garner much support for the prisoners. This all changed with the death of Frank Maguire MP. As a result of Maguire's death, a by-election was held to fill his vacant Fermanagh and South Tyrone seat. Sands stood for the seat on an anti H-Block[7] platform. On April 9 he was elected, defeating Ulster Unionist candidate Harry West.

The election raised hope among the republican communities that a resolution to the hunger strikes would be found. However, Thatcher refused to grant political status. In her words, 'crime is crime is crime, it is not political' (Coogan, 2000, p. 493). On May 5, on the 66th day of his strike, Bobby Sands MP passed away. The British government's reaction was that he was a criminal who had chosen to take his own life. In the two weeks that followed, three more hunger strikers, Francis Hughes, Raymond McCreesh and Patsy O'Hara, died. The staggered deaths insured that their protest remained within the public consciousness. This led to increasing pressure, both nationally and internationally, on the Thatcher government. The swell of positive sentiment directed towards the strikers led to further electoral. As the strike continued, there were a number of interventions by representatives of the Catholic Church to bring an end to the strikes, and from the strikers' families seeking medical intervention. By October 3, the strike ended. In total, ten PIRA and INLA prisoners lost their lives; from Bobby Sands on May 5 to Michael Devine on August 20. Three days after the strikes ended, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, James Prior, announced partial concessions to the prisoners' five demands, with only the demand not to do prison work unmet.

Peace process and politicisation

The success of the hunger strikes to gain national and international recognition, as well as electoral success, led the leadership to re-assess their strategies. As a result, by 1986 they were officially adopting a dual political and paramilitary campaign, with the Armalite[8] in one hand and the ballot box in the other (Taylor, 1997, pp. 281–282). At the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis[9] and PIRA General Army Convention of 1986, it was voted that elected candidates could take their seats in the Irish parliament in Dail Eireann. However, unlike the leadership of Goulding, they would still refuse to take their seats in Westminster or Stormont. Importantly, they also pledged to retain the 'armed struggle.'

The late '80s saw a return of the England bombing campaign. The most lethal of these attacks was the 1989 Deal Barracks bombing, which resulted in the deaths of 11 bandsmen of the Royal Marines Band Service. On Remembrance Day, November 8, 1987, using Libyan Semtex, 11 people were killed, with over 60 injured during a Remembrance Sunday commemoration at the cenotaph in Enniskillen, County Fermanagh. Of the causalities, many were pensioners. At the dawn of the '90s, the PIRA launched their 'human proxy bomb' tactic. This involved individuals being forced to drive explosive-laden vehicles to British military sites. Upon arrival at the target, the explosives were detonated remotely. On October 24, 1990, proxy bombs targeted three separate British Army outposts. In Coshquin, Cloghoge and Omagh, a total of eight people were killed and 14 were injured. The Provos used people accused of collaborating with the security forces as their 'drivers.' This tactic caused outrage in the Catholic and nationalist communities (Bloom and Horgan, 2008).

It seemed like there was no end to the violence in sight. However, behind the scenes moves were being made to bring an end to the armed campaign. In 1988 John Hume, the leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), began a series of secret discussions with the Sinn Fein president, Gerry Adams. It was Hume's belief that the peace would only come to Northern Ireland if the PIRA could be persuaded to promote their agenda exclusively through their political wing. He believed that the British government were now prepared to negotiate over the future of Northern Ireland from a position of neutrality. Involved within this was an acceptance of the principle that the onus was on the people of Northern Ireland to reach a consensus of the country's future. In April 1993, Hume and Adams released a statement arguing that the self-determination was the right of the Irish people as a whole (BBC, 1993). This marked a significant stepping-stone that moved the conflict away from terrorism and towards political negotiations.

In December 1993, the U.K. Prime Minister John Major and Irish Taoiseach Albert Reynolds published the *Joint Declaration on Peace*.[10] Central to this declaration was the British denouncement of any 'selfish strategic or economic' interests in Northern Ireland (British and Irish Governments, 1993). Despite opposition from the members of the unionist political parties, the table was set for the establishment of negotiations. On August 31, 1994, the PIRA announced a ceasefire, during which significant progress was made, but not without its setbacks. February 1995 saw the publication of the *Framework Documents* dealing with the establishment of North/South institutions and the development of a single-chamber Northern Irish Assembly elected by proportional representation (British and Irish Governments, 1995). The early to mid-'90s also saw the development of U.S. political assistance and mediation in the peace process, most marked by the appointment of Senator George Mitchell as the United States Special Envoy for Northern Ireland. Ultimately this cessation was not to remain permanent. It ended with the bombing of Canary Wharf in February 1996. The Provos declared that the British Prime Minister and unionist politicians had failed to rise 'to the challenge' of enhancing a 'democratic

peace process.' However, it is widely believed that the end of the ceasefire came due to internal discontent in the membership of the Provisionals directed towards the leadership of Adams and McGuinness (Morrison, 2014a).

With the resumption of the armed campaign, the PIRA resumed their attacks in England, detonating multiple bombs in London and Manchester in 1996. On June 7, 1996, their violence also spread south of the border. During a post-office robbery in Adare, County Limerick, members of the Provisionals shot dead Detective Garda Jerry McCabe, an act that lost them what little sympathy they had amongst the general population of the Republic. This continued into 1997 with the targeting of RUC, British Army and civilian targets across Northern Ireland. However, on July 19, 1997, the Provos declared a restoration of the 1994 ceasefire (IRA, 1997). This paved the way for the PIRA and Sinn Fein's acceptance of the Mitchell Principles and the ultimate signing of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement in 1998.

The Mitchell Principles are a set of ground rules put forward by Senator Mitchell and agreed by the Northern Irish political parties and the British and Irish governments. Central to the Principles was the statement that all of those engaging in talks gave a commitment to 'democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues' (Taylor, 1997, pp. 351–352). In order for Sinn Fein to sign up to the Mitchell Principles, the PIRA convened a General Army Convention in October 1997. Although hotly contested, the proposal to accept the Mitchell Principles was accepted. However, in the aftermath of this Convention, leading members of the Engineering and Quartermaster Departments exited to form their own autonomous paramilitary force, the Real IRA (RIRA). This was reminiscent in the split in the aftermath of the 1986 Convention with the formation of the Continuity IRA (CIRA). Both of these violent dissident groups, alongside Oglaigh na hEireann (ONH), Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD) and others have continued their paramilitary activity in spite of the peace process (see Morrison and Horgan, 2016; Horgan and Morrison, 2011).

After 29 years of violence, the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement was the major political breakthrough that laid the foundation for peace. The document was agreed by most of the major parties. It was then put to a referendum both north and south of the border. In Northern Ireland, 71.1% of the voters, and 94.39% in the Republic, voted for the acceptance of the document. The Agreement includes a legal agreement between the British and Irish governments and a broader political agreement between the Northern Irish political parties and the two governments. There is an acknowledgement that Northern Ireland will remain part of the United Kingdom until the majority of the people of Northern Ireland wish otherwise. But most relevant for the PIRA, and other paramilitary groups, signing the Agreement committed participants 'to exclusively democratic and peaceful means of resolving differences on political issues.' For their part, the British and Irish governments gave a commitment to the early release of prisoners servicing sentences in connection with paramilitary activities.

With the Belfast Agreement, and the subsequent St. Andrews Agreement (British and Irish Governments, 2006), now in place, and the PIRA placing their arms beyond use (IRA, 2002), Northern Ireland is largely at peace. The PIRA is no longer waging a war against 'British occupation.' In fact, some of their leading members are now shaking hands with the Queen of England, a once-viable target (Greensdale, 2012). The road to peace has brought them from the murder of close to 2,000 people to having their political wing in a power-sharing government with their former adversaries, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). However, this road to politicisation has come with violence, criminality and controversy. In late 2004 and early 2005, with the Northern Bank robbery (Glendinning, 2008) and the murder of Robert McCartney (McCartney, 2007), it was clear that some members of the PIRA were still involved in criminality and vigilantism. Similar accusations have been made in relation to the continuation of

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CONCEPTUALISING COUNTERTERRORISM

Ronald Crelinsten

I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.

(Abraham Maslow 1966, p. 15)

Introduction

The war on terror that emerged in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and later morphed into the war against the Islamic State group (IS) has faced challenges and created problems across a wide range of policy domains: international humanitarian law and the laws of war; criminal justice and the rule of law; international diplomacy; development programs in post-conflict societies and transitional states; harmonization of social and cultural policy among allies; free trade and open borders; banking, international finance, aviation and tourism; migration; and resource development and environmental policy. The wide range of issues where threats to democratic freedoms and values have arisen, such as torture and extraordinary rendition (Crelinsten & Schmid 1995; Jaffer & Singh 2007; Sands 2008; Fried & Fried 2010); surveillance and the right to privacy (Parenti 2003); data mining; limits on freedom of expression and assembly; restriction of religious symbols; regulation of charitable organizations and giving; and border, visa, immigration, and refugee controls; starkly demonstrates the pervasive impact of this global counterterrorism (CT) effort. The way in which its impact has rippled so far and wide highlights how complex and multifaceted CT has become in today's world.

It is now widely recognized that CT policy can no longer remain compartmentalized in one or two policy areas, but must be coordinated across a wide array of policy domains (Crelinsten 2009; van Dongen 2010). This has come to be called the "comprehensive", "whole-of-government", or "whole-of-nation" approach. Yet it is not always easy to clearly demarcate one policy domain from another, since action in one area often affects other areas. Grey areas between domains complicate the overall picture and can pose daunting challenges most often related to a need to balance different and often competing values and goals (Crelinsten 1998, 2009). A comprehensive approach involves multiple levels of government and society: subnational, national, international, transnational; state and non-state actors. Here, too, blurry boundaries between "inside" and "outside", domestic and foreign, and public and private, complicate matters further.

CT is most often linked with "hard power" – intelligence, law, policing, and military power – but it increasingly makes use of "soft power" – political, social, and economic control – as well as broader policy areas dealing with the environment, development, critical infrastructure, migration, and humanitarian intervention.

Conspiracy theorists often imbue government efforts at coordination across separate policy domains with nefarious intent. Honest efforts to achieve a whole-of-government approach can have unintended consequences that feed such theories. Many have recognized the unique problems faced by democracies in fighting terrorism, and the costs to democratic values and governance that can arise in areas such as human rights, openness, accountability, legitimacy, and public trust in government (Barber 2003; Bhoumik 2004; Bianchi & Keller 2008; Bowyer Bell 1978; Cox, Levine & Newman 2009; Crelinsten 1989, 1998; Reinares 2000; Schmid & Crelinsten 1993; Weinberg 2008; Wilkinson 1977).

As a whole-of-government approach becomes the new normal, institutional cultures, bureaucratic organization, information flows, and coordination and interoperability present new challenges. The same can be said for a whole-of-nation approach that involves partnerships and cooperation among government, the private sector, civil society, NGOs, and international organizations.

CT can take a variety of forms, some of which will be surveyed in this chapter. Each approach conceives of terrorism differently, though there is some overlap. Some are more traditional; others are not. As suggested by Abraham Maslow's quote above, the tools that a particular CT approach uses can often reflect a particular conception of terrorism and the threat it poses. Those responsible for countering terrorism must therefore broaden their toolboxes so as to avoid narrow, truncated conceptions of the terrorist threat or exaggerated depictions of the threat as existential or evil incarnate. Both can limit policy options and undermine effectiveness, legitimacy, and democratic acceptability. If CT mirrors the violence of the terrorist, it can be considered terrorism itself – just as freedom fighting can. In a world where boundaries are blurring between internal and external security, international and domestic jurisdictions, and state and non-state actors, it is important to cast our eyes wide in developing an effective approach to CT that can apply across a broad variety of policy domains, reflect democratic values, and outlive the electoral horizon of individual governments.

Varieties of counterterrorism

Coercive counterterrorism

The criminal justice model

A criminal justice approach treats terrorism as crime. If one considers the most common terrorist tactics, such as kidnapping, assassination, bombing, and armed attacks, the end result is usually the infliction of injury or loss of life on persons, or the destruction of property, all of which are universally proscribed in the criminal law of all nations.

Treating terrorism as ordinary crime, not as a special offence requiring special procedures or punishments, performs a delegitimization function. By criminalizing the acts that terrorists commit, emphasis is placed on their criminal nature and not on their political or ideological motive (Crelinsten, Laberge-Altmejd & Szabo 1978).

All this changed after 11 September, 2001. Many Western countries created special terrorist offences after the 9/11 attacks: the US and Canada in 2001; Australia and Norway in 2002; and Sweden in 2003 (U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2005). In many of these special offences, motive became a central element of the legal definition of terrorism. Offences have included committing terrorist acts or committing acts for terrorist purposes, as well as mem-

bership in a terrorist organization and providing material support for terrorism, such as money, weapons, or technical expertise, and recruitment.

The creation of speech offences has also increased. U.N. Security Council resolution 1624 (2005) calls for Member States to take steps aimed at prohibiting by law and preventing incitement to commit terrorist acts. Glorification of terrorism has become an offence in several countries, such as the UK and Spain.

The criminal justice model relies on a complex bureaucracy with strict rules of governance and many interacting institutions, with their own traditions, culture, and language. It can be slow and ponderous, with appeals stretching the process out for years. While the criminal justice model can achieve some important goals in terms of deterrence, retribution, education, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, these benefits are largely dependent upon how the system is used, how fair it is seen to be used by others, and how committed individuals are to terrorist violence either as a means to other goals or as an end in itself.

The war model

The war model treats terrorism as if it were an act of war or insurgency. Because wars are usually fought between states, countering terrorism within a war model implies that the terrorist group represents the equivalent of a state. Treating terrorism as war therefore tends to credit the terrorist with the status of equal partner in a zero-sum conflict. This is why many terrorist groups use the word "army" in their names. IS even presents itself as a functioning state (al-Tamimi 2015).

Although the central element of the war model is the use of maximal force designed to overpower the enemy, the conduct of war does not occur in a legal vacuum. The laws of war lay down rules for how wars should be fought and how non-combatants should be treated. The 1949 Geneva Conventions represent a kind of trade-off that legitimizes killing or detention without trial in time of war, as long as it is directed at overpowering an enemy combatant. The trade-off is that once a combatant is captured and disarmed, or gives up and abandons the fight, s/he must be accorded humane treatment, protection, and care (Rona 2005, p. 164).

In a war model of CT, success tends to be defined in terms of victory or defeat (Angstrom & Duyvesteyn 2007). A "war on terror" only ends when the terrorist enemy is defeated. If the struggle is a protracted one, even spanning generations, then CT efforts must be maintained as long as a state of war exists. This has led some to argue that we are engaged in a "long war" or even a "never-ending" war with Islamist terrorism (Harris 2002; Hironaka 2005; Podhoretz 2007; Wittes 2008; but see Danner 2005).

The war model is considered by many to be quick, effective, and ideally-suited to the new kinds of threat posed by decentralized, ideologically-driven terrorist networks whose adherents are not deterred by traditional criminal justice or contained by traditional military power. It places great value on the remarkable things that science and technology can achieve: remote sensing, satellite imagery, spy drones, missile technology, smart bombs, facial recognition and other biometrics. The idea that a nation's military can watch, listen, record, and track anyone or anything anywhere in the world (Zachary 2007) and strike at will with guided, pilotless attack planes or space-based weaponry, is the ultimate individualized war model, designed to fight an atomized, dispersed enemy rather than the traditional hostile state or terrorist group. The global CT effort now routinely makes use of intelligence-led drone strikes and targeted assassinations (Aslam 2011; Becker & Shane 2012; Harris 2012; Junod 2012; UNOHCHR 2010).

The war model carries a high risk of unintended consequences that can escalate violence, undermine the legitimacy of governments that use it, or pull governments along a dangerous path to

anti-democratic governance (Crelinsten 2009; Parker 2007). Despite these risks, the war model can be a useful tool in an overall CT strategy. As in just war theory, the use of force can be justified under certain strict conditions (Elshtain 2003; Robinson 2003; Walzer 1977). It must be discriminate, proportionate, declared by a proper authority, used for a justifiable cause, with just intentions that outweigh the evil of the means used by the good of the ends sought, have a high probability of success, enjoy public support, and be used only as a last resort, when all other means have been pursued.

Proactive counterterrorism

The intelligence model

In a proactive approach, intelligence becomes central to any CT effort (Gill & Phythian 2012). In proactive policing and security intelligence, information is not gathered for evidentiary purposes but for intelligence purposes. The ultimate goal is not necessarily criminal prosecution. Instead, the goal of intelligence operations is to learn more about what the targets are up to. The demands of information-gathering can therefore conflict with those of criminal investigation and due process.

Proactive CT is therefore a double-edged sword. It can nip a burgeoning threat in the bud or destabilize a terrorist network enough so that its operatives cannot move from the planning stage and go operational. On the other hand, it can permanently erase any chance of learning more about the enemy's plans or to identify and apprehend those who have not yet appeared on the radar screen.

The intelligence model of CT has led to massive surveillance of a wide swath of individuals and detention without trial of citizens as well as resident aliens. Much of the debate post-September 11 surrounding CT efforts in the area of surveillance relates to how wide the net should be cast and whether profiling of specific target groups is justified or acceptable.

Two opposing concerns underlie honest efforts to address both security concerns and concerns about democratic acceptability. On one hand, a fear of false negatives (failure to detect a threat) can lead to widening the surveillance net as much as possible, thereby running the risk of infringing upon civil liberties of those targeted and, ultimately, facilitating the commission of human rights violations by control agents. On the other hand, a fear of false positives (targeting innocent individuals, organizations, or communities) can lead to the imposition of onerous judicial restrictions upon intelligence gathering, the creation of oversight committees with political agendas, and the creation of sunset clauses on anti-terrorism legislation that activate at inappropriate times, thereby running the risk of attenuating the effectiveness of intelligence-gathering operations.

Persuasive counterterrorism

The communication model

All response options convey information of some sort to different audiences; they are expressive and symbolic as well as instrumental. The particular messages that are actually received by a particular audience may not be what the sender intended to convey. This lends an inherent complexity to CT and can lead to unintended consequences. It is therefore important to understand the different kinds of messages, audiences, and communicative pathways involved in the complex web of terrorist-counterterrorist interaction (Crelinsten 1987a, b).

Persuasive CT can try to promote desired perceptions among individual members of terrorist organizations, their sympathizers, and their foreign supporters, such as the message that terrorism is counterproductive and that other means are more useful to achieve their goals. Counter narratives that foster cross-cultural and inter-ethnic understanding can undermine those aspects of terrorist propaganda and ideology that promulgate hatred and demonize particular groups of "enemies" (Crelinsten & Özkut 2000).

Two of the most powerful beliefs that bind individual members to a terrorist group are the idea that once violence has been committed, you can't go back, and the idea that the group is the only place where a sense of identity, belonging, importance, or existential meaning can be achieved. Laws can provide reduced sentences for those who cooperate with authorities, or offer amnesty for renouncing violence. Official assurances that exit from the group is always possible, and that those who cooperate and who renounce violence can be accepted back into society, could help to prevent certain individuals from remaining trapped in the self-contained world of the terrorist (Crelinsten & Schmid 1993).

Psychological, material, and economic concerns that make individuals vulnerable to recruitment can be addressed by creating alternative incentive structures for people to move away from embracing violence and terrorism. Talking to one's enemies and their constituencies, though anathema to many governments, can serve an important function in challenging, and perhaps refuting, undesired perceptions whose very existence can be missed in the absence of dialogue and exchange of views (Atran 2010; Goerzig 2010; Perry 2010). Counterradicalization efforts aimed at potential recruits and communities at risk, and deradicalization efforts aimed at current or imprisoned members, are central to preventing undesired perceptions and belief systems (Bjørgo & Horgan 2008; Horgan 2009; Kessels 2010; Neumann 2011; Satloff 2004).

A central element in persuasive CT is the maintenance of public trust and confidence in government. Public education about the nature and extent of the terrorist threat, as well as the limits and feasibility of policy options, can help to promote public understanding both before and after a terrorist attack.

Promoting public awareness without fuelling insecurity, apathy, or intolerance and hate is an essential element of such an approach. An explicit policy to downplay the impact of terrorism, while condemning the terrorism itself, can help to promote the idea that terrorism is unacceptable in democratic society, while minimizing the risk of public calls, fuelled by insecurity and terror, for repressive measures that undermine the rule of law and individual freedoms. Incessant warnings by politicians and security experts about the dangers of radicalization or the risk of terrorist attack can create a kind of learned helplessness in the face of seemingly inevitable catastrophe. As the rule of law and individual rights are increasingly whittled away in the name of increased security, many citizens simply accept the fact that their rights have to be sacrificed (Guarino 2013).

The challenge is to prevent the legitimation of terrorists and terrorism without resorting to censorship, intimidation, or outright repression. The controversies surrounding WikiLeaks, the trial and harsh punishment of Private Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning, and the Edward Snowden case all suggest that transparency and accountability have become a casualty of the war on terror.

Defensive counterterrorism

Prevention (before an attack)

The preventive model

There are three primary means of prevention.

First, target hardening aims to make potential targets less attractive or more difficult to attack. It has traditionally focused on important people (e.g., VIPs, government officials) and important places (e.g., government buildings, military bases) at particular times (e.g., major sporting events, international summits, special anniversaries). Making favoured targets less vulnerable to attack forces terrorists to innovate and to find alternatives, tying up resources and planning. This often leads to target substitution or displacement to softer targets. The hope is that deterring attacks

against obviously important targets can channel potential terrorists towards less damaging or less costly forms of attack.

Government and industry are often at odds over financing, training, effectiveness, technology, responsibility for and timetables for implementation, and potential impacts on operations. Partnerships between government, industry, and other stakeholders are therefore essential, though challenging (Bailes & Frommelt 2004; Chesterman & Fisher 2009).

The second aspect of prevention is critical infrastructure protection (CIP). While opinions vary on what infrastructure is critical, the areas of energy, transportation, industry, communications, banking, and urban living are widely recognized as key sectors. Potential targets include hydroelectric and nuclear facilities, oil and gas refineries and pipelines, telecommunications, banks, airports, railways and bridges, urban transport, and shopping malls.

Most critical infrastructure is in the hands of the private sector. Government regulation is often weak or non-existent, and industry resistance to any attempts to strengthen security can be intense. Therefore, the most important part of CIP is to identify fruitful points of intervention where physical, structural, or procedural changes can be made that reduce the likelihood of attack, and to share this information across government departments and agencies, across levels of government, and with stakeholders in the private sector.

The third prong of the preventive model is to track the movement of people, money, goods, and services in an effort to discover plots in the making and thwart them or to impede their preparation. Terrorists need food, shelter, training, weapons, explosives, safe houses, communications, travel documents, and financing. When these are not available or difficult to acquire, the risk of terrorist attack drops. Border and passport controls, customs and immigration, refugee determination, and the monitoring and regulation of the flow of people and goods in and out of a country as well as within its borders, can help identify and track potential terrorists and the plots they devise. The regulation of banking and money transfers can impede terrorist financing, which in turn can make the implementation of terrorist attacks more difficult (Biersteker & Eckert 2007; Trinkunas & Giraldo 2007; Zarate 2013).

Illegal arms sales, weapons smuggling, theft of poorly guarded materials, corruption, and collusion to break sanctions or to circumvent tracking and monitoring efforts, or simply seeking profit at the expense of considering the impact of sales on future security, all constitute persistent impediments to reducing the likelihood that dangerous goods fall into terrorist hands. Terrorist groups often engage in auxiliary criminal activity to support their terrorist activities, and the possibility that they could cooperate with transnational criminal organizations to procure weaponry or other material has long been a concern (Berdal & Serrano 2002, pp. 201–2).

Mitigation (response to an attack)

The natural disaster model

Moshe Dayan, Israeli Minister of Defence from 1967–1974, suggested that "terrorist incidents more closely resemble natural disasters than acts of war" (cited in Bowyer Bell 1978, p. 124). Terrorist attacks do share many of the same elements as any natural disaster: dead and wounded people; damaged or destroyed infrastructure; uncertainty about what may happen next; people fleeing in panic or rushing to the scene to help; an urgent need for rescue workers, ambulances, transportation routes to hospitals; and intense media coverage that may interfere with rescue operations or create pressure on crisis managers and other authorities. Contingency planning, established chains of command and communication networks, stockpiles of emergency supplies, training of first responders, and strategies for dealing with victims, their families, and the media can all be arranged in advance. Such an "all-hazards" or "all-risks" approach means that

it can be more cost-effective to prepare for a wide spectrum of risks (Abbott & Hetzel 2005, pp. 121–2).

The public health model

Terrorism, particularly mass-casualty terrorism, has an impact on public health and the psychological well-being of citizens (Levy & Sidel 2002). Since the 9/11 attacks, public health, environmental safety, and local emergency preparedness have all been incorporated into defensive CT. Strengthening public health systems creates an infrastructure that can respond efficiently and effectively to a whole range of threats, whether a disease like MERS, SARS, or swine flu, an industrial accident, an environmental disaster, or an intentional release of a pathogen or explosion of a radiological, chemical, or biological device.

The psychosocial model

Interest in social and psychological defences and the development of citizen resilience in the face of terrorist threats has increased greatly in recent years (Butler, Morland & Leskin 2007). The terror in terrorism is most directly felt by those who fear terrorist attack themselves because of specific threats, or because they belong to the same category of past victims. In the case of indiscriminate, mass terrorism, the terror is much more widespread. Add to that the power of television, the Internet, and social media, and the psychological impact of terrorism can be quite pervasive and invasive. Chronic anxiety and stress about the threat of terrorism can be a serious problem in societies geared to expect that an attack is imminent or inevitable. It can even increase the risk of cardiovascular disease (Holman et al. 2008). Promoting citizen resilience means preparing people ahead of time and strengthening their capacity to cope with the stress, anxiety, and fear that particular kinds of terrorist attack provoke. This can help to take the terror out of terrorism.

Long-term counterterrorism

The development model

Development issues and resource utilization can have social and political repercussions that go far beyond purely economic concerns, and violence and terrorism often become part of the equation (Duffield 2001, 2007; Keefer & Loayza 2008). Trade, foreign aid, and development projects can undercut the ideological fuel that drives terrorist radicalization and recruitment in a world of haves and have-nots.

Land distribution and reform, environmental management, market regulation, and resource extraction and commodification have become increasingly important ideological motors in areas such as WMD proliferation, anti-globalization movements, environmental activism and protest, and anti-Western, anti-capitalist, and religious fundamentalist movements (Klare 2001; Le Billon 2008).

Capacity building in weak and conflict-riven states, including police and military training, judicial reform, and strengthening democratic governance, can be another aspect of the development model, where foreign aid and development are integrated into a long-term CT strategy (Rashid 2008; Wright 2006).

The human security/human rights model

The concept of human security reflects the view that international security cannot be achieved unless the peoples of the world are free from violent threats to their lives, their safety, or their rights. The focus of security is the individual, not the state.

Promoting social and economic rights can reduce the inequities that fuel radicalization and facilitate terrorist recruitment. Many of the U.N. conferences of the 1990s, such as those dealing with social development, women's rights, population, and habitat, focused explicitly on the need to strengthen legal regimes requiring States to protect different baskets of rights.

The promotion of political and civil rights can clearly have an impact on the attractiveness of the terrorist option. By giving voice to disenfranchised or oppressed groups, other options are provided that make the terrorist option less compelling. When rights are fully entrenched and institutionalized, and applied uniformly to all societal groups, not just to the majority, the use of violence becomes counterproductive. This was made painfully clear by events in Tunisia, Egypt, and especially Syria, where the early optimism of the Arab Spring gave way to the rise of IS.

Many international conventions on human rights single out education as a fundamental right and emphasize education as a vehicle for promoting democratic, pluralistic, and anti-racist values. Teaching methods that foster an understanding of the interdependence of human beings and an appreciation of ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, and historical diversity can contribute to reducing the fear and cultivated ignorance that lie at the root of much hatred and violence. Support for extremist and terrorist groups would become harder to sustain and recruitment would become more difficult (Crelinsten & Özkut 2000; Nelles 2003; U.N. News Centre 2013).

Education can also inform people of injustices and inequities around the world. Many seek refuge in the past or in the rigid authoritarianism of political or religious dogma. This is why critical thinking is more important than mere learning of issues and facts. The ability to think for oneself and to research issues by collecting data from many sources is a good antidote to ideological fads or exclusionary, racist theories. Many educated terrorists come from the professions, like engineering and medicine, including Mohammed Atta, the leader of the 9/11 hijackers. Few terrorists come from the humanities, where literature, history, and philosophy promote critical thinking and self-awareness (Allemang 2010).

The gender model

The vast majority of terrorists are young men. The practice of sex selection, such as female infanticide or sex-selective abortion, has led to a surfeit of males relative to females, especially in Asia. This means that many young men will never be able to find a mate, marry, or raise a family. These "bare branches", as the Chinese call them, are perfect fodder for terrorist recruitment (Hudson & Den Boer 2004).

Studies have found that the more educated a woman becomes, the less children she has (Ainsworth, Beegle & Nyamete 1996). In the long term, then, the best antidote to the bare-branch problem would be the promotion of education and empowerment of women and girls, particularly in those regions where the sex ratio significantly favours males.

In countries where the sex ratio may be more balanced than in Asia, but women are denied access to education or the workforce, the bare branch problem is manifested differently. Overpopulation and failing economies mean a lack of job opportunities for young men and therefore a reduced likelihood of finding a mate and raising a family. Idle, unemployed young men are ideal targets for radicalization and recruitment.

Traditional women's roles usually emphasize child-rearing at the expense of other contributions that a woman might make to society or the economy. Empowering women and girls could reduce the birth rate overall, addressing the bare branch problem, but also allow half the population to contribute to social, political, and economic life, and to resist the pressure of family and tribal traditions that can sometimes drive "deviant" girls and women along the terrorist path.

The environmental protection model

Disturbances brought on by climate change, such as flooding, drought, wildfire, insects, and ocean acidification, and factors that drive global changes in climate, such as land use, pollution, and over-exploitation of resources, all have important implications for the broader socio-political climate in which terrorism develops. More than 60 nations, mostly developing countries, face a risk of exacerbating tensions and conflicts over resources due to climate change, including the threat of environmental refugees. Countries that are now at peace risk the emergence of conflict triggered by the impact of climate change (Parry et al. 2007). The impact of climate change could also bring unprecedented reversals in poverty reduction, nutrition, health, and education (UNDP 2007). These warnings suggest that many long-term CT strategies are vulnerable to being undermined over time by the impact of climate change. Any long-term CT strategy should take this into account (Fetzek & Mazo 2014; Mayer 2015; The White House 2015).

Conclusion

Democratic forms of government are not perfect. What makes them imperfect is that delicate balances must be maintained between seemingly contradictory elements: loyalty and dissent, as embodied in the "loyal opposition"; public representation and private conscience, whereby elected officials vote their private conscience and are judged by the electorate on their public record; and freedom and law, whereby individual rights are enjoyed within the confines of the law and, when the law is applied, the State's monopoly on violence is exercised in deference to the freedom of others and the rights of the accused (Hampden-Turner 1981, pp. 200–203, Map 58/Level 9).

All this makes CT more difficult. It cannot be merely reactive or coercive. Otherwise it risks creating a bunker mentality, triggering resentment and backlash that facilitates terrorist recruitment, and missing the next new development. It must therefore be proactive, looking ahead and trying to out-think the terrorist. It must also be persuasive, convincing terrorists to abandon their destructive paths, and supporters and sympathizers to seek non-violent ways to achieve their goals. CT must think in the long term, even as it acts in the short term to respond to attacks and outwit terrorist planning, financing, and targeting. It must go beyond legal and military approaches to include political, social, cultural, and economic initiatives aimed at undermining the viral spread of radicalizing and violence-glorifying ideas that fuel the use of terrorism in social and political life.

A truly comprehensive approach that recognizes the complete range of options and understands when to use which, in what combination or order, and for how long, promises to be much more effective than a reductionist approach focusing exclusively on a few options, remaining blind to all others.

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TERRORIST DISENGAGEMENT AND DE-RADICALIZATION

Kurt Braddock

Abu Ibrahim, who had recently converted to Islam and joined the ranks of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), had second thoughts about his decision to join the group's fight. "Some of the policies, such as the beheadings of non-combatants … those things I didn't agree with." In an interview with CBS's Clarissa Ward (2015), Ibrahim explained how he initially sought out ISIS as an opportunity to live under strict Sharia law. As part of the group, he bore witness to many of the group's atrocities; he witnessed crucifixions, public stoning, and the other strict forms of Islamic law enforcement at the hands of the Hisbah, ISIS's religious police. Ibrahim conceded, "It's harsh, it's real, but it's the Sharia" (Tasch, 2015).

Despite his initial acceptance of the group's methods, Ibrahim grew dissatisfied. He began to question the group's policies, including the beheadings of Western journalists and other non-combatants. Describing them as "innocent," Ibrahim disagreed with the public executions. Moreover, Ibrahim grew disenchanted with the group and his role within it. He missed his family, he was bored, and he found his experiences with ISIS to be quite different than his expectations. Though Ibrahim had traveled to the Middle East to provide humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people, he claimed, "I wasn't doing what I had initially come for" (Ward, 2015). Despite incredible danger, Abu Ibrahim left ISIS. If his judgments are correct, he is not the first to do so, nor will he be the last. Ibrahim described some of his former comrades as disillusioned, even scared.

Stories like those of Abu Ibrahim went understudied within the terrorism literature for some time. In spite of a more recent focus on that which has become known as "de-radicalization" among many terrorism researchers (see later in this chapter and other chapters in this volume), there remain a wide range of issues that are misunderstood related to how individuals leave terrorism.

One of the key problems associated with the study of desistance from terrorism relates to our inability to understand and delineate the reasons how and why different individuals leave terrorism behind. Abu Ibrahim left ISIS due to his disillusionment with the group's practices and the draw of his past personal life; but there exist a variety of other personal, political, organizational, or social reasons why individuals abandon terrorism in different contexts. Further confusing the issue is the ongoing focus on de-radicalization initiatives and their evaluation (e.g., El-Said, 2015; Horgan and Braddock, 2010; Striegher, 2013). Though the study of these initiatives has been useful in illuminating how different countries treat terrorist offenders after they are caught

(and sometimes released), they have provided little insight into our understanding of how or why individuals initially desist from terrorism. Finally, and perhaps most problematically, some researchers and media personnel continue to use the terms "de-radicalization" and "disengagement" interchangeably to describe desistance from terrorism.

Of course, no single chapter can address every issue related to the study of de-radicalization and disengagement, so I will not attempt to do so here. Instead, with this chapter, I seek only to provide a synopsis of some of the most prominent topics related to these issues in two key ways. First, I will offer a definition for disengagement and offer some of the reasons that it occurs at the individual and organizational levels. Following this, I will define de-radicalization and discuss several of its drivers. Although the concepts of disengagement and de-radicalization are closely (and necessarily) associated, confusion about their meaning and the degree to which they are used interchangeably demands their conceptual distinction. So, I will provide a brief synopsis of how these two concepts differ and the implications of distinguishing them conceptually. Because other chapters in this volume address how practitioners have promoted disengagement and de-radicalization from terrorism in risk-reduction initiatives that exist in a number of countries (see Chapters 51 and 52 for example), I will not describe these initiatives here. However, to close the chapter, I will provide references to guide the motivated reader to readings that expand upon these initiatives and other issues concerning disengagement and de-radicalization.

As a first step, let us consider the concept of disengagement and some of its drivers.

Disengagement from terrorism

Disengagement is a process through which an individual who is involved with terrorism experiences a change in the role or function they serve whereby they participate in less violent activity (perhaps stopping altogether; Horgan, 2009a, p. 152). The most obvious form of disengagement from terrorist activity is an individual's decision to leave a terrorist organization and stop engaging in violent behavior on the organization's behalf. Although this form of disengagement does occur, it is important to note that disengagement does not necessarily require an individual's complete departure of the group of which he is a part. It is possible for an individual to disengage from terrorism while still supporting the terrorist group via other means.

Many evaluations of terrorist disengagement have focused on the end of violent activity at the individual level. However, there have been a number of instances in which an individual disengaged from terrorism not of his/her own volition, but because of changes that have occurred at the organizational level. In these cases, changes to the terrorist group's support, leadership, or strategic direction have forced individual terrorists to stop partaking in violent behavior.

Given the different precursors and outcomes respectively associated with disengagement at the individual and organizational levels, it is critical for any discussion of disengagement to address both types. The following section describes drivers of individual-level disengagement, and provides illustrative examples for each.

Individual-level drivers

Exhaustion

Engaging in terrorist activity is, by its very nature, a stressful endeavor. It requires its practitioners to largely abandon their former lives and dedicate their energy to not only carry out attacks, but also to avoid being captured. The constant pressure associated with engaging in terrorism can take a cumulative toll that can become so great as to motivate a terrorist to either abandon

violence as a practice (and perhaps move into a less stressful role with the organization), or leave the group entirely.

In an analysis of the factors promoting the disengagement of members of the Italian Red Brigades, Della Porta (2009) found fatigue and burn-out to be common themes in former members' life histories. Several former terrorists recounted the immense amount of time and energy they dedicated to the group's cause, and for some, the relief that came with their capture. One former member described a daily routine in which he/she would need to wake up at 5 a.m. to perform a reconnaissance mission, remain busy in other group activities throughout the day, and sleep again only around 1 a.m. the following morning. This individual admitted that upon his/her capture, one of his/her first thoughts was "thank goodness, more sleep" (Della Porta, 2009, p. 81).

This degree of exhaustion can weaken the resolve of even the most dedicated fighters, prompting them to put down their weapons for the sake of more peaceful activities. These individuals may not abandon their radical beliefs, but instead support their causes via means that do not require them to exert such physical and mental energy.

Changes in personal priorities and preferences

Most individuals who engage in terrorism have a personal life that extends beyond the boundaries of the groups of which they are a part. These individuals have friends, families, jobs, and other things that are personally important to them. Although terrorist organizations often attempt to isolate their members such that these personal interests do not impinge on the individual's capacity to function in support of the organizations, personal priorities can nonetheless loom large while an individual is engaged. Eventually, these other priorities can become sufficiently important that the terrorist decides to end his/her engagement in violent activity and spend more time tending to interests unrelated to the terrorist organization.

For example, in his analysis of disengagement processes among racist, neo-Nazi, or other right-wing violent extremists, Bjørgo (2009) found that many individuals decided to leave their groups upon reflecting on how violent behavior takes away from other personal prospects. He also found that many former militants felt they were getting too old to engage in violent behavior. As they aged, they no longer felt the need for excitement that violent activity gave them in their younger years. Extreme right-wingers were also cognizant of the fact that their engagement in violent activity would disqualify them from certain career prospects they wished to pursue.

Though age-based preference changes and diminished job prospects were key disengagement factors, Bjørgo (2009) argued that the establishment of a family is one of the strongest motivators for an individual to leave the terrorist groups of which they were a part. Getting a significant other or having children "involve[s] establishing new bonds of loyalty and setting different priorities" (p. 40). For groups in which complete loyalty and attention are required of the individual, this creates a conflict in which that individual must ultimately choose between the group and his/her new personal affiliations. This often leads the individual to disengage from terrorism to focus on other, more personally relevant matters.

Changing roles

Although active terrorists generate the most attention (both from academics and the popular press), the process by which an individual disengages from active terrorist activity highlights the importance of other roles within the group. Terrorist groups require personnel to undertake a variety of functions; recruitment, fundraising, and logistic support are three examples of non-violent jobs that members of a terrorist group may perform. Individuals often shift from violent to non-violent roles within terrorist organizations. Though the individual has not left the terrorist organization outright in these cases, he/she has disengaged from violent activity.

Interviews performed by Horgan (2009a, 2009b) have revealed that role changes within a terrorist organization can occur for a number of different reasons beyond the individual's control. For instance, organizational staff shortages in support roles or temporary ceasefires may force a terrorist organization's leadership to recall engaged fighters and assign them to non-violent roles within the group. Individuals may also be forced out of violent roles within a terrorist organization as a form of reprimand or as a means for the group's leadership to maintain surveillance on that individual. Horgan (2009a) cited an instance in which a former Provisional Irish Republican Army operations commander was removed from his post as punishment for sanctioning an operation that brought unwanted public pressure on the IRA.

Active terrorists can also voluntarily stop engaging in violence to move to a non-violent role within the organization. For example, in Horgan's (2009b) interview with "Alan," a former member of the Ulster Volunteer Force, the interviewee described how he became unconvinced that violence would achieve the group's goals. After being arrested and being exposed to other loyalists in prison, Alan came to run a community support group to assist former prisoners reintegrate into their communities. Alan disengaged from terrorism because of doubts associated with the efficacy of violence as a tactic, but he nonetheless seemed to maintain that his former use of that tactic was legitimate. This example illustrates how an individual can abandon violence of his/her own volition, but nonetheless remain adherent to the ideology that supports that violence.

Arrest/imprisonment

One obvious way in which an individual may be forced to stop engaging in terrorist behavior is through his/her removal from the battlefield at the hands of security forces. Terrorist activity is illegal by nature, and active terrorists run the constant risk of being apprehended, imprisoned, or killed by law enforcement personnel. When apprehended or imprisoned, the individual is (obviously) unable to engage in terrorist behavior. However, as with the other forms of disengagement outlined in this section, neither capture nor imprisonment (in and of themselves) are likely to dispossess an individual of the ideology that guided his/her former behavior.

Consider, for example, the scores of incarcerated white supremacists who maintain their beliefs through membership in ideologically based gangs in prison (e.g., Goldman, 2014). These individuals are effectively disengaged; they are unable to participate in violent extremist behavior due to their imprisonment. However, their incarceration does not temper their dedication to the white supremacist beliefs that advocate the behavior in which they engaged before they were jailed. Worse, imprisonment can exacerbate an individual's ideological extremism under certain conditions (Cilluffo, Cardash, and Whitehead, 2007; Goldman, 2014; Neumann, 2010). For example, individuals who are uncertain about their futures are likely to seek out cohesive groups in prison that provide them with a sense of structure (Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, and Moffitt, 2007) thus making them prime targets for continued radicalization by extremist groups. Although incarceration removes the threat for violence a terrorist poses, it may have no influence on their beliefs or attitudes in relation to the ideology that guided their behavior.

Organizational-level drivers

As evidenced by the number of examples cited in the previous section, there is a wealth of evidence to suggest that individuals stop engaging in terrorism a function of their own decision-making. However, it is often the case that an individual does not *choose* to stop engaging in terrorist activity, but is instead *forced* to stop engaging in terrorist activity as a result of changes to the organization of which he/she is a part or the environment in which the organization operates. This section will outline some of these organizational-level drivers of disengagement from terrorism.

Achievement of strategic objectives

Terrorist groups are motivated by some political, religious, or ideological goals. In the vast majority of cases, these goals go unfulfilled; terrorist groups tend to dissolve or be stamped out by security forces long before they achieve any large-scale strategic victory (Rapoport, 1992). However, there have been cases in which terrorist groups have achieved their strategic objectives, and as a result, end their violent campaigns.

One notable example of such a group was the African National Congress (ANC). Created in 1912 and ultimately led by Nelson Mandela, the ANC employed terrorism against the South African apartheid regime beginning in the 1960s. The ANC performed its final terrorist act in 1989 as apartheid ended in South Africa, the ANC transitioned into a legitimate political organization, and Mandela was elected the first post-apartheid president of South Africa. This type of transition was not uncommon. The South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO), which had performed a number of bombings in public locations, ultimately came to govern Namibia (p. 59; see also "Transition to legitimate government" below).

In some of the first research on the end of terrorist movements, Laqueur (1977) argued that terrorist organizations that achieve their strategic objectives are typically one of three types: groups with narrow, clearly defined goals; groups with powerful external protectors; and groups that challenged imperial powers with weakening influence. Regardless of the type of group of which an individual is a part, the achievement of strategic objectives by that group will leave that individual without an enemy to fight.

Arrest/killing of top leaders

The degree to which the decapitation of a terrorist organization's leadership influences the organization's subsequent activity is contingent on a large number of factors. Cronin (2009) argued that the efficacy of decapitation for stopping an organization's terrorist activity is a function of the group's structure, culture (i.e., whether it is built on a cult of personality), and the presence of a successor. Through an empirical analysis of dozens of decapitation incidents, Jordan (2009) found that groups that are larger, older, or are motivated by religion are likely to survive decapitation. Although the nature of some groups renders them more resilient to decapitation than others, there are cases in which the removal of a group's top leaders has caused the group to dissolve, leading its members to lay down their weapons.

For instance, the Shining Path was a Marxist movement that executed many peasant leaders in Peru in the 1980s and the 1990s. The group's leader, Manuel Ruben Abimael Guzman, recruited a number of followers and led them to a series of attacks. By removing or killing those that dissented against his policies and tactics, Guzman developed an obedient following of impressionable young fighters. Guzman's charismatic persona, coupled with his repression

of dissent within the Shining Path, made him a centrally powerful figure in the movement. In September of 1992, however, Guzman was captured and subsequently imprisoned. His capture decimated the Shining Path; the group's activity declined significantly throughout the 1990s, and the group was essentially destroyed in 1999 when Guzman's successor (Oscar Ramirez Duran) was also arrested.

In another example, Shoko Asahara founded Aum Shinrikyo in 1987. Drawing a collection of international followers, Asahara claimed that the world would be coming to an end as a result of an American attack against Japan. As the head of the apocalyptic cult, Asahara convinced his followers that they must undertake operations to prepare for the impending U.S. attack. In 1995, two months after Aum Shinrikyo released sarin in the Tokyo subway, killing 12 people, Asahara was arrested and sentenced to death. This led to a rapid decline in membership and support of Aum Shinrikyo. At the time of the subway attack, Aum Shinrikyo boasted 45,000 members in multiple countries. By the mid-2000s, the group's membership had fallen to less than 1,000.

As evidenced by these examples, the demise of some extremist groups can be traced to the removal of their leaders. When this happens to a group, the individuals that comprise its membership tend to stop fighting or move into other domains in which their skills can be put to use (e.g., organized crime). Regardless, when a group dissolves as a function of its decapitation, its fighters disengage from terrorism, as there is no terrorist action left to undertake.

Destruction of the group

In most cases, terrorist groups fail to achieve their strategic objectives. In an early analysis of terrorism's effectiveness, Rapoport (1992) found that 90% of terrorist groups fail to survive more than a year beyond their founding, and of those that do, more than half do not exist for more than a decade. These figures indicate that at least 19 of 20 terrorist groups fail to achieve their goals or sustain their activities geared toward doing so. Although Held (2008) claimed that terrorism may be slightly effective in some cases (for examples, see the sections entitled "Achievement of strategic objectives" and "Transition to legitimate government" in this chapter), the vast majority are destroyed by security forces or dissolve from within (Cronin, 2006).

Although some scholars have warned against the use of armed conflict as an exclusive means of combatting asymmetric violence like terrorism (e.g., Roberts, 2005), there are some cases in which intervention (for conflicts abroad) or repression (for domestic terrorists) has resulted in the destruction of the target terrorist group. For example, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) engaged in attacks against Sri Lankan government forces, performed suicide bombings against the Sri Lankan population, and killed members of the Tamil community that did not abide by their ideology (Devotta, 2016). Between 2006 and 2009, however, Sri Lankan security forces defeated the LTTE in a number of key places around the country. In May of 2009, the group's key leaders conceded defeat. Following the group's destruction, most of the group's membership (nearly 12,000 fighters) surrendered to the Sri Lankan military (Sriyananda, 2011). Still, some members continued to adhere to the LTTE's cause, attempting to revive the group among the Tamil diaspora scattered throughout the world (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2016).

As evidenced by the case of the LTTE and other groups (e.g., Shining Path, Narodnaya Volya), government and military force can promote terrorist disengagement through the destruction of the groups of which terrorists are a part. However, disengagement resulting from military intervention or repression does not necessarily promote the abandonment of a group's ideology on the part of the individual fighter. These individuals may stop fighting in the short term, only to attempt to re-engage at a later time or in another place (Kramer, 2005).

Transition to legitimate government

Although some terrorist groups' activities are motivated by religious (e.g., ISIS) or ideological (e.g., Army of God, Animal Liberation Front) goals that are largely unrelated to politics, terrorist organizations interested in altering political landscapes may be affected by their inclusion in a legitimate political process. Negotiations between the government and the terrorist organizations can serve to pacify the latter, convincing them that armed conflict is no longer needed, and a political solution to their grievances can be attained. In some cases, these negotiations have led to the terrorist organization's formal representation in the government.

The most widely known example of this process involved the negotiations between the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the British and Irish governments. These negotiations led to the signing of the Belfast Agreement by the IRA, effectively ending their decades-long war of attrition against British rule in Ireland. As a result of that agreement, the IRA decommissioned its weapons and committed to democratic means for resolving political disagreements with the United Kingdom. Ultimately, the political wing of the IRA, Sinn Féin, was integrated into both the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish Parliament. As of 2016, the IRA's transition to legitimate governance has been widely accepted.

Despite large-scale acceptance of the solution to the Troubles offered by the Belfast Agreement, there were many within the Irish republican movement that refused to accept the political "concessions" made by the PIRA. In the time since the signing of the Agreement, the group has split into multiple dissident groups that have continued their armed campaign within the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (see Morrison, 2015). In essence, members of the PIRA who were dissatisfied with their being forced to disengage from violent activity broke off from the group, forming their own violent groups (e.g., the Real Irish Republican Army, the Continuity IRA, Óglaigh na hÉireann), with which they re-engaged in violence. The example of the PIRA and its violent splinter groups demonstrates that organizational decisions that promote disengagement—even decisions that can be construed as strategic successes—may not uncouple fighters from the ideologies that drive their behavior.

Note that neither the individual- nor the organizational-level drivers for disengagement *affect* or are *affected by* a change in the terrorist's adherence to an ideology that advocates political violence. It is altogether possible for an individual to end their engagement in violent activity, but nonetheless maintain beliefs that advocate the use of violence for a political ideal. The abandonment of such a belief system represents a different process altogether—one often referred to as de-radicalization.

De-radicalization

Even more so than disengagement, the term "de-radicalization" has been the subject of heated debate among terrorism scholars. As a testament to the complex nature of de-radicalization, there exist a wide array of definitions for the term, each with its own emphasis. A review of all of these definitions and their implications is beyond the scope of this modest chapter, but in most cases, they refer to the weakening or loss of beliefs and attitudes that support the use of terrorism. For the purposes of this chapter, however, de-radicalization can be thought of as what Horgan (2014, p. 141) called "psychological disengagement." This refers to a process whereby an individual experiences a change in beliefs or attitudes about the significance of his/her continued involvement with a terrorist group or active engagement in terrorist activity. Whereas initial desistance from terrorist activity represents disengagement, de-radicalization is a form of secondary desistance—changes in personal identity that prompt a reconsideration and/or reori-

entation of beliefs, attitudes, and values that are necessary for participation in terrorist activity (see Gadd, 2003; LaFree and Miller, 2008; Maruna and Farrall, 2004).

Like disengagement from terrorism, there are multiple reasons why an individual may experience de-radicalization at any point in his/her involvement with a terrorist group. Although there has been a significant amount of work on the numerous initiatives geared toward promoting de-radicalization, research on the factors that actually promote de-radicalization are far less understood. I will not repeat analyses or evaluations of these de-radicalization initiatives in this chapter, given that other chapters in this volume accomplish this task quite well. Instead, I will outline some factors that may promote de-radicalization among violent extremists. The terrorism literature has identified an array of factors that promote de-radicalization, but here, I will discuss the three most prominent: disillusionment with the realities of involvement with a terrorist group; disagreement with other members over how the group carries out operations; and disagreements about strategy, policy, or ideology.

Disillusionment with the realities of involvement

Terrorist recruitment propaganda can be particularly adept at depicting involvement in terrorist activity as an exciting, romantic endeavor. ISIS is a useful example; the group's propaganda portrays Iraq and Syria as potential paradises to which foreign fighters can travel to engage in glorious combat. However, as the example presented at the outset of this chapter illustrates, the realities associated with involvement with a terrorist group often fall far short of the individual fighter's expectations. This can lead to immediate disappointment and disillusionment with the group, its members, and the cause that it claims to support.

Horgan (2009b) argued that the discrepancy between an individual's expectations about his/her involvement in terrorism and the realities of that involvement are a critical contributor to psychological disengagement. Interviews with and autobiographies of former members of terrorist groups (e.g., the Provisional IRA [Collins and McGovern, 1997], the Italian Red Brigades [Peci, 1983], and al-Qaeda [Nasiri, 2008]) are rife with accounts that illustrate how individuals become disillusioned with their terrorist activity upon witnessing the behavior of those they believed to be principled, noble fighters. In Patricio Peci's account of his first encounter with a leader in the Italian Red Brigades, he described how the commander picked at his toenails with a breadknife during dinner (Peci, 1983, p. 11). In his autobiography detailing his time with the Provisional IRA, Eamon Collins had a similar experience that had an impact on his "romantic image of the IRA soldier" (Collins and McGovern, 1997, p. 103). Collins reported how after a successful bombing, one of his comrades stole money from a hotel. He recalled feeling as though his fellow IRA's behavior "took the shine off the operation," reducing the IRA to common criminals rather than principled fighters for a free Ireland.

Although disillusionment and disappointment in multiple facets of involvement with a terrorist group is a common theme in terrorist accounts of leaving terrorism behind, the discrepancy between one's expectations and the reality of engagement is one of the more ubiquitous. It is a powerful disincentive to engage in terrorist activity when the image of glorious combat is shattered by the mundane (and sometimes offensive) nature of day-to-day activities.

Disagreement over tactics

According to nearly every definition, terrorism involves violent activity against civilian targets. It seems natural to assume that individuals would be mentally prepared to engage in these tactics

upon getting involved with a terrorist group. However, there is some evidence to suggest that terrorists may come to disagree with their groups' tactical decisions, thus prompting them to re-evaluate their dedication to the group and the ideology that guides its behavior.

One of the most prominent examples of this phenomenon relates to Mohammed Nasir bin Abbas. Bin Abbas left the Indonesian group Jemaah Islamiyah after the 2002 bombing of a Bali bar that killed over 200 people (Horgan, 2009b, p. 33). Another high-profile case was when Sheikh Salman Fahd al-Oudah (who had once been a strong supporter of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda) publicly renounced al-Qaeda and its tactics. Al-Oudah appeared on a Middle Eastern television station to publicly challenge bin Laden on the group's tactics and the number of people that have been killed for the group's ideology (Bergen and Cruickshank, 2008).

In another example, Horgan (2009b) interviewed a former member of the Provisional IRA who described his gradual movement away from the group. Although "Michael" had been experiencing doubts about his involvement with the IRA for some time, the murder of a pregnant policewoman served as the final catalyst to undo his commitment to the group. This event was particularly pronounced in Michael's mind as "a step too far" (p. 94) when one of his comrades joked that the IRA would get "two for the price of one." Although Michael had been able to abide violent tactics against the Royal Ulster Constabulary, this "step too far" proved devastating to him and his commitment to the IRA. He resigned from the group shortly thereafter and eventually become an informer against his former group.

Strategic, political, or ideological differences

Similar to differences associated with near-term tactical decisions, some terrorists have reported leaving their respective organizations because they disagreed (at least in part) with the organization's strategic direction or developed an aversion to the ideology to which they had originally been drawn. The causes of these differences are widely variable, and are not mutually exclusive from the disagreements over tactical decisions.

In another interview, Horgan (2009b) described a conversation with "Doug," who had spent a substantial amount of time in prison for a Loyalist group in Northern Ireland, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). By all accounts, Doug was a steadfast Loyalist in his time with the group. However, after a visit in prison from the Secretary of State in Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, Doug came to believe in the peace process put forth by the Good Friday Agreement. Doug angrily described how he had suffered for the Loyalist cause in the fight against the IRA, but wished his compatriots would "give peace a chance for God's sake" (p. 112). As a result of his sponsorship of the peace process, Doug came to believe that his former comrades in UDA leadership roles were jealous of his involvement and took steps to discredit him. In essence, Doug felt that his enthusiasm for a shift in organizational strategy led to his split from the UDA.

As "Doug's" case illustrates, shifts in beliefs about the direction of an individual's organization can occur suddenly and have a strong effect on that individual's position in the group. Although Doug believes his movement away from terrorism (and the other strategies employed by the UDA) were prompted by jealousy on the part of his former comrades, there are instances in which individuals come to question their group's ideology simply by being exposed to the behaviors that the ideology promotes. The case of Abu Ibrahim outlined in the introduction to this chapter, for example, describes a man who quickly became disillusioned with ISIS's strategies (Ward, 2015). Regardless of their respective impetuses, it is clear that misgivings about a group's strategic direction or ideology is a key driver of de-radicalization.

Disengagement and de-radicalization: comprehension through distinction

As evidenced by the citations referenced in the preceding sections, some of the clearest and most convincing research geared toward distinguishing disengagement from de-radicalization has been performed by Horgan and various colleagues (Bjørgo and Horgan, 2009; Horgan, 2005; Horgan, 2009a, Horgan, 2014; Horgan and Braddock, 2010). This work has revealed four key themes that help to differentiate disengagement and de-radicalization while illustrating how the two are intimately related.

Research on disengagement and de-radicalization has produced evidence to show individual trajectories out of terrorism are as varied as the pathways into it. Some individuals grow disillusioned with the ideology guiding their terrorist behavior, thereby prompting them to abandon violence as a tactic. Others are forcibly disengaged from terrorism (e.g., through capture or organizational change) and come to abandon the ideology to which they had clung. Stated plainly, *there is evidence of terrorists de-radicalizing before disengaging, as well as disengaging before de-radicalizing.*

Less obvious, but just as critical for understanding why terrorism ends, are cases in which disengagement and de-radicalization do not co-occur. It is possible for an individual to disengage from terrorism without de-radicalizing. Research on individual drivers of disengagement shows that terrorists often lay down their weapons for reasons entirely unrelated to their adherence to the ideology that guides their behavior. Interviews with former terrorists have revealed that changes in one's personal circumstances or preferences can prompt them to abandon political violence while maintaining beliefs and attitudes that promote it. Given this, it is important to recognize that *individual drivers of disengagement from terrorism do not necessarily induce changes in beliefs or attitudes that promote the use of terrorism.*

Empirical work on the end of terrorism at the organizational level has produced similar findings. When a terrorist organization collectively ends its engagement in terrorist activities (whether forcibly or voluntarily), there are rarely mechanisms in place to help individual terrorists abandon the beliefs and attitudes that drove their support for the organization. Although terrorist "de-radicalization programs" have become more common around the world (see Ashour, 2009; Bjørgo and Horgan, 2009; Horgan and Braddock, 2010), only a small proportion of those who engaged in violent activity go through these programs. Moreover, the efficacy of these programs remains in doubt; even those individuals that undergo what these programs often call "de-radicalization" may not abandon their ideology. Taken together, this means that many individuals who are forced to halt their terrorist activity due to changes in their organization's strategic direction or capacity to continue operations may not experience a change in beliefs or attitudes related to the use of violence. As a result, *organizational drivers of disengagement from terrorism do not necessarily induce changes in beliefs or attitudes that promote the use of terrorism.*

Just as it is possible for an individual to disengage from terrorism without de-radicalizing, it is possible for an individual to de-radicalize without disengaging from terrorism. Individual terrorists may become disillusioned with the ideology that originally guided their behavior for any number of reasons (see above), but may find themselves unable to leave their respective groups. For example, the use of child soldiers in terrorist organizations is well documented (e.g., Bloom, Horgan, and Winter, 2016; Capone, 2016; Joyce, Lynch, and Veale, 2015). These children are often exploited and indoctrinated with terrorist ideologies without the capacity to leave the group without outside assistance. Other (adult) terrorists may no longer believe in their group's purported cause(s) and wish to leave, but fail to do so out of fear of reprisal by the group. As these and other examples illustrate, *changes in an individual's beliefs and attitudes such*

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ETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN COUNTERTERRORISM

Lyndsey Harris and Rachel Monaghan

The detention of 'suspected' terrorists without trial and the use of drone strikes by nation states against citizens 'suspected' of engaging in terrorism abroad highlights the ongoing complexities of counterterrorism in terms of ethics and human rights. Paul Wilkinson argued that in a liberal state the criminal justice system is best placed both morally and logically to deal with terrorism. However, states have resorted to military means and emergency powers to counter the threat posed by terrorism. Focusing largely on the experiences of the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), this chapter examines a range of methods used by states to counter terrorism and subsequently considers the ethical and human rights dilemmas faced by those charged with countering terrorism. In doing so, the chapter considers our understanding of ethics, including a discussion of two categories of normative ethical theory: namely consequentialism and deontology. The chapter also provides a wider exploration of the concept of human rights before assessing some British and American counterterrorism efforts involving the use of force and the use of law through the lens of ethics and human rights.

Introduction

The release in 2015 of Shaker Aamer, the last British resident held at the US military prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, following 13 years of captivity for being a 'suspected' terrorist and the targeted assassination of two British members of the so-called Islamic State (Reyaad Khan and Ruhul Amin) in Raqqa, Syria by a Royal Air Force (RAF) drone strike serve to highlight the continued complexities of counterterrorism in terms of ethics and human rights. Aamer's detention along with an estimated 780 detainees without trial by the US government following the 9/11 al-Qaeda terror attacks on New York and Washington, and their subsequent treatment therein (e.g. initial denial of protections afforded by the Geneva Conventions and allegations of torture and mistreatment) coupled with the emergence of extra-judicial killings of citizens 'suspected' of being terrorists abroad by guided missiles, demonstrates the "acute moral risks associated with counterterrorism" (Sorrell, 2011: 2).

According to Wilkinson (2008: 85), "the criminal justice system is morally and logically the correct institution in a liberal state to take prime responsibility for dealing with terrorism." Yet, we have witnessed military means and emergency powers being justified by states as legitimate tools to counter the threat of and acts of terror. Counterterrorism operations and policies

have been constructed on the understanding that the act of terrorism is a more serious type of crime. Primarily focusing on the experiences of the UK and the US, this chapter aims to examine some of the methods chosen by states to counter terrorism and considers the ethical and human rights dilemmas facing those responsible for countering terrorism. The chapter first considers what we understand by ethics and human rights and will examine two categories of normative ethical theory, namely consequentialism and deontology. It will also explore the concept of human rights before looking at a number of examples of British and American counterterrorism efforts involving the use of force and the use of law through the lens of ethics and human rights.

Understanding ethics

Ethics, or moral philosophy as it is alternatively known, involves the systematising, defending, and recommending of concepts of right and wrong behaviour. Reding *et al.* (2014: 5) define the field of ethics "as the systematic reflection of existential questions relating to the 'good life', moral obligations and 'just' society". Within the field, philosophers typically divide ethical theories into three main strands, namely metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. Within the first strand, metaethics explores the source of our ethical principles and their meaning. The second strand, normative ethics, is concerned with the content of moral judgements and seeks to arrive at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. The third strand, applied ethics, as Kagan (1998: 3) explains, "attempts to apply the general principles of normative ethics to particular difficult or complex cases." Such cases include war, animal rights and capital punishment to name but three. While much has been written with respect to ethical theory, for the purposes of this chapter only normative ethics will be discussed and in particular the theories of consequentialism and deontology as these "two broad classes of ethical theory … have shaped most people's understanding of ethics" (LaFollette, 2007: 8).

Consequentialism represents a family of theories, which are bound by a central idea "that the moral assessment of actions, motives, or rules is, at bottom, a matter of how much good such things produce, or how much bad they allow us to avoid" (Shafer-Landau, 2013: 413). Accordingly consequentialists contend that we are morally obliged to behave in ways that produce the best consequences. Thus, an act is morally right if the outcome or consequences of that act are more favourable than unfavourable (Carlson, 1995; Vallentyne, 2007). Within act consequentialism, utilitarianism is probably the best-known theory. For advocates such as Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) an act is morally right if the consequences of the act are more favourable (in terms of pleasure and/or happiness) than unfavourable (understood as pain and/or suffering) to the greatest number of people. According to act utilitarianism, specific acts such as torture and killing would be morally permissible if the acts' consequences were more beneficial than detrimental to the majority; this will be discussed on more detail later in the chapter (Burnor and Raley, 2011; Stewart, 2009). To counter this moral difficulty, other consequentialist theorists such as John Stuart Mill (1806–73) proposed a revised version of utilitarianism, namely rule utilitarianism, in which an act is morally right if it conforms to a behavioural code or rule and the consequences of adopting that rule are more favourable than unfavourable to everyone (Stewart, 2009; Vallentyne, 2007). The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016) aptly summarises the distinction between the two approaches:

> The key difference between act and rule utilitarianism is that act utilitarians apply the utilitarian principle directly to the evaluation of individual actions while rule utilitarians apply the utilitarian principle directly to the evaluation of rules and then evaluate

individual actions by seeing if they obey or disobey those rules whose acceptance will produce the most utility.

In contrast to consequentialism which we have seen concerns itself with the outcome or the consequences of moral behaviour, deontological theories concern themselves with the action and motive regardless of the consequences and thus are often described as duty theories (LaFollette, 2007; Stewart, 2009). Like consequentialism, deontology represents a family of theories. Probably the most influential theorist is Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). For Kant, the overarching principle of all morality is the categorical imperative. This imperative involves two formulations, the formula of universal law and the formula of ends. The first formula acts as the benchmark or standard for adjudging, which acts are right and which are wrong: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (Kant, cited in McNaughton and Rawling, 2007: 35). Subsequently, the categorical imperative can be viewed as a universalisability test, in that acts that pass become moral laws and those that fail are considered morally wrong and taboo (Stewart, 2009). The second formula according to Kant holds that we should "act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means" (Kant, cited in McNaughton and Rawling, 2007: 35). Thus, certain acts such as lying and cheating are always wrong; again, we will return to this idea later.

As with most theories, problems can be identified with respect to both consequentialism and deontology. Of particular interest is the already noted objection to act utilitarianism on the basis of moral permissiveness. Additionally, it can result in the violation of a person's rights or the commission of serious injustices if the majority benefits (for a more detailed discussion see Burnor and Raley, 2011). Rule utilitarianism also has its share of criticisms, again of interest to us are those surrounding the problem of relativism with respect to the existence of different behavioural codes or rules in different countries and the permitting of injustice (for a more detailed discussion see Stewart, 2009).

With an understanding of ethics considered albeit briefly and the two main categories of normative ethical theory explored, the discussion now turns to human rights.

Understanding human rights

Whilst human rights have evolved into a complex and broadly defined concept, for the purposes of this chapter it is sufficient to know that human rights are rights inherent to all people regardless of their nationality, sex, national or ethnic origin, race, religion, language, or other status (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2016). As Halstead (2014: 2) notes, "Western ideas of human rights are overwhelmingly based on the idea of universalism." Thus they are available everywhere; they are inalienable and cannot be taken away (except in specific situations – this will be discussed later); they are interdependent and indivisible, meaning states cannot select which rights to honour and not honour; and they are equal and non-discriminatory (OHCHR, 2016a).

Human rights include citizenship rights – these are concerned with basic constitutional issues and are frequently categorised into legal, civil and political rights (Open University, 2016). Examples of legal rights would include the right to a fair trial, equal treatment under the law and due process. Civil rights would incorporate the right to freedom of expression, free association and free movement, whereas political rights involve the right to vote, a secret ballot and free elections. Additionally, we can speak of social, cultural and economic rights, including the right to participate in culture, the right to food, and the right to work and receive an education.

Human rights are protected and upheld by international and national laws and treaties (often referred to as international human rights law), the most notable of which is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The UDHR was adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1948 and constitutes the foundation of the current international system of protection for human rights. The UDHR contains 30 articles that establish the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights of all people. It commits governments to uphold the fundamental rights of each person and provides a vision for human dignity that transcends political boundaries and authority (Amnesty International, 2016). Accordingly, all states have ratified at least one of the 10 core human rights instruments (nine treaties and the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) identified by the UN, and 80% of states have ratified four or more (OHCHR, 2016a).

Other international human rights laws relevant to this chapter would include the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the Geneva Conventions, and the European Convention on Human Rights. The CAT requires states to take effective measures to prevent torture in any territory under their jurisdiction, and prohibits them from transporting people to any country where there is reason to believe they will be tortured. Torture is defined in the Convention (Article 1) as:

> any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.
>
> *(OHCHR, 2016b)*

Additionally, Article 2 clearly prohibits the justification of torture on the groups of "exceptional circumstances" such as war, the threat of war, domestic political instability or any other public emergency.

The Geneva Conventions comprise a series of treaties that outline what is and what is not legal in terms of civilians and combatants in wartime. It involves four Geneva Conventions (last revised in 1949), which are complimented by three further Protocols (two from 1977 and one from 2005). The Conventions cover the protections afforded to sick and wounded military personnel on land and at sea, the treatment of prisoners of war and the protections afforded to civilians, including those in occupied territory (Internal Committee of the Red Cross, 2016).

Found in all four Conventions is Common Article 3. This article establishes fundamental rules covering non-international armed conflicts under which no derogation, that is to say a relaxation or exemption from the rule, is permitted. It includes, for example, the human treatment of all persons in enemy hands and specifically prohibits torture and cruel, humiliating and degrading treatment (Internal Committee of the Red Cross, 2016).

The European Convention on Human Rights is an international treaty to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in Europe. It was drafted in 1950 by the then newly formed Council of Europe and was adopted in 1953. It contains 16 rights which mirror many of those contained in the UNDHR, such as the right to life, freedom of expression, the prohibition of torture and no punishment without law. The Convention also permits signatory states to derogate from certain rights in time of "war or other public emergency threatening the life

of the nation". The European Court of Human Rights was established in 1959 to implement the Convention, meaning any person who feels that their rights have been violated by the state can take a case to the Court. Judgments that find violations are binding on the states concerned (Gani, 2014). Moreover, the UK government has incorporated the ECHR into the Human Rights Act 1998. As previously noted, while human rights are inalienable and some are considered absolute rights, such as the right to protection from torture, others are considered limited and qualified. For example, we have the right to liberty, but this may be limited under specific circumstances such as lawful arrest or detention. Likewise, our right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion may be qualified, meaning that a balance between the individual's rights and those of the state or community will be sought (Ministry of Justice, 2006).

With an understanding of both ethics and human rights considered, the discussion now examines some of the counterterrorism methods adopted by the UK and US with respect to the ethical and human rights dilemmas they pose.

Counterterrorism involving the use of force

A state has a number of options it can employ to counter the threat of terrorism. One of these options is the use of force. The justification for the use of force by states is often considered in light of the just war tradition: *jus ad bellum* (just cause to engage in war) and *jus in bellum* (just in war). Although Clark (1988: 31) contends that it is not possible to speak of a single doctrine of just war, it is he believes possible to view the just war tradition as "a set of recurrent issues and themes in the discussion of warfare and [it] reflects a general philosophical orientation towards the subject". Moreover, Bellamy (2008) argues that the just war tradition is deeply embedded in the way Westerners think about the legitimacy of going to war; he argues that it provides a common language to evaluate competing moral claims of war and that the just war tradition comes close to agreed international standards of behaviour. Thus, a number of conditions need to be met for waging war. War should only be resorted to for a just cause or intention (e.g. in self-defence, for restitution or retribution), its declaration must be made by a proper authority (e.g. legitimate authority), it must be a measure of last resort and there should be a reasonable hope of success (Algar-Faria, 2015; Clark, 1988; Walzer, 1977; and Westhusing, 2003).

The second element of the just war tradition (*jus in bello*) is concerned with the conduct of war once it has been embarked upon and centres on the ideas of proportionality and discrimination. Thus, it aims to limit the effects of armed conflict by protecting persons who are not participating in hostilities (discrimination), and by restricting and regulating the means and methods of warfare available to combatants (proportionality). This element is often referred to as international humanitarian law.

In light of the conditions required for a just war to be undertaken, Boyle (2007) considers whether they can be applied to a state's military response to terrorism. In terms of proper authority, he argues that "those responsible for the welfare of the community are duty-bound to respond" (Boyle, 2007: 711); however, this legitimacy has limitations in that states are expected to respect treaties and international law and seek appropriate international approval for unilateral actions. Thus, the US and its allies' response to 9/11 in the invasion of Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom), while not mandated by the UN, was widely regarded to be a legitimate form of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter in that the Taliban government was considered an accomplice to the events of 9/11 and, hence, a justifiable target for action (for more on the legal basis for the invasion of Afghanistan see Smith and Thorp, 2010). In contrast, the invasion and occupation of Iraq (commonly referred to as the Iraq War) in 2003 by the US and its allies including the UK is still contested in terms of its legitimacy (Bowcott, 2004).

Indeed, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, when asked if the invasion was illegal, responded by saying "Yes, if you wish. I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN charter from our point of view, from the charter point of view, it was illegal" (BBC, 2004).

With respect to the condition of a just cause, Boyle (2007: 711) suggests that "the justice of military defence against terrorism arises from the wrongfulness of the terrorist actions". Additionally, military measures taken to punish terrorists for their attacks or aimed at preventing terrorism in the sense of pre-emptive strikes do not constitute a just cause. However, Walzer (1977) argues that preventative strikes are justifiable if three conditions exist, namely an obvious intent to injure, a degree of active preparation and a risk to a state's territorial integrity or political independence if no action was taken.

The issue of pre-emptive strikes as a counterterrorism measure also raises ethical and human rights questions in relation to *jus in bello*, in that specific individuals identified as terrorists are targeted and killed, often through the use of drones. The use of drones can be viewed as a prime example of the consequentialist, namely act utilitarian ethical framework guiding UK and US military counterterrorism operations in that their use, it is argued, causes fewer civilian casualties and less destruction than say air strikes or carpet bombing (Ahmad, 2014). It is also argued that their use minimises the risk to soldiers; however, as Crawford (2015: 40) points out, "if they reduce risk to combatants but hurt civilians directly, or indirectly as a consequence of increased militancy in reaction to drone strikes, then the utilitarian case for drone strikes is weakened." Some drone strikes do result in civilian deaths; for example, the human rights group Reprieve's data suggests that as a result of 47 men being targeted by US drone strikes, 1,147 people were killed (Ackerman, 2014).

The UK's use of drones in the targeted killing of so-called Islamic State members Reyaad Khan and Ruhul Amin and a similar US drone strike which targeted Mohamed Amwasi (Jihadi John) in Syria raise dilemmas with respect to citizens' human rights. All three were British citizens yet were assassinated rather than arrested and tried for terrorist activity. The British government in justifying its drone strike said it had acted in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, in that it had "clear evidence" that terrorist attacks were being planned on the UK (BBC, 2015).

An obvious critique of the application of the just war tradition to the problem of terrorism and states' subsequent counterterrorism efforts is that it was originally developed with wars and the threat of wars between sovereign nations in mind. Additionally, Forst (2009) identifies another problem with respect to the principles of discrimination and proportionality in that the tradition does not fully distinguish between strategic and tactical aspects of conflicts. He notes: "we have yet to establish how external powers can adapt just war principles to deal with such problems. The just response to terrorism is not always effective in achieving peace and order, and the effective response is often unjust" (Forst, 2009: 267).

Duffy (2005: 333) contends that the arrest and incarceration of 'suspected' terrorists since 9/11 has led to "widespread allegations – and considerable evidence – of torture and other mistreatment". Under the Third Geneva Convention, the coercive interrogation of prisoners of war is strictly prohibited; as a way to avoid this, the US under President Bush reclassified such detainees as unlawful 'enemy combatants'. In doing so the detainees were not afforded any of the protections enjoyed by soldiers and civilians captured in war (Algar-Faria, 2015). Whilst the use of torture is explicitly prohibited in all human rights instruments, in terms of ethics the debate in often framed within the context of the ticking time bomb scenario. Such a scenario envisages a situation in which a terrorist with knowledge of an impending terrorist attack is apprehended; the question is how far the authorities should go in order to extract that information (for a more detailed consideration of this scenario see Wisnewski and Emerick, 2009).

For utilitarians, the consequences of an action are the most important consideration, so if the cost of torturing one terrorist is outweighed by the benefits accrued to a greater population, then torture would be ethically permissible. But as Ignatieff (2004) points out, once torture is accepted as legitimate in certain hypothetical contexts it soon provides the basis for routinely torturing people. In contrast, deontologists "would walk away from the situation without hesitation owing to the categorical imperative of never treating a rational being as a means to an end" (Algar-Faria, 2015: 24).

Counterterrorism involving the use of law

Another option that states can employ to counter the threat of terrorism involves the use of law, namely the creation of anti-terrorist legislation and/or derogation from existing legal commitments. The creation of anti-terrorist legislation frequently follows specific terrorist attacks and they are often argued for on the grounds of necessity. As de Londras (2011: 8) notes:

> domestic law-making processes tend not to cope particularly well in times of crisis. Panic, fear and populist impulses can conspire to create an atmosphere where the imperative turns towards combating a risk, and where the risk is presented and/or conceived as being particularly grave or dangerous.

In the UK, for example, prior to the Terrorism Act 2000, anti-terrorist legislation had existed albeit on regularly renewed temporary provisions. The first Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provision) Act 1974 was passed by Parliament just eight days after the Birmingham pub bombings by the Provisional IRA, which saw 21 people killed and 184 injured. In introducing the bill, the then Home Secretary Roy Jenkins warned the House of Commons that "the powers ... are Draconian. In combination they are unprecedented in peacetime. I believe these are fully justified to meet the clear and present danger" (cited in Walker, 1992: 31). The Act gave the police and the security services wide-ranging powers of arrest and detention to counter terrorism extending from Northern Ireland, including the detention of persons suspected of terrorism for up to seven days. Additionally, the Act included exclusion orders designed to prevent people under suspicion of terrorist activity from entering Great Britain (England, Scotland and Wales) from either Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland. However, the legislation did not apply to UK citizens who had been living for the last 20 years or born and ordinarily resident in Great Britain. As Doody (2012: 80) explains, a total of 448 people received exclusion orders and "the fact that the majority of these people were Irish ensured the creation of fear amongst the Irish community that it could be applied to anyone at any time". The Act also, it is argued, created a suspect community whereby Irish people living in England, Scotland and Wales or travelling between Ireland and Great Britain were deemed 'suspect'. Hillyard (1993: 258) argued that "this community is treated in law and in police practices very differently from the rest of the population".

Following 9/11, the US introduced the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, more commonly known as the PATRIOT Act. This act was designed to deter and punish terrorist acts in the US and around the world and to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools. Moreover, it gave far-reaching surveillance powers to national security agencies to intercept electronic communications and to request without court approval that telecommunication companies hand over information. The Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution protects the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures" (cited in Fabbrini, 2015: 90) and thus criticism of the PATRIOT Act has primarily been around the right to privacy and the extent of the federal government's surveillance powers. Data available from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) with respect to the administrative subpoenas (national security letters) issued by FBI agents to gather information such as phone, bank, computer and credit history records for national security purposes record that nearly 193,000 were issued between 2003 and 2006. This led to one terror-related conviction; a conviction they argue would have been secured without the use of the PATRIOT Act (ACLU, 2015).

Examples of derogation would include the detention without trial of individuals suspected of engagement in terrorist-related activities. In Northern Ireland between 1971 and 1975 nearly 2,000 people, the majority of whom were Catholic, were held without trial; this policy was more commonly known as internment. The British government had informed the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of its derogation from the ECHR, namely with respect to the right to liberty and security (McCleery, 2015). In the aftermath of 9/11, the UK passed the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which contained measures to permit the indefinite detention of foreign nationals suspected of being international terrorists (McGoldrick, 2008). A derogation was made with respect to the provisions of the UK's Human Rights Act, which encompasses the ECHR. However, a case was brought to the House of Lords (prior to 2009, it was the highest Court of Appeal in the UK) on behalf of a number of foreign national detainees in Belmarsh prison. The Lords ruled that the detention of foreign nationals was incompatible with Article 14, namely the prohibition of discrimination. The Belmarsh detainees were being discriminated against on the basis of their nationality and no such detention without trial provisions applied to British nationals suspected of being terrorists.

Conclusion

As has been shown in this chapter the methods adopted by states in their efforts to counter terrorism are fraught with ethical and human rights dilemmas. Much of the UK's and US's counterterrorism responses abroad post 9/11 have involved the use of force and as such appear to be justified by utilitarian ethics. Pre-emptive strikes involving the use of drones against members of the so-called Islamic State are argued to be 'just' and undertaken in self-defence to prevent terrorist atrocities at home, yet they violate a number of human rights, including the right to life, a fair trial and due process. The treatment of captured 'suspected' terrorists, their detention without trial and their experiences of enhanced interrogation techniques and torture again justified by utilitarian ethics contravene the right to due process and freedom from torture. As Ignatieff (2004: viii) points out, "when democracies fight terrorism, they are defending the proposition that their political life should be free of violence. But defeating terror requires violence. It may also require coercion, deception, secrecy, and violation of rights." Thus, it is no surprise to find human rights dilemmas arising out of the measures taken at home by states through both the introduction of anti-terrorism legislation and derogation from existing human rights commitments. The right to liberty, privacy and non-discrimination have all been discussed with respect to British and American counterterrorism laws. States have a duty to protect their citizens as they go about their daily business, but in doing so they need to consider the ethical and human rights consequences associated with their operations and policies: "the counter-terrorist must be sure today's solution is not the seed of tomorrow's insoluble problem" (Irwin, 2004: 100).